Women have been at the forefront of the popular uprisings that have swept the Arab world over the past year and a half. Their role in the collective struggle for freedom, dignity and justice is indisputable. Yet despite their pivotal contribution to the success of the revolutions that have led to the downfall of four dictators so far, women activists continue to feel let down.

The initial euphoria is giving way to a disquieting sense of frustration and disappointment. An increasing number of activists are linking the Arab transition to democracy with a regression in women’s rights. This concern will be the focus of my remarks today. I will first address its causes. Then, I will try to explain why I believe it may not be fully justified. Finally, I will offer some insight on the challenges ahead.

I. Causes for concern: the half Empty glass
Concern regarding women’s rights in transitioning countries is the result of four intersecting factors: heightened expectations, the marginalization of women in some transitional political arrangements, the rise of political Islam, and threats to backtrack on past pro-women achievements.
• Heightened expectations. As experiences from other countries have shown, democratic transitions offer tremendous opportunities for change, and therefore bring with them a sense of immense optimism and a greater feeling of empowerment. But they also give the false impression that long-standing economic and societal problems, including women’s issues, can be resolved as soon as the despot boards the plane. As this rarely happens, disappointment sets in. This disappointment is even greater for women as they see that many of the issues they care about are accorded a low priority by the new political elite. In the immediate aftermath of Arab revolutions, emergent political parties are more concerned with consolidating their foothold in the political arena, and more focused on shaping the transition at the national level. Issues regarding gender equality and the advancement of women seem to have been relegated to the back-burner for many of the Governments and parliaments of the region.
• Marginalization of women in some transitional political arrangements. In Egypt and Libya, the post-revolution governing bodies included very few women. In Egypt, not one woman was included in the committee set up by the Higher Military Council to amend the constitution and the number of women in the Advisory Council fluctuated between none and a maximum of five, due to the continual resignation and appointments of new members. In Libya, women were almost completely absent from the top ranks of the National Transitional Council (just one woman was appointed to the council but not to a ministerial position). This was enough to trigger fears that women are once again being looked upon as unequal partners.
• The rise of political Islam. There are fears that with the rise of socially conservative political groups, particularly Islamist parties in countries in transition, a general decline in social freedom and liberties will ensue. Islamist parties won a plurality in the Tunisian and Moroccan Parliaments and an outright majority in the Egyptian elections. This led some to believe that women’s rights in particular will suffer, and that former gains will be sacrificed.
• Threats to backtrack on certain pro-women legislation. Despotic regimes used and abused the issue of women’s empowerment. They used it to brandish their credentials as modernizers and reformers. By focusing on the empowerment of women, Arab regimes succeeded in weathering the storm stirred by their Western partners. As opposed to real political reform, this was the only non-zero-sum game available to them. They could grant rights to some, without weakening their monopoly over power. By granting women more rights, they were redistributing power among their subjects rather than sharing power with their citizens.
Despotic regimes also abused the issue by making women’s empowerment the “pet project” of their first ladies, who tended to control women’s machineries and influence gender-based legislation. In the prevailing popular discourse, these machineries became tainted by association and reforms were presented as a Western intrusion into local traditions and cultures.
Today, there is legitimate concern that populist politicians may use these perceptions to reverse some of the gains achieved on women’s rights so as to gain political favour. Some of the remarks made by leading figures in Al Nour party in Egypt, on the possible cancellation of the current divorce law “khula’” and decreasing the marriage age for women, have consolidated these fears. In Libya, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, the chairman of the Libyan National Transitional Council, made women more wary of the intentions of the new political elite when he declared (on 23 October, 2011) in his speech celebrating the “liberation of Libya" that polygamy would now be allowed.
Collectively, these factors have fostered a pessimistic and somewhat defeatist atmosphere. For women, the immense hopes of the first days of the uprisings have already started to fade away.

