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INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION**

STUDY ON THE LABOUR INTENSIVE WORK PROGRAMME IN YEMEN



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ACRONYMS

CDP	Community Development Programme
CfWTEP	Cash for Work Temporary Employment Programme (Liberia)
CWP:	Community Work Programme (South Africa)
EPWP:	Expanded Public Works Programme (South Africa)
FGD:	Focus Group Discussion
ILO:	International Labour Organisation
<i>Jefes:</i>	<i>Programa Jefes and Jefas de Hogar Desocupados</i> (Programme for Unemployed Heads of Households) (Argentina)
LIWP:	Labour Intensive Works Programme (Yemen)
MGNREGA:	Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (India)
PEP:	Public Employment Programme
PSNP:	Productive Safety Net Programme (Ethiopia)
PWP:	Public Works Project (Yemen)
RBA:	Rights-Based Approach
SFD:	Social Fund for Development (Yemen)
SPF:	Social Protection Floor
SWF:	Social Welfare Fund (Yemen)
TPSD:	Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development (for Yemen)
USD	United States Dollars
USAID:	United States Agency for International Development
WFP:	World Food Programme
YER:	Yemeni Riyals

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES AND CONTEXT

The Labour Intensive Works Program (LIWP) in Yemen is a Public Employment Programme (PEP) that started in 2008, primarily as a response to the financial, food and fuel crisis at the time. It is implemented by the Yemen Social Fund for Development (SFD) and financed by several international donors as well as by the Government of Yemen. It has evolved considerably since it started in 2008, as it has had to respond to several political and economic events in Yemen during this period.

The purpose of this study is to analyse and assess the role of the LIWP in Yemen within a broader social policy context. It is the intention that this case study will assist in sharing the experience and lessons learned from Yemen with other countries, especially in the ESCWA region. The study is part of a wider project aiming to document social protection options in the region, and seeks to contribute to the larger question of what role social protection can play, especially in this period of dramatic political and social change. The study identifies key lessons learned from the programme which can potentially inform improvements of the programme in Yemen as well as in other countries where such programmes are being implemented or considered.

The LIWP was chosen as the subject for this case study since it is generally viewed positively by all its main stakeholders, including international donors, the government of Yemen, the SFD, the communities it serves and its participants. The programme is also reasonably well documented, and has been subject to rigorous evaluations. At the same time, the five-year period over which the LIWP has been implemented in Yemen has been full of turmoil and instability, and this has also affected the programme. Given this very difficult context, the implementation of the LIWP stands out for continuing to have positive impacts.

B. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

This report consists of six sections. The second presents an overview of international experience relevant to the LIWP in Yemen and the questions this case study is exploring, the third summarises the current social protection context in Yemen, the fourth gives a detailed description of the LIWP, and the fifth analyses some of the impacts and effects of the LIWP. The sixth section provides conclusions and recommendations that have emerged from the study.

C. NOTES ON THE METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study builds on desktop research as well as on interviews with SFD staff and focus group discussions (FGDs) with programme participants held in four governorates. Interviews were also conducted with officials from the Social Welfare Fund (SWF), with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) and with senior staff of the SFD.

With regard to the desktop research, of particular importance is the independent impact evaluation of the LIWP which was commissioned by the SFD. This impact evaluation used treatment villages where the LIWP was implemented and compared these to control villages. Surveys in these villages were conducted in May 2010 and November 2011. FGDs were also conducted in these villages in May 2010. The results of this impact evaluation were published in three separate papers¹ provided by the SFD, all of which are frequently referred to in this report. These three papers all relate to the same impact evaluation, and when this report makes a reference to the impact evaluation of the LIWP, it refers to the evaluation as a whole. When a specific paper is drawn upon, it is referenced in a footnote. The results of the impact evaluation are extremely useful, and the implications of their findings still warrant further analysis and discussion, as will be shown. This study provides a good opportunity for such discussion.

¹ These are Al-Iryani et al., 2010; Al-Maweri and Egel, 2011; and Christian et al., 2013.

The changing conditions in Yemen, and the responses by the SFD in adapting and improving the LIWP, made this a complex case study, as not all the changes are documented, and in many cases the implementation of the changes is an ongoing process. The author also faced significant challenges with regard to obtaining detailed, consistent and accurate programme data. This has limited the extent to which some features of the LIWP could be analysed.

II. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES

A. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SOCIAL PROTECTION FLOOR.

The International Labour Organization's (ILO) approach to social protection is rights-based, in that it views adequate social protection as a right which policies should ultimately aim to realise.² In practice, the ILO has set out three objectives which cover the main dimensions of social protection: extension of social security, promoting labour protection, and protection of specific vulnerable groups such as migrant workers and workers in the formal economy.³

Led by the ILO, the United Nations has since 2009 been promoting the introduction of the Social Protection Floor (SPF) as a mechanism for ensuring that there is a minimum level of social protection available to all citizens of a country. The SPF was introduced as a response to the recognition that the majority of the world's population had inadequate access to social protection. It is designed to provide a minimum level of social protection by ensuring at least the following basic social security guarantees:

- (a) *access to a nationally defined set of goods and services, constituting essential health care, including maternity care, that meets the criteria of availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality;*
- (b) *basic income security for children, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, providing access to nutrition, education, care and any other necessary goods and services;*
- (c) *basic income security, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, for persons in active age who are unable to earn sufficient income, in particular in cases of sickness, unemployment, maternity and disability; and*
- (d) *basic income security, at least at a nationally defined minimum level, for older persons.*⁴

For PEPs, an important question is how countries interpret and define component (a) of the SPF, and in particular if they choose to widen this to include essential services other than health care, such as water, sanitation and education. In the case of Yemen, it would appear reasonable to let the national definition include access to such basic services as well. That would have important implications for how the LIWP contributes to the SPF. This issue is further explored below.

PEPs, like the LIWP, can make a contribution to several aspects of the SPF, although the extent of their contribution can also vary considerably. The most important contribution they can make is to provide basic income security - directly for adults, and indirectly for children and the elderly who are part of the households that benefit from the PEP. They can also indirectly improve health care access through the income they provide. From the perspective of protection against specific risks, PEPs are instruments which can be designed to protect the working-age population and their dependents from risks associated with shocks, unemployment, underemployment and food insecurity.

B. PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES AND THEIR MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES

1. *Employment, social protection and work outputs: Synergies*

PEPs always have three objectives, although the relative importance of each objective varies considerably from programme to programme. The first objective is the provision of income to programme participants, which has direct bearing on the income security objective of providing social protection. The second objective is the participation in work by participants,⁵ and the third is the creation of outputs from the work

² This rights based approach of the ILO is based on the right to social security as supported most importantly in article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 which states that "everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security".

³ As explained on the relevant section of the ILO website: International Labour Organization, undated.

⁴ International Labour Organization, 2012.

⁵ This second objective is not always obvious, as the work and income aspects are of course directly related.

in the form of assets or services. While there are clear synergies between these three objectives, and while they can all be achieved simultaneously, there are also trade-offs between them which are not as obvious.

In most countries, the policy choice for aPEP is linked to these synergies and based on a need to address multiple problems: not just insufficient income, but also unemployment and a need for investment and/or improved community services. This theoretical ability to “kill three birds with one stone” is probably the main reason why these programmes are widely used around the world. However, achieving all three objectives does not happen automatically, and in practice one or two of the objectives are often dominant, resulting in the third one being compromised or achieved to only a limited degree. In South Africa, there is strong emphasis on the production of assets, service and employment, but as a result the social protection outcomes are compromised, and there is, for example, no minimum amount participants can expect to earn.⁶

In the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) in India, which has a strong emphasis on ensuring that work is provided as demanded by participants, the completion of projects remains a challenge.⁷ In the end, the extent to which a programme contributes to enhancing social protection depends on to which extent the first objective is sufficiently prioritised. The key lesson is that PEPs need to be designed as social protection interventions in order to be effective as such.

2. Employment, social protection and work outputs: Trade-offs

The design feature that most clearly highlights the trade-off between social protection and the assets creation is the labour intensity of the projects implemented. Projects that specify a very high labour intensity (typically above 65 per cent) - such as the MGNREGA and the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia - obviously transfer a high share of their budgets as income to participants. This, however, means that many types of projects are not possible to implement under the scheme, as it limits the materials, equipment, and technical inputs. So, for example, when these programmes work on roads, they are limited to earth and gravel roads. These programmes can be more effective in maintenance, which generally requires less material input, but – ironically - both the PSNP and the MGNREGA exclude maintenance activities.

A less obvious design feature is whether there is a minimum transfer or number of days of paid work to which a selected participant is entitled. This is common in programmes that have a strong social protection focus, as they aim to provide a minimum and predictable level of income. Programmes that have such a requirement need to design projects enabling it to be met. A village project, for example, may need to be designed so that all the selected participants are provided with 70 days of employment. It is, however, often difficult or impractical to design projects in this manner, since for most projects the labour input required depends on the stage of the project. This again limits the types of projects which can be implemented, and/or reduces the efficiency, as at some stages of the projects more people than necessary may actually be employed. It can also lead to non-completion when more people are required beyond the 70 days provided for by the budget. In contrast, programmes that have a strong focus on the assets and services tend to let the nature of the project determine how many people are employed and for how long.

Programmes that have a strong focus on the employment objectives tend to place stronger emphasis on the employment conditions. For example, in South Africa there are specific employment conditions legislated for the Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) through a ministerial determination issued by the Minister of Labour after consultation with the social partners. This determination specifies the employment conditions that apply to EPWP projects, and includes a minimum wage. In contrast, in programmes like the

⁶ This was the main reason the Community Work Programme, a sub programme of the EPWP was introduced. It is designed to provide regular and predictable income and provides participants with two days of work a week on an ongoing basis. However the other sub-programmes of the EPWP have maintained their primary focus on the provision of services and assets.

⁷ India, Ministry of Rural Development, 2013a, p. 39, shows that only 14.5 per cent of projects started in 2012 had been completed by the end of the third quarter of the 12/13 financial year. Projects started could of course still be completed in the remaining quarter, but it seems unlikely that this would be the case for all the remaining 85.5 per cent. Another source that illustrates this problem is the recent draft performance report of the MGNREGA by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, which shows how this problem varies by state. The report states that in 11 of the 28 states the completion rate of projects was below 50 per cent. India, Ministry of Rural Development, 2013b.

PSNP and the MGNREGA many of the employment conditions are ambiguous, and it is unclear to what extent existing labour legislation applies to participants working in the programme.

