Distinguished delegates,
Ladies and gentlemen,

As you would expect, my comments on governance today are shaped by the breathtaking uprisings rocking Arab States since December 17, 2010.
On that day, Mohammad Bouazizi, a 24 year old Tunisian street vendor, from the little known town of Sidi Buzeid, set himself on fire. Bouazizi did not hate life. He just could no longer live with the fear, abuse and humiliation inflicted upon him and the majority of Tunisians by one of the worst despotic regimes in the region. His self-sacrifice, tragic as it may be, ushered in the most powerful wave of protests in contemporary Arab history. Two regimes, in Tunisia and Egypt have since fallen. Some, like in Libya, have responded violently. While others, like Morocco, have embarked on reforms that promise to bring a better life and a brighter future for their citizens.
Until that December 17, our region was the prime model of bad governance at both the national and global levels.
Arabs enjoyed little freedoms, and their universally enshrined human rights were trampled upon with impunity. Presidents ruled for life, supported by unrestrained security apparatuses that nourished corruption and fed on it. Elections were mere rituals that reproduced the same ruling elites; and citizens never made it beyond the status of subjects that can have no influence over their destinies.
Whereas such regimes represented the failure of governance at the national level, the continued Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories is a glaring example of the failure of governance at the global level. Though in flagrant violation of international law that prohibits the acquisition of territory by force, the Israeli occupation that started over 43 year ago, persists as one of the few remnants of humanity’s reprehensible colonial past. The whole global architecture entrusted with peace and security and with upholding international law could not roll it back. Or, perhaps, will not roll it back. Meanwhile Palestinians continue to be denied their most basic rights; and to lose their homes, lands and lives to a colonial settler that treats them as lesser human beings.
It is this feeling of double dispossession at the hands of regimes and foreign powers that drove millions of Arabs to freedom squares all over Arab cities and towns.
Failed governance in our region had ramifications that went beyond economics and development. It became a major cause of violent conflicts, as it created the conditions for societies to fall apart, and for countries to splinter.

A governance deficit weakens political institutions and renders them incapable of resolving contentious issues through peaceful means. To suppress dissent the ruling elite opts for “divide and rule” tactics which erode national identity, and trust in state institutions. Marginalized communities resort to violence to defend their socio-economic and political rights. And when a country is of any geo-strategic value to international and regional powers, civil strife slips into protracted proxy wars.
The three LDCs in our region, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, have all experienced some form of violent strife over the past decade. Most of those quasi civil wars started as a struggle against marginalization and the unfair distribution of power or resources. Regimes could have nipped such insurrections in the bud through more inclusive development. Instead some played the ethnic or tribal chords in order to prevail over their own people and to mobilize interested foreign powers. They didn’t mind fracturing their societies in the process, and sinking their countries into a never-ending quagmire of bad governance, conflict and de-development.
In addition to its humanitarian fall-out, the governance deficit creates serious economic inefficiencies. Precious fiscal resources are diverted to the security sector to quell potential dissent, and to buy the loyalty of the political elite. This comes at the expense of much needed social services and infrastructure. The absence of accountable bureaucracies and the arbitrary enforcement of regulations distort economic incentives and stunts private initiative. Though economies may still grow under such circumstances, such growth is often jobless and voiceless.
Mainstream economic theory suggested that economic liberalization in the Arab world will not only promote growth, but will also yield social development, stronger state institutions, and a viable middle class. It didn’t. All the countries experiencing social upheavals at present boasted consistent increases in per capita GDP from 1996 to 2009. Simultaneously, almost all, including LDCs, witnessed significant deterioration in governance standards according to the World Governance Indicators. No wonder frustrations built up and people took their grievances to the streets.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The conflict and de-development trap can only be broken with systems of good governance, systems that are based on the full respect for human rights and freedoms, where women are empowered and none is marginalized, and where the rule of law and a fair, just and independent judiciary protects the rights and dignity of all citizens. No longer is this a remote dream. Tunisians and Egyptians have shattered the sinister theory of Arab exceptionalism. They have inspired us and shown us that the will of the people will ultimately prevail.
We at ESCWA, along with other UN agencies are strongly committed to supporting the move towards good governance in the region through empirical research and an array of capacity development programs.
But we know that capacity building assistance and financial support measures as envisaged in the Program of Action will not, in and of themselves, be sufficient to help our LDCs graduate from that status. This is particularly the case with conflict affected LDCs.
Observing political developments in Yemen over the past months makes one less certain that their problem lies in weak human assets or limited institutional capacity. Listening to Yemenis meticulously analyzing their predicament and articulating a vision for their future, one may point to a suppressed and underutilized human asset, not a weak one. Far from that! Watching Yemeni NGOs draw and implement one of the most peaceful, powerful and sustained popular uprisings in modern history tells of weak public institutions, not popular ones. At the moment, what they need the most is unambiguous support for their right to shape their future and to live free from fear, not just want. The international community must assist in turning this into reality.
The responsibilities of the international community in the Program of Action will remain incomplete if they did not include an explicit commitment to uphold the UN charter, human rights, and international covenants. This is not a call to commit military assets or boots on the ground. This is an invitation to commit to moral values and act accordingly. It suggests not only condemning dictators and the atrocities they perpetrate against their peoples, but, more importantly, not supporting them in the first place. It calls for holding violators to account even if they are vital to our strategic priorities, and not granting foreign occupiers a waiver just because they are our friends. Ultimately, it means never subjecting the rights of peoples secured by justice and international law, to political bargaining or the calculus of interests.