II. Causes for optimism: the half full glass.
Today, I would like to challenge this pessimistic hypothesis. While acknowledging short-term difficulties, I have no doubt that the Arab uprising will not leave women behind, and that the rights of citizenship currently being forged in transitioning countries will ultimately empower all citizens including women.
I will outline three reasons for that.
First, the experience so far does not indicate a general reversal in women’s gains. On the contrary, 2011 saw new breakthroughs for women. In a pioneering step, Tunisia and Morocco decided to lift all reservations on CEDAW, making them the first Arab countries to do so. In Tunisia, the electoral law was a first worldwide as it established parity between men and women when it required alternation between male and female candidates on all lists for election of the constituent assembly.
Women’s political participation did not shrink. Recent parliamentary elections in Tunisia and Morocco are a case in point. In Morocco, women captured 17 per cent of parliamentary seats in an increase of over 6 per cent from the previous election. In Tunisia, the percentage of women in the new parliament (27.1 per cent) is almost unchanged from the 27.6 per cent prior to the uprising.
Egypt is often “pulled out” as Exhibit One for opponents of this view. They point with apprehension to the significant drop in the percentage of women in parliament to a worrisome 1.8 per cent. But this reduction cannot be attributed to post uprising political structures. It is more the result of a flawed electoral law decreed by an unelected military council. The law abolished quotas for women, and although it required each political party to include one woman on its list of candidates, it did not require a woman to be placed in a so called “winnable” slot. Accordingly, only eleven women reached the parliament (nine through running for elections and two directly appointed), four of whom are affiliated with the Islamist Freedom and Justice Party.
Second, the rise of political Islam may be a challenge, but it does not justify a doomsday scenario. Actually, in the two countries where they have managed to form Governments (Tunisia and Morocco), Islamist parties were true to their promise of protecting previous gains in women’s rights. In their electoral campaign, both had committed not to curtail social freedoms like banning alcohol or imposing a dress code on women. Such commitments were met with skepticism. Yet, neither one reneged on these promises after elections. An-Nahda went even further in protecting the secular nature of the state when it announced last week that the country’s new constitution would not make Islamic law a source of legislation. The decision reflects that Islamist parties will be more affected by the national consensus than by the more conservative elements in their ranks, as they move forward with the transition to democracy.
Islamist parties now know the power of mass movements, and they don’t want to be on the wrong side of people. They also know that not all elected them for their social agenda. Many voted for them because of their image as neither corrupt nor corruptible, because of their perceived independence from foreign interests, and because of their historic record in supporting just causes. They will have to live up to people’s expectations to get reelected. A conservative social agenda and a regression in the rights of women, who today are more empowered, more vocal and more connected across the world may weaken their position as leaders in the transitions. The fear from Islamist parties may be exaggerated as it fails to see how such parties are developing in response to challenges
The third reason relates to dramatic transformation in the attitudes of women and women’s movements. Women have grown more assertive and are mastering the courage to challenge unjust authority, be it social or political. Some refer to the virginity tests carried out in Egypt on women detained in the uprising, as a stark example of the deterioration in women’s rights. But those tests are not new. They had been invented by the genius of the former regime to intimidate women and deter them from actively opposing the regime’s corrupt and unfair practices. What is new, however, is how women, in the aftermath of the uprisings, reacted to such abuse. They decided to go public with it, despite the stigma that in the past would have silenced them. Samira Ibrahim did not become an outcast when she went to court to challenge the practice. She became an icon for a new generation of women who will not shy away from fighting fiercely for their rights even if it means taking on the mighty military.
The uprisings have also created a heightened awareness of women’s issues in the public sphere. This has injected vitality and life into the public debate on women’s issues, both as women and as citizens.
Finally, a new model for the empowerment of women is emerging. This new concept focuses on real political and economic empowerment as opposed to the disingenuous focus on numbers adopted by former regimes. The issue is no longer about adding one or two women to cabinets and declaring “mission accomplished”. Leading women in political life under former regimes were not actually empowered. They were as dis-empowered as men. In contrast, women’s political participation in the aftermath of the Arab revolutions is conscious, driven and obvious in all walks of life. Arab women are creating new and different role models that empower other women and have a positive impact on social attitudes towards their cause.

III Real challenges remain
Despite these encouraging new dynamics, some historic challenges continue to face women in the region.
• These challenges include legal discrimination and social patterns that shape the position of women in Arab societies. Though discrimination in economic and social laws has been curtailed in recent decades, social patterns will prove to be slower to change. Such patterns are shaped by certain religious interpretations, and customs and traditions, and are consolidated through socialization, curricula, the media and other forms of cultural production. These have created acceptance or at the very least encouraged turning a blind eye to the abuse of women’s rights. Violence against women, such as honor crimes, wife battering and early marriage persist because legislation does not criminalize them and because certain segments of society tend not to oppose them. Though legislation can easily be changed, altering social attitudes will take much longer and will require a concerted effort by rights groups to deal with their root causes.
• Women under occupation and in conflict settings: The region still suffers from the only remaining occupation of the 21st century. The daily plight of Palestinian women under Israeli occupation is immeasurable. They are denied their basic human rights, security, freedom of expression and movement, a safe healthy environment, and basic education. They live in uncertainty fearing the demolition of their homes, and the imprisonment of their children, husbands and fathers. Women under occupation still see little gain from the Arab uprisings, as they face an Israeli regime of oppression and discrimination much more entrenched than those of the Arab despots.
• Women in post-conflict countries also continue to suffer. In Iraq, essential services have collapsed, families have been torn apart and women have fallen victim to the scourges of war. There are violent groups that deliberately target women and girls. Moreover, many have been driven into debilitating poverty since 2003, especially since a large number of women have been left without an income because their husbands or sons – the family breadwinners – were killed or have disappeared. It is estimated that there are now some 740,000 widows in Iraq. Consequently, this social outcome coupled with the security situation has significantly affected overall access to education. For example, the female tertiary enrolment ratio declined from 104 per cent in 1990 to just 59 per cent in 2005, and the trend seems set to continue.

IV Conclusion
Women still suffer from unequal treatment in law and practice. But there is hope that this will change as countries transition to democracy. The new social contracts that are currently being forged in transitioning countries focus on empowering all citizens. Gains in the rights of citizenship will invariably include women.

But the road to democracy is going to be bumpy. Short term reversals are not inconceivable. Counter revolutionary forces and conservative social groups will continue to fight against progress and more rights for women. In the long run these forces cannot prevail; but in the short run, they can do much damage.
It is in the interest of women to prevent such forces from foiling the transitions to democracy which present the golden opportunity for re-establishing societal relationships on the basis of universal rights and freedoms including justice and gender equality. Women should join forces with other progressive political groups to forge a new social contract based on citizenship rights. This is the only way for them to address the multiple challenges they face as women and as citizens.
This will require them to establish working channels with all active forces including Islamist parties. It will necessitate forming broad coalitions with civil society organizations to defend fundamental rights and prevent a relapse. Women will also need to work with the media to promote awareness of gender concerns and facilitate public discussions on the impact of prejudices on women and on society as a whole. And it requires most of all not to be discouraged or become complacent. It also means staying vigilant, and keeping our fears in check and our eyes on the ultimate goal: the prevalence of democratic values and justice for all citizens.