Another reason for the popularity of PEPs is that their political acceptability is generally high. In most countries there are political limits on “handouts” to the working age population, as it is usually preferred that people of that category work for their income, which PEPs enable them to do. The prevalence of PEPs is also explained by a belief in the inherent value of work (beyond the income it provides). In this view, everyone should have the opportunity to work, and work is regarded as an activity that provides valuable experience, enables individuals to contribute to their community and society, generates self-confidence, creates skills, fosters independence, and builds relationships and networks. This aspect of PEPs is hard to quantify and rarely studied, but an attempt was made in the FGDs to understand it better.

Understanding the multiple objectives, their relative priority, and how the programme design influences them is critical to understanding a PEP. An important aim of this study, therefore, is to get an understanding of the relative importance of the LIWP’s objectives and how the SFD is managing them. So, while the focus of this study is on the LIWP and how it contributes to social protection in Yemen, it is also important to understand the other objectives and outcomes in relation to the assets and services, so that consideration can be given to the programme as a whole, with all its benefits.

In this regard, it is also important to note that the LIWP does not have as an objective the establishment of an SPF, and that it was not designed for that purpose. So, the analysis of this report will look at how some of the aspects/outcomes of the LIWP contribute to the objectives of establishing an SPF, and how the programme could be changed to do so in a more systematic and structured manner.

3. Assets and services and the Social Protection Floor

Another relevant question for a PEP is if - and if yes, how - the assets and services provided contribute to social protection and the SPF. This depends largely how broadly the SPF is defined at the national level, and whether essential services other than health care are deemed to be part of the SPF. If the definition is broad enough, projects like building a road or digging a well would also contribute to social protection, as it may be argued that roads can facilitate better access to health care and education, and that wells can reduce expenditure on water, thus enabling more expenditure on food. Such questions become even more relevant when PEPs also provide services in education and health, as are now being introduced in the LIWP. As the SPF has not yet been defined at the national level in Yemen, a broader approach will be adopted in this study, recognising that the assets created under the LIWP also have the potential to contribute to the SPF.

However, the extent to which the assets and services provided by the LIWP contribute to social protection or the SPF is difficult to assess. Because the LIWP was not designed to contribute to the SPF, it has not been monitored or evaluated from that perspective. At the same time, this report does not want to obscure the trade-off in PEPs between the objective of transferring income and the delivery of quality services and assets. It is important to understand this trade-off so that it can be managed. The fact that the income transfer as well as the assets and services contribute to the SPF does not mean that one should not be prioritised over the other if such a trade-off presents itself in practice.

C. TOWARDS A RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES

1. Incorporating a rights-based approach into a public employment programme in India

Perhaps one of the more difficult questions around the contribution of PEPs to the SPF is how to incorporate a rights-based approach (RBA) to social protection to provide “social security guarantees”. In most PEPs the income is not guaranteed, as it is temporary and directly linked to the time the participant is provided with work in the programme. Neither do they – not even the extensive MNREGA accounted for below - aim to provide universal coverage, but tend to reach only a limited target group based on the available budget, and should therefore be seen as part of a broader set of policies and measures to provide such guarantees.

The MGNREGA provides a guarantee of a hundred days of paid employment to every rural household in India willing to do manual labour, as well as an entitlement to an unemployment allowance in case the government is not able to provide this employment. Furthermore, rural households have the right to request this employment for the time period that suits them best, and so the scheme effectively has to provide employment “on-demand”.⁸ It is also notable that the MGNREGA is an act adopted by Parliament, and that the rights enshrined in it are legal entitlements. Thus, the programme cannot simply be stopped or revoked by the government of the day, as this would require revoking the act by Parliament. While the MGNREGA initially paid the minimum wages for agriculture as set by the different states themselves, a programme minimum wage for each state was eventually adopted due to the large variation between states.⁹

The features above, together with the size of the rural population of India, make the MGNREGA a very bold and ambitious intervention, as it mandates the government to provide employment, on-demand, to potentially more than 168 million households¹⁰. In practice, of course, not every rural household wants employment through the MGNREGA, but nonetheless, more than 125 million households – or 74 per cent of all rural ones - are registered for the scheme.¹¹

2. *Lessons from a rights-based approach in India*

The experience with the implementation of the MGNREGA varies considerably from state to state, and from district to district. One must be careful, therefore, about drawing general conclusions from it so far. However, from the perspective of implementing a rights-based programme, two observations are worth highlighting.

The first is that adopting an RBA has catapulted the MGNREGA to achieving an unprecedented coverage of the rural Indian population. Since its independence, India has had many different PEPs in place, but none ever reached the scale of the MGNREGA. The RBA of the MGNREGA has played an important role in this achievement by mandating the national government to make funds available for the scheme. At the same time, by providing households with the right to demand employment, it also pressures state governments and local authorities to supply work. As a result, in the 2012-13 financial year the MGNREGA provided 50 million households with 2.3 billion days of employment and INR 271.3 billion (USD 4.3 billion) of income.¹² In comparison, prior to the MGNREGA the two main national PEPs in India created only 1.1 billion days of employment in 2005-06.¹³

The second observation relates to act’s provision for payment of unemployment allowances. According to the act, households who are not provided employment within 15 days of requesting it are entitled to an unemployment allowance which must continue until employment is offered. This provision is the main recourse for those seeking work (the right-holders) when their right to it is not being realised by the state. So far, implementation of this provision of the act has proven extremely difficult, to the extent that it is almost non-existent.¹⁴ This highlights how making something a right does not necessarily guarantee its actualisation, since the resources, capacity and pressures and/or incentives for the state and its officials to realise the right also need to be in place.

These two observations show only two aspects of the MGNREGA, and why it has been the subject of both much praise and much criticism. And while the failure to implement the unemployment allowance provision of the MGNREGA on a wide scale is a cause for concern, it does not negate the fact that the scheme is in place to a massive extent. While progress has been made with regard to realising the right to work by providing employment at an unprecedented level, right-holders have hardly any recourse when this right is

⁸ India, Ministry of Law and Justice, 2005, p. 3-4.

⁹ India, Ministry of Rural Development, 2011, p. 2.

¹⁰ Number of rural households in India from CensusInfo, 2011.

¹¹ India, Ministry of Rural Development, 2013a, p. 8.

¹² India, Ministry of Rural Development, 2014a.

¹³ Mehrotra, 2009, p. 11.

¹⁴ In the financial year 2013-14, no unemployment allowance at all was apparently paid out. India, Ministry of Rural Development, 2014b.

not being realised. Hence, while the Indian experience proves that applying an RBA to PEPs is possible and can have a huge impact, it also shows that ensuring that mechanisms are in place for right-holders to be able claim their rights is difficult.

Incorporating an RBA, or at least elements thereof, in a PEP does not have to be as explicit as in the MGNREGA. From an income security perspective, the two important advantages of an RBA are that; a) it enhances the predictability and regularity of income, which is increasingly recognised as an important element in augmenting the impact of social protection schemes, and b) it pushes a programme towards broader coverage. Whether driven by an RBA, as articulated in the SPF, or by a more pragmatic approach of wanting to deepen the impact of programmes, an increasing number of PEPs are offering participants employment that is longer-term and more regular and predictable. One of these is the PSNP in Ethiopia.¹⁵ This approach has influenced some of the more recent changes in the LIWP. The implication is not that an RBA does not matter, but rather that even where it is not possible to adopt such an approach, some of its advantages can still be incorporated into a programme's design.

D. IMPACT INDICATORS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES

The impacts of PEPs can best be grouped along the lines of their three main objectives and outputs. The three main objectives and some of the most important aspects they affect are provided below.

- *Provision of income* impacts on income security, consumption smoothing, food security, retention and acquisition of assets, and poverty
- *Participation in work* impacts on skills development, work experience, self-confidence, building of work relationships and networks, internalizing of training, and future employment prospects
- *Work output* has various impacts depending on the nature, but common impacts are on household access to water, sanitation, education, markets, agricultural land, and irrigation, and functioning of watersheds

Generally, the impact of these programmes can be assessed at three levels: the individual/household (micro) level, the community (meso) level and the macro level (either regionally or nationally, depending on programme scale and location). At each of these levels, PEPs can have a variety of impacts. Table 1 lists the micro level impacts and possible indicators for assessing these. Tables 2 and 3, similarly, list possible impacts at the meso and macro levels. (These tables are based on the author's experience and compiled from the review of many such studies).

Table 1: Micro/ household impacts

<i>Area of Impact</i>	<i>Possible indicators</i>
Impacts on household income and expenditure	Changes in quantum of income and expenditure, changes in breakdown
Changes in household assets	Assets acquired/disposed of
Access to labour markets	Accessing other employment (graduating to private employment), changes in looking for work, migration
Livelihood diversification	New livelihood activities, investment in income-generating activities
Child labour and school attendance	Changes in child labour (hours, percentage of households, frequency) Changes in school attendance, breakdown in gender
Improvement of dwelling	Investments in improving housing/dwellings
Household food security	Calorific intake, more frequent and more regular/nutritious meals
Increased productivity	Through use of new assets of PEP investments in private assets (where allowed)

Source: Compiled by the author

¹⁵ Other examples of programmes have been the *Jefes e Jefas de Hogar* Programme in Argentina, which was started in response to the 2002 crisis there, and the Community Work Programme currently being implemented in South Africa.

Table 2: Community level impacts of PEPs

<i>Area of Impact</i>	Possible indicators
Local economic activity and productivity	Increase in number of businesses, increased local demand, sales and consumption, more travel, increased savings
Employment	Changes in local employment, unemployment, underemployment, and labour force participation
Social cohesion	Changes in crime, (domestic) violence, unrest and protest
Local governance and government	Increased voter turnout, better functioning local structures, more regular meetings, more democratic decision-making, larger budgets managed and spent locally
Food security	Fewer food-insecure households
Use of local assets	Increased use of assets created, maintained, or made more accessible: roads, water wells, clinics, schools, community centres, etc
Provision of services	Access to water (lower cost, less time, more reliable), education (higher attendance, fewer dropouts, fewer absences, shorter travel times) and health care (more regular and frequent access, less travel time), more children able to access social assistance and school meals
Poverty reduction	Local poverty headcount, depth of poverty
Reduced vulnerability	Reduced distress-sales of assets, increased savings, consumption-smoothing
Migration	Changes in migration patterns (migration in and out of the community)
Local environment	Improvements to the local environment (water availability and quality, agricultural land, water management)
Women Empowerment	Female participation in programme , labour market participation, access to income/households' resources, involvement in decision-making
Wages and working conditions	Changes in wages (gender disaggregated) , changes in local working conditions

Source: Compiled by the author

Table 3: Macro impacts of PEPs

Impacts	Indicators
GDP growth	Effect on GDP (direct and indirect), multipliers
Inclusive growth	Distribution of growth/changes in wage share, changes among the poor
Employment	Changes in employment rates, unemployment rates, underemployment rates, and labour force participation
Wages	Impacts on overall wages and working conditions
Government revenues	Changes in tax revenue
Poverty reduction	Poverty headcount, depth of poverty
Reduction in vulnerability	Fewer food insecure households, savings,

Source: Compiled by the author

Given the range of these possible impacts, and the complexity and cost for assessing many of them, no single PEP has been able to assess all of the impacts listed above. Neither will it be possible to do so for the LIWP, since for many of these indicators there is no data available. The impacts and indicators for which there is data available to analyse the LIWP on the micro and meso levels in this study have been marked in bold in the tables above.

E. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH TARGETING, SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AND CHILD LABOUR

1. Geographical targeting in public employment programmes

Most PEPs employ some level of geographical targeting so as to reach the areas where they are expected to have the biggest impact. The basis for this targeting varies considerably, however, and often depends on a combination of policy priorities, existing knowledge, and available data. Even the MGNREGA applies only to rural areas in India. However, rural areas are clearly defined in the Indian context, and this exclusive focus on rural areas is easy to implement there.

In South Africa, on the other hand, where the entire country is divided wall-to-wall into municipalities, there is no official definition of what rural or urban areas are. As a result, the various sub-programmes of the EPWP use different geographical targeting approaches. The infrastructure programmes factor in poverty data and access to basic services to determine budget allocations to each province and municipality. In the environmental sector, the target region is often determined by the level of environmental distress in the area. The Community Work Programme (CWP) focuses on the poorest wards based on census data.

In Mexico, the PET programme uses a combination of geographical targeting methods. As there is already an index of the most marginalized areas (municipalities) in the country, this forms the basis for the first level of targeting. The second level is that the programme is only implemented in villages with less than 5000 inhabitants. In Ethiopia, where experience of addressing famine is extensive, districts known to suffer from chronic food insecurity were selected for the PSNP when the programme started.

It should also be pointed out that in most countries it is politically important to spread the benefits of PEPs over as many regions as possible. An example of this is the CWP in South Africa, where the first priority was not to reach the country's poorest wards in absolute terms, but rather the poorest wards in each of the nine provinces. Similarly, the current expansion of the CWP focuses on establishing a site in the poorest ward of each municipality.

These examples illustrate how geographical targeting is generally shaped by the combination of programme objectives, local knowledge, available data and – ultimately - political imperatives. How effective these approaches are is heavily influenced by the quality of local knowledge and data. In practice, this is rarely assessed.¹⁶

2. Wage rates and self-targeting in public employment programmes

Setting the wage rate at below the market wage is often used to self-target in PEPs. This approach tends to target the poor and the unemployed, as the assumption is that only the poor with no other employment options would be willing to work at these low wages. At the same time, the wage rate also influences the actual amount of income transferred to the beneficiary of the programme, and since most programmes limit the number of days of work available, the wage rate is one factor that determines the upper limit of the amount that can be transferred to a household. In the setting of the wage rate, it also needs being taken into consideration how the programme impacts on the overall labour market. If the PEP was to pay relatively high wages, this might impact on the market wage and encourage displacement as people leave other employment to take up work in the PEP. Finally, the wage rate also affects productivity, and if it is seen as too low or exploitative, it may be difficult to achieve acceptable productivity. Programmes therefore need to carefully consider all these factors to find the most appropriate balance between them.

In practice, relying only on self-targeting using the wage rate often proves difficult, as it can lead to significant errors of both inclusion and exclusion, and as it is often difficult to keep the wage-rate low for a longer period of time. With regard to inclusion errors, indications are that particular households that have surplus labour (unemployed members) but are not among the poorest may still find work at low wage rates attractive, as it tends to complement overall household income in the absence of other options.¹⁷ If it is

¹⁶ When geographical targeting is largely driven by political imperatives, assessing the effectiveness of the geographical targeting is perhaps most important, but also the most difficult as political principals will tend to resist having such an assessment as it could challenge the targeting approach they favour.

¹⁷ Vaidya, 2010, p. 59.

primarily the unemployed that are the target group, this may not be seen as a problem, but if the objective is to specifically target the very poorest, this does raise concerns as it may reach the less poor unemployed instead.

With regard to the exclusion effects of relying on self-targeting through a low wage, the main concern is that many of the poorest are still not reached if this is the main targeting mechanism. Lack of time and information about the PEP opportunities are the most important reasons.

Finally, even if self-targeting using only the wage rate provides good targeting results, it is risky to rely only on this, as it makes the targeting vulnerable. Wage rates are often sensitive issues politically, and there can be considerable political pressure to increase a programme's rate. Additionally, in times of severe crisis the market wage can drop, again compromising the targeting effectiveness in terms of reaching the poor and unemployed.

The increasing consensus, therefore, is that self-targeting needs to be complemented by other targeting mechanisms such as geographical, community-based and categorical targeting. Critics of the self-targeting approach argue that these complementary targeting mechanisms may even be sufficient for reaching the target group, and that the wage rate can more appropriately be set based in line with minimum wages or the desired level of income to transfer to participants.

With regard to the actual amount of income to be transferred, programmes increasingly combine the wage rate with a minimum number of work days to be provided to ensure that each participant is ensured a minimum level of income. This level can be directly linked to the objective of a programme, as is the case for the PSNP in Ethiopia, where the amount is based on the minimum level of consumption that the programme aims to ensure. The entitlement of work-days is based on household size, and households are entitled to 30 days of work per household member and year.¹⁸ Together with the wage rate, the income from these 30 days is sufficient to purchase the equivalent of six months of grain requirements per household member, i.e. providing sufficient food for survival for half the year.

Households in India are entitled to 100 days of employment a year, and in the CWP in South Africa to two days a week on an ongoing basis. Both of these programmes pay a minimum wage level specific to the programme. The LIWP has also been shifting to such an approach, where a minimum income level for each household is set, as is a target of the number of days of work provided to each household.

With regard to impacts upon the overall labour market, PEPs' tendency to put upward pressure on the market wage has traditionally been seen as a negative effect. It is now recognised, however, that in some contexts it can actually be positive. Adherence to the agricultural minimum wage is in many Indian states poor, but the MGNREGA has by paying it pressurised farmers to follow. While farmers have been complaining about the need to pay higher wages, this pressure to make them do so is generally seen as positive, especially among those concerned with reducing poverty and inequality in rural India.

Another important lesson for PEPs is that determining market wages in rural areas can be complicated, since the notion of a normally functioning labour market does not always apply there. In many instances, the number of employers in rural areas is limited, and those who exist have disproportionate power in setting the wage rate. Furthermore, in many countries the "market" wage in rural areas differs significantly for men and women, with male earnings typically being higher. It must be clear what wage rate is used to determine that of the PEP, and generally it may be advisable to take the male wage rate, not the average one, as a benchmark. Where attracting more women into the programme is an objective, the choice may be made to set the wage below the male market wage rate but above the female one, thus making the programme relatively more attractive to women. In theory, this is the case in Yemen, but for a number of reasons discussed in more detail below it has not led to much higher female participation rates.

¹⁸ World Bank, 2010, p. 23. The 30 days per household member per year is calculated from the programme providing 6 months of transfers and the size of the transfer is based on 5 days of work per month for each household member.

Households with labour constraints - such as those in which adults are sick, of old-age, or living with disabilities, or where there are no adults – are naturally limited in the extent to which they can benefit from PEPs. For them, complementary or different types of social protection may be required. The PSNP in Ethiopia has managed this by integrating into the programme a direct transfer component, providing an unconditional income transfer to households who have insufficient labour supply. Work requirements, in addition, are lesser for those whose ability to partake is restrained.¹⁹

3. *Public employment programmes and child labour*

PEPs can lead to both increases and decreases in child labour. On the one hand, they raise the overall labour demand from a household, and can thereby increase child labour by having children meeting part of this demand. On the other hand, PEPs can lead to higher household income, which in turn can reduce the need for children to work. Because of these opposing theoretical effects, the real impact of PEPs on child labour is an empirical question, and in most cases the net effect needs to be considered.

Recent studies of both the MGNREGA and the PSNP have clearly found these opposing effects, and have assessed the net effect of these two programmes on child labour. For the MGNREGA, it was found that participation by households in the programme reduces the probability of a boy or a girl entering child labour by 13.4 and 8.9 percentage points, respectively.²⁰ For the PSNP, the key findings are worth quoting, as they highlight the complexity of the opposing effects of these programmes:

Although the [Public Work Programme] component of PSNP increased the amount of time both girls and boys spent on paid work by 0.13 hours per day, it reduced the amount of time girls spent on child care and household chores by half an hour per day. The net effect is that children's total hours spent on work are reduced. Moreover, [the Public Work Programme] also increased the time girls spent on studying by 0.25 hours per day.²¹

Few other programmes have looked at the effects on child labour in such depth. Most tend to focus on the effects on school attendance, and often use this as a proxy for the effects on child labour, but care should be taken with regard to this approach, as it is of course possible that children attend school and work after school or in the holidays. The quote below from an evaluation of a programme from the Malawi Social Action Fund is a good example of this:

School children who happen to work on [the Public Works Programme] work spend their earnings on purchasing school requirements, especially notebooks and pens.²²

As with child labour, the effects on school attendance have also been found to be positive, neutral or negative. For example, large positive effects were found in South Africa in programmes that provided regular part-time employment and specifically targeted the poorest women-headed households. In these households, regular school attendance increased from 67 to 90 per cent.²³ In contrast, programmes that relied largely on self-targeting and provided once-off short-term employment (approximately three months) had much higher school participation rates to start with (above 93 per cent), and the increases were only a few percentage points.

4. *Training and skills-development in public employment programmes*

While training and skills development are important components of most PEPs, the objective of this generally is not to enable participants to find other employment after the PEP, even though this is a common

¹⁹ Lieuw-Kie-Song, 2011, p. 4-6.

²⁰ Dev, 2011, p. 12.

²¹ Woldehanna, 2009, p. 31.

²² Malawi Social Action Fund, 2003, p. 103.

²³ McCord, 2004, p. 56.

perception.²⁴ PEPs rarely include this objective, as it tends to generate demands and expectations which often cannot be met.

Firstly, PEPs are frequently implemented in response to economic crises which decrease the demand for labour, resulting in increasing unemployment. In simple language, governments implement PEPs to create jobs as there are not enough other jobs around. In such a context, even many skilled and semi-skilled people lose their work, and skilling PEP participants will have only limited impact on their ability to find employment. Furthermore, policymakers may prefer to increase coverage with the limited funds available rather than use it to fund training.

Secondly, including training to enable other employment makes sense only when there is a high level of confidence that unemployment is driven by a structural gap between available skills and the demand for skills, *and* where a PEP can contribute to closing that skills gap. Such circumstances are rare. On the one hand, unemployment is often due to a lack of labour demand, not a lack of skills. And where there is a lack of skills, the training which can be provided as part of a PEP usually is not extensive enough to equip participants with them. This is particularly the case when programmes target the poorest and most vulnerable, who are also most likely to be illiterate or to have completed only very basic education.

Thirdly, training, especially accredited and/or vocational training, is expensive in the context of a PEP, and the logistics of providing it daunting. In South Africa, for example, a basic training course of ten days in laying pipes for rural water supply costs ZAR 172 per day (USD 17) and participant.²⁵ In comparison, such a participant would earn around ZAR 65 per day. This highlights that programmes face a real trade-off between simply creating more jobs and using some of the available resources for training. If there is a high degree of confidence that the training will result in participants being able to enter the labour market, providing it can make sense, but if this is uncertain, programmes may instead choose to focus on creating more employment.

For these reasons, the experience of providing formal or accredited training to equip participants to find employment elsewhere is limited. The EPWP in South Africa was perhaps the most ambitious programme in this regard, but after the first phase it changed to the common, and more pragmatic, approach of letting the main purpose of the training be rather to build the skills required to implement the PEP and its projects.

Given the context in which many PEPs are implemented, the value of the training along with the skills developed from working in the PEP should be seen from a broader perspective than whether it can assist with finding other work. Questions as to whether it can enhance existing livelihoods or impart practical skills which can be applied in the household or are “generally valuable”²⁶ should ideally also be considered. And this value should be weighed against the low cost of providing such pragmatic training and skills development within a PEP - they are often a bonus of the PEP, or come at very low costs.

The type of training most common in PEPs is related to the work participants are expected to complete. The content of such training is determined by the skills levels of participants as well as by the nature of the projects. It can range from nothing, in cases where participants have done the type of work before, to quite extensive, especially in programmes involving work which is not common. In South Africa, for example, the Working for Water sub-programme of the EPWP involves the removal of invasive alien plants from public lands. Training participants to do this can take several weeks.

Whether such training proves useful after participants are no longer in the PEP largely depends on the nature of the projects, and if they are related to local livelihoods and economic activity. In the PSNP in Ethiopia, many of the projects have a strong watershed management focus, and participants are trained to construct ponds and structures to control soil erosion such as check dams. From this training, and through the work,

²⁴ This expectation is created because many PEPs offer only a once-off period of work and this then raises the question of what will happen to participants afterwards. The popular, but often unrealistic answer is that they will join the labour market, and will be able to do so because they have gained skills in the PEP.

²⁵ South Africa, Department of Public Works, undated, p. 95.

²⁶ For example learning to work together with others to plan and complete a group task is something that can be learned on a PEP and could be considered a generally valuable skill.

they learn both about the benefits of these structures and how to construct them. There are indications that almost half have applied these skills on their own land.²⁷

Such an approach to skills development, with the objective of enhancing livelihoods, appears to hold more promise. It is being implemented in some programmes, but as separate, complementary programmes rather than as activities integrated into the PEP. The Household Asset Building Programme in Ethiopia is an example. It is separate from but complementary to the PSNP, and, apart from training, also provides services such as micro-credit and extension services.

5. Scale and relative size of public employment programmes

The scale of PEPs varies greatly - as, of course, does the size of the countries in which they are implemented. The absolute size of a programme, measured by the total number of beneficiaries or by its budget, is therefore not necessarily useful for the purpose of comparing it to other PEPs. An alternative method implies considering the number of beneficiaries as relative to the total labour force, and the budget as a percentage of GDP. Table 4, below, provides such figures for a few selected programmes in countries ranging in size from Cape Verde to India.

Perhaps the main observation in this regard is that donor-funded programmes tend to be relatively small, whereas programmes which are funded by governments themselves tend to be bigger. The notable exception is the PSNP, which is largely donor-funded, but which pools all available donor-funding into a single programme.

Table 4: Comparison of the scale of selected PEP's

Programme	Expenditure (millions USD) for given year	Expenditure as % of GDP²⁸	Number of households of individuals provided with work	Work opportunities as % of labour force²⁹
MGNREGA (India 08/09)	7 100	0.47%	49.8 million	9.7%
PSNP ³⁰ (Ethiopia 09)	280	1.5%	1.5 million	3.8%
EPWP ³¹ (South Africa 08/09)	2 830	1.0%	570 000	2.8%
CfWTEP ³² (Liberia 09)	1.5	0.17%	8 500	0.8%
<i>Jefes</i> ³³ (Argentina 2003)	3 056	0.9%	2 210 000	13.0%
FAIMO ³⁴ (Cape Verde)	10.8 (1998), 19.7 (1992)	Between 2% (1998) and 5% (1992)	15 000 to 20 000	11.5% (2000)

Source: Compiled by author based on information indicated in footnotes

²⁷ Campbell, 2008, p. 39.

²⁸ Author's calculations based on GDP data from United Nations Statistical Division, 2013.

²⁹ Author's calculation. Source for labour force size is from International Labour Organization, Department of Statistics, undated, and where not available from Wikipedia, 2014.

³⁰ Programme for PSNP from World Bank, 2010, p. 19 and 21, and includes both donor and government contributions through provision of PSNP staff.

³¹ Programme data for the EPWP from South Africa, Department of Public Works, 2009, annexure A.

³² Programme data for Cash for Work Temporary Employment Programme based on Andrews et al., 2011, p. 9.

³³ Programme data for *Jefes* from Kostzer, 2008.

³⁴ Programme data for FAIMO based on Ferreira, 2003.

III. CONTEXT OF THE LABOUR INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME CASE STUDY

A. THE NATIONAL CONTEXT AND THE GOVERNMENT STABILISATION PLAN

Since the LIWP started in 2008, many aspects of the Yemeni economy have worsened. The continuation of food shortages, the worsening internal conflict, chronic water shortages and the Arab Spring of 2011 have all combined to create what could be seen as an ongoing crisis, and this has in turn led to an increase in poverty. These multiple crises, as well as some of the structural problems in the Yemeni economy, have led to an estimated increase in the poverty rate from 42 per cent in 2009 to 54.5 per cent at the end of 2011.³⁵

After the violence and protests in 2011, a government of national reconciliation was formed, and this government prepared the Transitional Program for Stabilization and Development (TPSD). This plan outlines both Top Priorities and Urgent Actions (Chapter 2) and a Medium Term Economic Recovery Program (Chapter 3). It focuses upon stabilising the situation to create a platform for recovery and, ultimately, growth.

In Chapter 2 of the TPSD, under priority three: “Meeting urgent humanitarian and material needs”, the TPSD calls for addressing the immediate needs for nutrition, and for enhancing the role of social protection in relation to meeting urgent humanitarian and material needs.³⁶

In Chapter 3, priority number three is the expansion of social protection. The components of this expansion to which the LIWP is most relevant are “Enhance the social safety mechanisms and networks”, “Expand social protection network and support poor groups”, and “Give priority to labour-intensive investments in all economic sectors, with special emphasis on women’s and youth labour force participation.”³⁷ The SFD responded to the TPSD by introducing changes to the LIWP which are discussed in more detail below.

B. THE LABOUR MARKET IN RURAL YEMEN

Since PEPs provide income mainly through offering employment, an understanding of the nature of un- and underemployment in an area is important in order to recognise what effects a programme can have there, and what the implications should be for its design. Especially in rural areas, the character of un- and underemployment is often poorly understood, and not accurately captured by official labour market definitions and statistics.

Fortunately, the impact evaluation of the LIWP also provides an insightful analysis of the rural labour market in Yemen.³⁸ These insights arise from looking at how much, how regularly and under what conditions respondents worked over the past year as well as the past month, giving a more nuanced perspective.³⁹ Some of the findings of the study are summarised below, and their implications for the LIWP discussed.

1. *Unemployment and underemployment in rural Yemen*

The first interesting finding from the evaluation is that while it was confirmed that unemployment among young men, estimated at over 40 per cent, remained very high, this rate was only slightly higher than that of older men. Another important finding is that underemployment is probably an even bigger problem than unemployment in rural Yemen. The evaluation found that half of all men reported working only six months of the year or less, and that only some 20 per cent of adult men responded that they worked every day and

³⁵ World Bank et. al., 2012, p. xxvi.

³⁶ Yemen, Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2012, p. 11.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 17.

³⁸ Al-Maweri and Egel, 2011, p. 9-10.

³⁹ The official definition of unemployment is based on whether respondents have worked or not in the past week. In the Yemeni context where less than 20 % of the labour force has what can be considered long-term employment this definition alone does not sufficiently capture the actual work situation of the majority of the work force. Over the course of a month or year, most people are neither fully employed nor unemployed but rather underemployed. This study assisted in understanding this better.

could be considered full-time employed. It should be noted that respondents included days worked on their own land (self-employment in agriculture) in their responses, and so the high levels of underemployment are not caused by such labour not being reported. It was also found that of those employed, about 27 per cent were employed on a permanent basis (e.g. government work), 43 per cent on a temporary basis (e.g. day labour work), and 11 per cent on a seasonal basis (mostly in agricultural work). The remainder reported working in a combination of the above arrangements, including 8 per cent who reported that they managed to combine permanent work with other temporary or seasonal work.⁴⁰

These high rates of un- and underemployment substantiate the rationale for having an intervention like the LIWP. In such a context, the LIWP is highly likely to effectively mobilise otherwise idle labour, and one can reasonably assume that the opportunity-cost of participating in the LIWP, through the loss of other income, is likely to be low. In times of high un- and underemployment, the degree to which the LIWP would compete with other labour market opportunities is probably mostly a concern during peak agricultural seasons. Offering work through the LIWP during such periods can easily be avoided, making the programme complementary to other forms of employment.

In terms of the female labour market, the situation was found to be even more complex. The general perception in Yemen is that rural women are not employed, and indeed the study found that merely 20 per cent of women were engaged in some form of salaried employment, most of them only part-time. However, another study reported upon in the evaluation found that “60% of adult females reported earning an income of some type”, and that “[t]his difference is likely because many traditional female income generating activities (e.g. handicrafts, selling produce) are not considered employment”.⁴¹ This implies that while few women are in salaried employment, the majority of rural women are actually economically active.

From the perspective of the LIWP, this seems to support the notion that the difficulty in achieving high female participation rates in the programme does not stem from women being unwilling to work and earn an income. While cultural factors are known to be important in this regard, the low participation of women cannot be separated from the high rate of un- and underemployment among men. As work in the LIWP is offered to a household, not to an individual, it is ultimately the household’s decision who actually performs the work. In a context of such high un- and underemployment rates among men, it is perhaps not surprising that households tend to decide to let men take up the work. This is even further exacerbated by the manner in which tasks and wages are determined in the programme, which allows for higher earnings for more (often physical) work performed. This will be discussed in detail below.

2. Wages and income

With regard to rural wages, the same study found that almost 70 per cent of adult men earned daily wages of more than YER 1000 (USD 5), and that more than 40 per cent earned daily wage of more than YER 1500.⁴² They also found that the distribution of wages was relatively tight: those doing skilled labour had only slightly higher wages than those performing unskilled tasks, and those who earned most were the ones doing a combination of skilled and unskilled work. This reflects the fact that few jobs in these areas require significant human capital. It was also found that the average household had over six family members, but only one individual working, and an estimated annual income of around USD 1700. While these earnings were bolstered by other sources, wage labour made up the bulk of household income.

A second important finding is that in-kind payments generally made up a substantial component of the total compensation for rural men employed by third parties. In-kind payments typically included *qat*, cigarettes, food, and sometimes a place to sleep. More than half of all working men reported in-kind payments of at least YER 500 (USD 2.50), typically including several meals (YER 200-400) and some *qat* to the value of YER 100-200. Furthermore, more than one-quarter of the men reported that in-kind payments were equivalent to their daily cash wage.

⁴⁰ These figures are the author’s calculations based on data provided in Al Maweri and Egel, 2011, figure 2.5.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 9.

⁴² Ibid., 2011, p. 11.

C. CURRENT SOCIAL PROTECTION MEASURES IN YEMEN

Social protection in Yemen can be divided in two parts, with separate schemes serving different sections of the population. The social insurance schemes cover workers in the formal economy, and given that 94 per cent of employment in rural areas is estimated to be informal, few there participate in the social insurance schemes.

The second component is a large social safety net, described as “an integrated package for poverty reduction, by means of increasing productivity of local communities and focusing on poverty pockets”.⁴³ The LIWP falls within this second component, and the question of how it is integrated with the rest of the safety net will be further explored in this study.

The most important components of this safety net are run by the SWF and the SFD. The SWF has a focused social security mandate, and implements interventions like the cash transfer programme. The SFD has a much broader development mandate and implements a range of development oriented projects, including construction of schools and clinics, water supply and sanitation projects, small and medium enterprise development programmes, support to small farmers, and the LIPW. The most important component of the social safety net, at least in terms of scale and coverage, is the unconditional cash transfer programme of the SWF. This programme initially only targeted specific vulnerable categories, such as orphans and persons with disabilities, but was reformed in 2008, when the poor were made part of the target group.⁴⁴ The programme has expanded quite dramatically in the past years, from around 1 million in 2010 to 1.5 million beneficiary households in 2012, comprising 6.9 million individuals in all 21 governorates. Its annual budget is approximately YER 60 billion (0.65 per cent of GDP), and it is estimated that 50 per cent of its beneficiaries can engage in economic activities. Additionally, in 2012 there were about 400,000 applications in the pipeline.⁴⁵ This backlog in processing applications was driven by both the shift to targeting based on poverty criteria, which is still being implemented, and the increase in the number of families in poverty due to events in the past years. The amount of the cash transfer varies by number of dependents, and ranges between YER 2000 and YER 4000 (USD 20) per month.⁴⁶

The cash transfer programme of the SWF currently faces a number of pressures. It is clear that with the shift towards covering the poor generally, it is not able to provide coverage to all who are eligible - particularly not with the increasing poverty rates observed over the past years. While the poverty rate has increased to 54.5 per cent of the population, or 12.6 million people, and food-insecure people were estimated by the World Food Programme (WFP) to make up around 45 per cent of the population in March 2012,⁴⁷ the SWF cash-transfer programme reaches only 6.7 million beneficiaries, or less than a third of the population. To cover all the poor in Yemen, it would have to almost double in size. Moreover, the value of the SWF cash transfers have eroded significantly due to generally inflated prices resulting from the 2011 crisis. So, there are arguments for increasing the coverage as well as the benefit levels of this programme, measures which both would require additional funding.

In addition to the Community Development Programme (CDP) and the LIWP implemented by the SFD, there is the Public Works Project (PWP),⁴⁸ which is implemented by the MOPIC through a Project Management Unit. This programme started in 1996 and currently runs in parallel with the CDP and LIWP. The PWP has different objectives than the LIWP, wherefore its design and operating modality are very dissimilar. In general, the PWP has a much stronger focus on infrastructure delivery, using small contractors and, at the same time, creating short-term job opportunities for unskilled and skilled labourers. As such, the duration of employment offered completely depends on the nature of the project, and there is no target of providing a minimum income transfer to each person employed. While sometimes referred to as a social protection or safety net programme, the PWP's objectives and priorities relate to the delivery of

⁴³ International Labour Organization, 2008, p. 7.

⁴⁴ Bagash et al., 2012, p. 31.

⁴⁵ World Bank et al., 2012, p. 62.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. xxvi.

⁴⁸ In some literature and World Bank documentations this is also referred to as the Labour Intensive Public Works Project (LIPWP), but the programme's website calls itself the Public Works Project.

infrastructure, albeit in a labour-intensive manner. However, the type of infrastructure it develops focuses on enhancing access to essential services, and so it also contributes to that aspect of the SPF. Its labour intensity is not fixed, but varies depending on the project, and is reported to be on average 44 per cent.⁴⁹ Because of the lower labour intensity, the programme is also to implement a wider range of projects than the LIWP, such as construction of schools and classrooms, health clinics, water and sanitation facilities and community centres. Available funds are allocated to communities based on three criteria: population size, poverty, and remoteness. It requests communities to propose small projects, the best ones of which are then implemented. The PWP generally uses commercial contractors for implementation, and these contractors hire local labour but do not specifically target the poorest. A comparison of the two programmes will be provided below after the LIWP has been described in more detail.

Perhaps the most important efforts to integrate the various social safety net interventions is around the area of targeting. There have been efforts for the SWF and the SFD to cooperate on targeting which will be discussed in below in the section on targeting.

⁴⁹ World Bank, 2012, p. 4.

IV. THE LABOUR INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME AND EVOLUTION OF ITS KEY FEATURES

A. DESCRIPTION OF THE LABOUR INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME

1. General overview of the Labour Intensive Works Programme

The LIWP is being implemented by the SFD. When food prices surged in Yemen in 2008, leading to increased food insecurity, various donors worked with the SFD to establish the Cash for Work Programme to provide income to affected households and, at the same time, construct productive assets to help address food insecurity. This Cash for Work Programme evolved into the LIWP. The LIWP has expanded significantly in the wake of continuing crises in Yemen, particularly the impact of the Arab Spring in 2011. The LIWP is not a completely homogeneous or singular programme, mainly because its various components have been, and remain, funded by various donors, often with different objectives and requirements, as well as by the government of Yemen. The British Department for International Development, the European Union, the States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, the WFP and the Netherlands Development Cooperation have all financed or co-financed some element of the LIWP. The urban component, which is to more than 95 per cent funded by the government, is designed and implemented differently from the donor-financed rural one. While of comparable size to the rural component in terms of budget, it has not been as well-documented, or as intensely evaluated.

The SFD has made considerable efforts to standardise the LIWP, and to have more fixed operational procedures regardless of who finances particular components.⁵⁰ Over the five years it has also made various changes to the LIWP which in many ways reflect lessons learned during the implementation. The approach taken in this paper is to attempt to describe key aspects of the programme, and, where applicable, analyse some of the changes since its start. This is seen as an effective method for capturing some of the key lessons learned, which is the main objective of this study. It should be pointed out two of the strengths of the SFD are its emphasis on continuous improvement and its ability to adapt its programmes during their implementation.

Generally, these ongoing changes in the LIWP are informed by four factors:

- SFD's own experiences with the implementation of the LIWP, which have affected, for example, developments in setting benefit levels, geographical targeting and asset selection,
- Independent evaluations and impact assessments, which have affected the targeting within communities,
- New information or international experiences which have led to the introduction of beneficiary cards and complaint mechanisms,
- Events and changing conditions in Yemen which have led to LIWP expansion and to more beneficiaries participating for shorter duration.

The LIWP has three different modalities for implementation. The first modality is the original, short-term one where participants are in the programme for four to six months only. Although the SFD was planning to shift away from this modality to the third one, it was expanded after 2011 - due the effects of the crisis and the policy in the TPSD to extent coverage - and remains the dominant one.

The second modality is the urban one, which also provides a once-off opportunity. Its targeting is much simpler, and is essentially self-selection based on the wage-rate offered. Opportunities to work in the LIWP are publicly announced, and work is offered applicants on a first-come first-served basis.

The third modality takes a medium- to long-term approach, and participants remain in the programme for a period of three to five years. It is the one closest to a en employment guarantee, as it aims to provide such a guarantee for at least a limited period. Participants are not working over this entire time, but are assured that

⁵⁰ The SFD has for example developed a single Project Operations Manual that will apply to all LIWP projects. The manual is officially still a draft but it was indicated by SFD management that it is already being used by the branch offices implementing LIWP projects.

for each year they will be allocated a minimum amount of work and related earnings. Hence, there is regularity and predictability with regard to income over this period. This approach draws on the experience of the PSNP in Ethiopia, and takes into consideration that the poorest households generally require ongoing, rather than once-off, transfers to achieve food security. The relationship formed between the LIWP and the community in this modality also creates an opportunity to together identify complementary development interventions and to mobilise expertise in other sections of the SFD to implement these.

2. *The Social Fund for Development's response to the 2011 crisis and the role of the Labour Intensive Works Programme*

The SFD shifted its entire strategy in response to the 2011 crisis, particularly to counter increased unemployment, poverty and food security. "Income through temporary employment" became the core element of the strategy which was articulated as follows:

To maximize income generating opportunities from temporary employment through implementation of a wide range of workfare programs of immediate, short-term and medium to long term outcomes, with nationwide coverage focusing on the most affected and vulnerable communities/groups. In addition to exploring, piloting, mainstreaming and where possible scaling up other relevant interventions in the areas of: Food Security, Malnutrition, and State building.⁵¹

This shift has elevated the importance of the LIWP, as it was the most suitable vehicle the SFD had available to deliver on this new strategy. Resources were shifted to the LIWP, and some changes were made to the programme's design.

Based on the lessons from 2008 to 2011, the SFD wanted to shift more of the LIWP to the third implementing modality described above. This, however, was in essence postponed, and focus shifted to making a faster expansion in order to reach a larger number of households. That, in practice, mainly meant retaining the first modality, although with some modifications. The objectives of the programme became more short-term, addressing the growing food insecurity without necessarily seeking to build the capacity of those reached to increase their productivity over the medium-term. This meant that some aspects, like the type of infrastructure, were simplified, and that interventions were shortened in order to reach a higher number of people within a wider geographic spread.

In 2013, another shift occurred. Now, the development objective was broadened to include elements on capacity building and skills. The development objective of the LIWP is currently formulated as follows:

LIWP's objective is to provide a cash-for-work safety net to targeted households to bridge their consumption gap during shocks and stagnation of agricultural seasons, while increasing the productive assets of communities and households. It also aims to raise awareness among the targeted communities about the dangers of malnutrition and damages of qat, and build the capacity and enhance the skills of the targeted communities to cope with future shocks.⁵²

The second part of the development objective has been added recently, with the introduction of the aim to provide education and nutrition-related services. The part about building capacity and enhancing skills to cope with future shocks links to some of the training programmes also being introduced, as well as to building capacity of communities in participatory planning and management of development activities.

B. KEY FINDINGS FROM THE FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS AND INTERVIEWS

Before proceeding with the analysis of some of the other features of the LIWP, this section will provide an overview of the FGDs and interviews conducted as part of this study and highlight some key findings. These, and some of the other findings from these interview and FGDs, are also integrated into the thematic areas of

⁵¹ Republic of Yemen Social Fund for Development, 2012, p. 12-13.

⁵² Republic of Yemen Social Fund for Development, 2013a, p. 43.

this report. FGDs were held with LIWP participants, and interviews conducted with officials and staff in the SFD branch offices as well as with staff at the SFD head office and officials from the MOPIC and the SWF.

The FGDs were held in four governorates: Taiz, Hajja, Hadramout and Sana'a. The areas in which to conduct the FGDs were selected as follows: From the list of implemented projects under the LIWP, two projects were randomly selected in each of the four governorates. The SFD subsequently provided the lists of beneficiary households and workers of these projects, and from each such list 8-12 people were randomly chosen. The SFD then informed the nominated people, and arranged a meeting place for the discussions to take place. Two FGDs (Almaru in Hajja and Magbana in Taiz) also included community members who were not part of the LIWP. The schedule and details of the interviews and FGDs are included in Annex A.

1. Description of the study areas in the four governorates

The Hadramout has a very low population density, and the population is scattered, with many people living in very small settlements. The LIWP consequently had difficulties finding villages of at least 300 people, which is the basis for its targeting. While the study area (Ain Basoid village in Hajr district) has good agricultural land, most of it is owned by large landowners. Hence, small-scale agriculture is limited. The population is, in addition, better known for trading than for farming traditions. The projects in the area tried to support small scale farmers, even though they did not own the land they were farming. Works included rehabilitation of irrigation channels and protection of existing wells, runnels (small irrigation canals often lined with stone or masonry to reduce or prevent water from filtering into the soil) and springs. Special care was taken to ensure that these projects benefitted small farmers and not large landowners.

In Hajja governorate, the focus groups were held in the two villages (Almarwe and Alanabis) in the Washa district. This region is a major *qat* growing area, and the SFD, as a matter of policy, focuses most of its projects and investments on villages where no *qat* is grown. Those are generally also poorer, and therefore tend to be prioritised anyway. The region has limited water supply and relies on rain-fed agriculture. It is mountainous and politically unstable. In the first village, the projects involved construction of seven water-harvesting reservoirs, maintenance of agricultural lands, and protection of existing wells. In the second village, it involved four water-harvesting reservoirs, maintenance of agricultural lands and reduction of floods-flow. While The FGDs covered only rural projects, the interviews with officials also covered the experience with LIWP projects in the urban areas of Hajja.

In Taiz, the FGDs were also conducted in two villages: Alaref, in the Magbanah district, and Geraf, Mawiah district. Even though these areas are rural, they are quite densely populated, as is the Taiz governorate overall. Both areas have generally poor agricultural land and a short rainy season. Rearing livestock - mostly sheep - is an important economic activity, and no *qat* production occurs. In both areas the projects involved maintenance of agricultural lands, water reservoirs, which also served livestock, and access roads.

In Sana'a the project was in the Shaoub district of Sana'a City and involved improved drainage/ flood control, construction of a box-channel and tubular channels for the street, and paving of sidewalks.

2. Key findings from the focus group discussions

The FGDs explored five themes: 1. The relationship between the participant and the LIWP; 2. Effects on access to services, including health and education; 3. The relationships between LIWP and the rest of the community and society; 4. Empowerment to improve one's own life, community and environment; and 5. Broader economic impacts and effects of the LIWP. Interviews with officials and consultants in the four governorates related to operational aspects of the programme as well as to its effectiveness and impact, whereas interviews with officials at the head office and with the MOPIC and the SWF focused more on policy. Many of the findings from the interviews and FGDs are incorporated in sections of this report dealing with specific thematic areas, but four general points that emerged will be accounted for here.

The first point is the general concern among participants regarding the continuity - or, rather, the discontinuity - of the work. For all of them, involvement with the programme ended with the completion of their part of the project. Thus, while all were enthusiastic about the LIWP - to the extent that in Hadramout

they referred to the four-month project implementation phase as a “golden period” for the village - they were also interested in future work with the programme, but did not know if this would happen. For the participants, then, the LIWP provided a once-off windfall, while they were eager to have longer, or some kind of regular, work with it.

The second point is linked to the first, in that as the project provided only a once-off opportunity, it raised the question whether participants had gained the skills to find other work. Apparently, the extent to which they had done so was small, as participants generally indicated that the skills they had gained were limited. Some had learned construction-related skills, but such were not particularly useful in the prevailing economic context.

The third key point emerging is that while the SFD tries to encourage female participation in general, the projects were not really suitable for the employment of women. The main reason for this was that the type of work to be done in the projects (mostly construction-related) was not considered appropriate for women, who were therefore mostly allocated peripheral tasks - such as preparing food or collecting rocks - for which they could not be employed for very long.

The fourth important point common to all the FGDs related to maintenance of the completed assets. This was generally a concern, although for varying reasons. In the urban projects, participants indicated that communities were weak and transient, making it difficult to mobilise members to undertake voluntary maintenance as intended. Consequently, the drains constructed in the project were rapidly filling up with garbage. In the rural areas reasons varied, but one point was that the maintenance committees often were not functioning as intended, and so people were uncertain as to what specific roles they had in the maintenance process.

On the more positive side, participants in the FGDs were generally very satisfied with how selection of participants took place, and felt that the process was fair and transparent. They also felt that they had been able to influence the selection of projects, and that the projects generally were useful and beneficial to a large part of the community or to the community as a whole.


C. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

1. Labour Intensive Works Programme management arrangements within the Social Fund for Development

The LIWP is managed and implemented by the SFD, to which its achievements are intricately linked. The SFD in Yemen is widely recognised and admired as a highly effective development agency, and the importance of the LIWP having a strong and professional institutional home with a well-established reputation cannot be underestimated. It is difficult to separate the LIWP from the SFD, since the programme is designed to be implemented taking into account the capacities of the fund. The LIWP has benefited from the overall institutional experience, leadership, capacity and memory, as well as reputation and resources, that come with the SFD. Particular areas where the LIWP has benefited from being implemented by the SFD include targeting, project management, community contracting, impact evaluation and mobilisation of funds. The SFD was established as an autonomous state institution under the Council of Ministers in 1997. The Prime Minister of Yemen is the chairman of the Board of Directors, and six other Ministers (Social Affairs and Labour; Planning and International Cooperation; Education and Technical and Vocational Training; Local Administration; and Finance) are also on the board. The board consist of six other directors drawn from the NGO, private, academic and banking sectors, as well as of the Managing Director. The SFD functions as a state institution, but because of its structure it operates rather autonomously from the government. The SFD implements a wide range of development-related projects and programmes, of which the LIWP is one.

Within the SFD, the LIWP is managed by a Programme Manager based at the SFD head office and reporting directly to the Managing Director of the SFD. The Programme Manager has ten technical staff members working with the LIWP in his team at Head Office. Their different functions are provided in the figure below.


Figure 1: LIWP staff at Head Office



Source: Republic of Yemen Social Fund for Development, 2013b, p. 11.

The LIWP Unit’s focus is on the implementation of the programme and its projects. It works closely with other units in the SFD, particularly with the programme unit on geographic targeting, the M&E Unit and the Training and Organizational Support Unit developing the capacity of LIWP field staff as well as consultants. There is also an LIWP structure at each of the SFD’s branch offices. The general structure of the LIWP Team at the branch level is presented in the figure below. This structure is flexible, however, and adapted to the number of LIWP projects for which the branch is responsible.

Figure 2: Structure of the LIWP in SFD Branch Offices



Source: Republic of Yemen Social Fund for Development, 2013b, p. 19.

2. Involvement of other government departments and authorities

The overall government oversight of the LIWP takes place through the board of the SFD, on which most ministers with responsibilities for different aspects of the LIWP are represented. At the implementation level, the only government party with an active role are local authorities, and their role is mainly in assisting the SFD with deciding on the final districts and villages to select for implementation of the LIWP. This is meant to take place through a workshop with the local authorities where the SFD presents the districts and sub-districts it wants to target as determined based on their criteria and available data. If there is disagreement on these areas with the local authorities, site visits are arranged to verify the data to come to a final selection.⁵³

However, as indicated in the interviews with staff in the field offices, the degree to which these workshops and joint selection of communities actually happen varies. In some interviews, it was indicated that the involvement of local authorities is limited to informing them in writing that the SFD is planning to implement LIWP projects in their area. Given that the districts and sub-districts are selected based on a strict set of criteria and already available data, it may make sense that local authorities are content with merely being informed. Furthermore, as the LIWP tends to select the most remote villages and areas, local authorities may also have only limited interest in engaging with the selection of districts and sub-districts in more detail.

Some staff also indicated that in certain instances the participation of local authorities complicates things, especially if they are not seen as objective in the process. Staff also reported that there were cases in which the involvement of local authorities led to them getting entangled in tribal disputes in the area (Hajja). In Taiz, Hadramout and Sana'a, interviewees indicated that the involvement of the local authorities was more limited and passive. They tended to be engaged when the SFD approached them for assistance, which occurred on a more limited basis. Interviews with local authorities generally showed that they were comfortable with the current state of affairs, but that there was scope for increased participation from their side.

One approach that the SFD is planning to explore on a pilot basis is to increase the involvement of selected local authorities who are deemed to have implementation capacity: to engage the local authority as an implementing agent or partner, whereby they would mostly be responsible for the implementation of the project. It is still unclear when this will start, however, or what the exact modalities will be.

3. Community level structures

The LIWP works with communities through several committees, and a crucial part of its work is to facilitate the establishment of these committees. The most important of them is the project committee, which consists of three to five elected members from households participating in the LIWP. At least one of the members must be a woman. The project committee's responsibilities include the prioritisation of projects and raising awareness about the LIWP. It also plays a critical role in the community contracting process, where it essentially represents the community. To support the project, committees work with the LIWP, which provides them with training on, amongst other aspects, project implementation, participatory rural appraisal tools, communication, and objectives and impacts of the LIWP. The project committee can establish additional committees, such as awareness committees, to support its work.

The LIWP also facilitates the establishment of development committees, which have no direct role in the implementation of the programme. These committees are meant to identify opportunities for improving local livelihoods, and to work with the LIWP and other SFD staff to implement activities related to that end. For example, a development committee can establish a productive group on horticulture, and in working with this group identify opportunities for training in horticulture which can then be provided by the SFD.

⁵³ Republic of Yemen Social Fund for Development, 2013b, p. 34.

4. *Different contracting modalities used in the Labour Intensive Works Programme*

The LIWP is now being implemented either through commercial contractors or through community contracting. Generally, commercial contractors are used in urban areas and community contracting in rural ones. These approaches have been developed after different attempts to allow the LIWP to best address capacity constraints: its own as well as overall capacity constraints in rural areas, where, for example, commercial contractors and technical consultants are not present or are more expensive to deploy.

In urban areas, contractors are commissioned based on the SFD's procurement policies, which require a public announcement of available tenders as well as the public opening of all received tenders. The specific LIWP requirements for the hiring of labour - minimum labour intensity and wage rates - are specifically included in the tender and in the subsequent contract of the appointed contractor.

In rural areas, the community contracting approach is now commonly used.⁵⁴ On the side of the LIWP, the community contracting approach is implemented through consultants appointed and trained by the programme. These consultants work with the community through the LIWP project committee. After participants have been selected, and have elected the project committee, the committee, in consultation with the rest of the community and the LIWP consultants, decide on suitable projects, and the community is then contracted to execute the project.

In this approach, the selected participants are contracted as groups to execute a project, and they are monitored by the project committee and the consultants appointed by the LIWP. Such a work group consists of both skilled and unskilled workers to ensure quality and that the group is able to manage many of the day-to-day aspects themselves. The project committee usually forms the work groups, and the LIWP ensures that there is sufficient skilled labour available, if necessary by hiring labour from residents who do not meet the poverty targeting criteria or from outside the community. The advantage of the community contracting approach is that it is much more cost-effective for the SFD than contracting and supervising each labourer individually, as its project management requirements are much lower. This has enabled the SFD to increase the number of participants in the LIWP.

In many countries, the main risk with this approach is that the quality of work may not be up to standard. Even if noticed, this may be difficult to correct, as the resources available to the community to implement corrective measures tend to be limited. However, this is not a major concern in Yemen, where it is generally possible to find enough labour with construction skills who can be part of the community contracting process. Furthermore, in order to reduce the risks associated with this approach, the range of projects is kept simple to minimise both the material and technical inputs.

The LIWP is also aiming to test other approaches using civil society organisations as the implementing parties. In such models, the civil society organisations would be contracted to implement (multiple) projects, and the SFD would provide the funding and oversight.

D. TARGETING

1. *Overall targeting approach*

The LIWP uses different targeting approaches for rural and urban areas. In rural areas it uses a combination of targeting mechanisms in a four-step process.⁵⁵ The targeting process starts with geographic targeting, through which villages for the implementation of the LIWP are identified based on available data. The second step involves a workshop with local authorities to discuss and agree on the district and village to be targeted. The third step involves verification of the results from the data through visiting the proposed village and site, and the final step involves selecting the individual households, using a combination of assessing the

⁵⁴ This approach is also used on other programmes by the SFD, see also Republic of Yemen Social Fund for Development, 2014a, for more details.

⁵⁵ Republic of Yemen Social Fund for Development, 2013b, p. 34.

degree of poverty the household is experiencing, community based targeting and self-targeting through the wage rate.

In urban areas the targeting process is simpler. While a similar geographic targeting approach is used to identify the poorest parts of urban areas, the programme thereafter relies mostly on self-targeting. These targeting mechanisms are discussed in more detail in the sections below.

2. *Targeting in rural areas*

Step 1: Geographic targeting

The geographic targeting approach used by the LIWP aims to identify the poorest villages with at least 300 people. It is very data-driven and uses the database of the Programme Unit of the SFD. This database combines the 2004 census data and the 2005-06 household budget survey with other government data as well as with data collected by the SFD. It is used for the targeting of all the SFD's activities.

The SFD has developed a poverty index for villages and settlements based on six indicators: the illiteracy rate, the share of school age children not in primary school, the percentage of households without adequate sanitation, the percentage of households with electricity, the percentage of households with drinking water supply, and the percentage of households using firewood or coal for cooking. The average value of these six ratios determines the value of the poverty index for a village or settlement. Those with a score of between 76 and 100 are categorised as category 4 and prioritised by the LIWP.

This approach is increasingly also complemented by other data in order to get an even better understanding of the characteristics of villages and their households. Data from the SWF on the beneficiaries of the cash transfer programme has now also been linked to this SFD database.⁵⁶

The geographic targeting process starts with distributing the available budget among the branch offices in the governorates in which the LIWP is implemented, based on the number of poor people in each governorate. Then, based on the number of people that can be reached with the available budget, an estimated number of villages that can be reached is determined. Villages that are classified as category 4 and have more than 300 people are then identified and become potential target villages for the LIWP. The lower limit of 300 people is, in essence, to keep the LIWP cost-effective and to have a minimum number of participants to justify the costs of project management by SFD-appointed consultants. If the number of villages still exceeds what can be accommodated using the budgets, those with the lowest rankings are prioritised.

In the impact evaluation of the LIWP, this targeting approach was found to be effective in that the selected villages tended to be the poorest ones within their sub-districts, districts and governorates.⁵⁷

Step 2: Consultation with local authorities

Step 2 of the targeting process involves consultation between LIWP staff in the branch offices and the local authorities. This consultation is done through a workshop where the LIWP staff presents the results of the first step and the local authorities can comment upon or question the results. The LIWP staff may decide to go and visit villages to verify that the data used is correct. In case no consensus is reached with the local authorities, the SFD takes the final decision.

As was mentioned in 4.2.2, these consultations do not always take place, and when they do take place they are not always considered very useful. In some ways this is not surprising, as the data-driven approach of the SFD leaves very limited room to the local authorities to change or influence the selection of villages. The interviewees in Hadramout also indicated that while they did not fully agree with the accuracy of the poverty indicators adopted by the SFD, they did not see this as important enough to not cooperate with SFD.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 33.

⁵⁷ Al Maweri and Egel, 2011, p. 22.

Step 3: Verification of targeted villages

The third step in the targeting process is that programme officers conduct site visits to all the targeted villages to verify that they are suitable for, and interested in, participating. In order to make the project cost-effective, the LIWP requires that at least 70 per cent of targeted households are willing to partake. The third step, in essence, is meant to confirm that people in the villages identified will cooperate with the LIWP in implementing the project.

Step 4: Selection of individual households

The fourth step involves selecting individual households within the selected village. This is done through a combination of methods. Household surveys assessing access to basic services are used, as well as community participation in identifying the poorest households. In addition, the programme still relies on self-targeting through its wage rate.

Initially, the LIWP in this step relied mostly on self-targeting, but this was changed to a large extent based on the findings of the impact evaluations commissioned by the SFD. These questioned the effectiveness of relying only on self-targeting within the village, as it was felt that the effective wage of YER 1500 was not especially low as compared to actual income and wages of local households.⁵⁸ One reason for this was that communities did in fact demand high wages as the work offered by the LIWP was physically demanding. In addition, one of the effects of the 2011 crisis was that wages in rural areas actually went down, making the LIWP more attractive.⁵⁹

Another finding was that the participation of those not in the target group, such as teachers, was clearly visible. However, as participation was open to all who were willing to work at the programme wage, it was difficult to prevent these community members from participating.⁶⁰ The prevalence of this was not extremely high, but it all the same risked damaging the programme's credibility. Perhaps most concerning was the finding that around 7 per cent of participants reported being able to "sell" their place in the project to other members of the community.⁶¹ Of these, only a quarter did so because they were not able to do the work themselves, whereas the others most likely did so simply in order to earn something without having to work. Even though this does not appear to have occurred alarmingly frequently, the practice could significantly undermine the credibility of the programme if left unchecked.

The findings from the FGDs held for this study indicated that communities perceived the targeting process to be fair and transparent. These findings are similar to those of other FGDs conducted, which also found that communities understood that in many cases the participation of the not-so-poor was linked to them possessing skills or assets (transport) beneficial to the project. When their participation took place for these reasons, it was not seen as unfair.⁶²

Finally, it is interesting to note that these changes were apparently driven as much by the requisite of increasing the fairness and transparency of the targeting as by the need to increase its efficacy as measured in the percentage of participants that are defined as the target group.

3. Targeting in urban areas

The targeting approach adopted in urban areas by the LIWP is much simpler. The first two steps are similar as for the rural targeting, but after that the programme mostly relies on self-targeting. The main reasons for this is that the urban projects are implemented through commercial contractors who typically are not interested in being involved in community-level targeting approaches, and that the urban programmes are always of a short duration and thus do not justify investment in a longer targeting process.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 23.

⁵⁹ Christian et al., 2013, p. 22.

⁶⁰ Al-Iryani et al., 2010, p. 9.

⁶¹ Al Maweri and Egel, 2011, p. 32.

⁶² Al-Iryani et al., 2010, p. 9.

4. Targeting and participation of women


The participation of women in the LIWP has so far remained limited despite efforts to increase it. The low participation is due to a combination of factors, including the overall lower labour force participation rate of women, cultural norms that inhibit women from taking up work outside the home, and the lack of tradition in Yemen of women working in construction. Furthermore, as the LIWP targets households and not individuals, the final decision to participate is made in the household, and the LIWP cannot demand that households deploy only or more women to the projects.

In FGDs conducted in 2010, women proposed three measures that would increase their participation: “(1) designing the projects so that the work site is closer to the village centre, (2) allowing the women to work together in groups separate from the men (‘if they let us go in groups it won’t be a disgrace’), and (3) adapting some of the work to be less physically strenuous.”⁶³ The LIWP has tried to implement these measures, but there have been only limited increases in female participation. The general conclusion from the FGDs in this study was that the projects were still seen as largely unsuitable for women, whose participation remained peripheral.

Data obtained from the SFD shows the number of labourers working in the LIWP broken down in unskilled and skilled labour, as well as in male and female labour. No project so far has hired any skilled female labour, hence only the unskilled labour is broken down in male and female. Of the 412,224 people who worked on the LIWP between 30 August 2010 and 1 November 2013, unskilled labourers amounted to 366,734, or 89 percent. The 72,307 women, it follows, made up 17.5 per cent of the total labour force and 19.7 per cent of the unskilled one. In 2011 and 2012, the share of females of the total number of labourers remained around 17 per cent, but it increased to 24 per cent in the data so far available for 2013.

There was also some variation in female participation regionally, as shown in Figure 3 below, with the Amran governorate being the notable outlier with female participation rates of above 30 per cent in both 2011 and 2012. It is not clear why projects in Amran were able to have much higher rates of participation by women.

Figure 3: Percentage of women in total number of labourers on LIWP projects per governorate for 2011 and 2012.



Source: MIS Data provided by SFD

⁶³ Ibid., p. 6.

It should be stressed, however, that LIWP work is allocated to households, not individuals, and that it is generally shared within the households. Over the same period, 107,552 households participated in the LIWP. On average, 3.83 persons and 0.67 women in each household worked on the programme.

While the data provided shows the total number of days worked by all labourers, this is not broken down between males and females. Thus, while it is known how many women worked on the projects, it is not clear how the days worked were distributed among males and females. Hence, it is not known how much the women earned, or what share of the total earnings accrued to them. But given that the type of tasks allocated to women were fewer (meaning that they were likely to work fewer days), that no skilled women were employed, and that the average implied wage of women was much lower than that of men,⁶⁴ it is likely that the percentage of total income paid to women was significantly lower than the female percentage of the total labour force.

The data, in addition, does not provide any indication as to how many households headed by women - usually widows - were targeted, even though such households are seen as a target group of the programme, since they belong to the most vulnerable ones.⁶⁵

Given the above, the introduction of new LIWP components in education and health that specifically provide employment more suitable to women, or are only open to women, seems like a sensible approach to increase the participation and earnings by women.

E. SCALE AND SCOPE OF THE LABOUR INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME

Except for 2011, the LIWP has grown year-on-year since it started in 2008, and it is anticipated that the programme will continue to grow in the coming years. Table 5 provides an overview of the number of participating labourers and households for 2010-2012.

Table 5: Numbers of labourers and households participating in the LIWP

Year	Number of New Projects	Number of labourers working		Number of benefitting Households	Employment created (work-days)
		Males	Females		
2010	152	102 515	17 597	26 598	1 727 763
2011	74	88 468	18 646	22 767	1 485 039
2012	175	103 903	21 611	33 563	2 333 483
Total	401	294 886	57 854	82 928	5 5462 285

Source: Data provided from SFD 2013⁶⁶

What is noticeable from these figures is the dip in all indicators during 2011, and the subsequent strong rebound in 2012, when the programme managed to grow again, exceeding performance in 2010. The highest number of labourers participated in 2012, when it was equivalent to approximately 1.8 per cent of the labour force.⁶⁷ In that year, the LIWP reached 33,563 households, and with an average household size of 6.7 this means that 225,000 people benefited from the programme. For comparison, this is around 2.3 per cent of the ten million people the WFP estimated to be food insecure.

In 2011 and 2012, the LIWP created 1.49 million and 2.33 million days of work, respectively. For comparison, the PWP in 2011 created approximately 1.82 million days of work,⁶⁸ and in 2012 all SFD

⁶⁴ According to Al Maweri and Egel, 2011, p. 31, the average wage for men was YER 1400, whereas for women it was YER 700.

⁶⁵ See for example Republic of Yemen Social Fund for Development, 2014b, for anecdotal evidence of this.

⁶⁶ These figures differ from figures in the SFD annual report and after verification with the LIWP team in the SFD it was indicated that the detailed data provided was more accurate.

⁶⁷ Estimate of the labour force of Yemen of 6,858,155 from World Bank, 2014.

⁶⁸ World Bank et al., 2012, p. 71 provides the number of in work-months, and a conversion to days based on the assumption of 25 work days per month on average (no clear definition provided in the reference) gives the number 1,819,325. The conversion is merely to enable comparing the scale of the programmes.

programmes (including the LIWP) together created approximately 7.5 million days of work.⁶⁹ In 2012, the expenditure on the LIWP was USD 32.5 million, representing 0.056 per cent of GDP. The expenditure on all SFD programmes, including the LIWP, in the same year amounted to USD 149.6 million.⁷⁰

The data obtained from the SFD is disaggregated in accordance with the nine branch offices of the SFD, six of which cover multiple governorates. Table 6 below provides an overview of the distribution and performance for the nine branch offices for 2012.

Table 6: Scale and selected indicators of the LIWP implemented by each branch office

Branch Office	Governorates covered	Budget Allocation (USD)	No of Beneficiary Households	No of days worked	Implied daily wage (USD)	% of wages to total expenditures	Av. Income per HH
Ibb	Ibb	2,938,291	2,893	200,435	9.31	86%	645
Hodeidah	Al-Hodeidah Raimah	3,529,713	4,895	340,011	8.49	91%	590
Mukalla	Hadramout, Shabwah and Al-Maharah	3,385,139	1,376	76,284	10.47	73%	580
Taiz	Taiz	5,059,000	5,298	348,918	9.98	85%	657
Hajja	Hajja	5,118,718	4,722	479,982	6.67	89%	678
Dhamar	Dhmar, Al-Baidha	2,471,272	3,092	149,387	10.82	76%	523
Sana'a	Sana'a City. Sana'a, Mareb, Al-Jawf, Al-Mahweet	5,388,999	5,016	330,602	10.58	84%	698
Aden	Aden, Lahj, Abyan, Al-Dhale	2,314,523	2,257	124,606	8.63	79%	476
Amran	Amran, Sadha	4,300,739	4,014	283,259	8.50	83%	600
Grand Total		34,506,394	33,563	2,333,483	9.27	83%	605

Some regional variations shown in table 6 are worth highlighting. One considerable variation is the implied daily wage, which was lowest in Hajja, at USD 6.67, and highest in Dhamar, at USD 10.82 - a difference of USD 4.15, or 62 per cent. However, even though Hajja had the lowest implied wage, the average transfer per household is among the highest, at USD 678, which means that households in Hajja worked a lot more days (101 days) on average as compared to the households in Dhamar who worked only 48 days on average. The labour intensity also varies considerably per branch office, and this is partially due to the geographic characteristics. This is discussed in more detail below.

In terms of planned expansion, the SFD, according to its 2012 strategy,⁷¹ aims to grow the rural LIWP to reach 100,000 households and an additional 670,000 beneficiaries by 2015, and the urban counterpart to 100,000 households and 600,000 beneficiaries. This, however, is dependent upon additional financing being secured. The expansion would bring the total number of people benefiting from LIWP income to 1.27 million, corresponding to approximately 13 per cent of the food insecure population as estimated by the WFP. While that is a relatively small percentage of the entire potential target group of the programme, it

⁶⁹ Republic of Yemen Social Fund for Development, 2013c, p. 6.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.6.

⁷¹ Republic of Yemen Social Fund for Development, 2012, p. 14.

should be kept in mind that the LIWP in effect targets two subgroups of the poor. In rural areas, it really targets the poorest people in the poorest and smaller villages, and is able to do so quite effectively. In reaching this target group, it provides a substantially bigger income benefit (USD 600 to 700 per household) as compared to the SWF, which provides an annual maximum of USD 240 per household, and which has not been adjusted up despite significant increases in the cost of living since 2011. So, for the poorest households, the LIWP is an attractive programme, and it is making its impact by reaching the very poorest with a relatively large benefit.

Information on any overlap between the SWF cash transfers and the LIWP is limited. In the impact evaluation of the LIWP, income from the SWF is lumped together with income from charities, giving only a partial picture.⁷² It was found that between May 2010 and November 2011 the number of households receiving income through charity increased in both control and treatment villages, but the increase was higher in control villages. In villages where the LIWP was implemented, the percentage of households receiving income from charity increased from 17.7 to 34.4 per cent. In control villages this percentage increased from 16.1 to 40.6 per cent. Over this same period, the SWF increased its number of beneficiaries from 1 million to 1.5 million, and so it is likely that some of these increases were due to the increased coverage of the SWF.

There is no policy to avoid participants from the LIWP accessing the SWF cash grant and vice versa. This is an area where there is a need for more policy integration and better coordination between the SWF and the SFD. This was confirmed in interviews with SWF and MOPIC officials, who indicated that while a coordination structure on social protection had been formed, it was not yet very effective. One concrete area of collaboration pertains to targeting, and the SFD “has obtained SWF data base and has linked it to its own data base, thus enabling LIWP to utilize SWF data at household level for targeting”.⁷³

F. TYPES OF WORK AND PROJECTS EXECUTED IN THE LABOUR INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME

1. *Nature of projects*

The LIWP has the target that at least 70 per cent of a project budget should be transferred to project participants, and in 2012 as much as 83 per cent was. This high labour intensity requirement places limitations on the type of projects the LIWP can implement, since there is very little budgeted for any material inputs. In 2012, only 8.2 per cent of expenditure was on materials. The types of projects implemented by the LIWP therefore mostly involve earthworks and stone masonry using locally available stone, and include terrace and land rehabilitation, flood defence walls, rural road improvement, building of canals and water ponds and the rehabilitation of wells and dykes. The cumulative outputs of the rural LIWP are presented in table 7.

Table 7: LIWP Physical outputs (Cumulative 2008 to 1 November 2013)

Terrace Rehabilitation	m2	5,633,523
Land Rehabilitation	m2	33,490,000
Flood Defence Walls Built	m3	321,135
Rural Roads Improved	km	337
Canal Built	m	146,323
Water ponds	No's	3,423
Wells rehabilitation		742
Dykes		56

Source Data: Provided from the SFD 2013

⁷² Christian et al., 2013, p. 25.

⁷³ Republic of Yemen Social Fund for Development, 2012, p. 16.

Another constraint on the projects is that they need to be implemented so that each household is allocated between 80 and 95 days of work, enabling it to earn the minimum targeted amount. Because three to four members of one household typically work on the LIWP, they are usually able to contribute these days within the two to three month period.

Since 2013, the LIWP has also included a whole new range of activities. These are referred to as “Cash for Work Social Services” and include two streams of work: education, numeracy and literacy; and nutrition. This new areas of activity aim to offer work that is more suitable for women and for unemployed younger people who have more than high school education. In the first stream, unemployed graduates of universities, high schools and teacher training institutes will be employed to provide numeracy and literacy classes to adults and school-dropouts, as well as in schools with insufficient teaching capacity. The nutrition stream will employ female community health volunteers who will deliver a package of community-based nutrition services for children under five years of age and pregnant and lactating women. This package will include enrolment and initial malnutrition screening; quarterly or bi-annual malnutrition screening; facilitating transport to health facilities for treatment; monthly nutrition education to mothers; nutrition education for pregnant women; breastfeeding promotion; and community level nutrition and health education.⁷⁴ It is too early to evaluate or assess these new initiatives, but the key performance indicators are the number of youth and women who are offered employment and the number of beneficiaries receiving these services.⁷⁵

2. Selection of projects

Projects are identified and selected by the LIWP staff together with the project committees, who in turn are required to work in close consultation with their communities. Apart from the labour intensity requirements, the main criteria are that projects are technically feasible, that their costs are within the budget, and that they are supported by the community. Generally, a range of possible projects is identified by LIWP staff, and a final selection is then made in consultation with the community.

Respondents in the focus groups were generally also positive about the process through which projects were decided upon. In general, it was felt that they were able to contribute to the prioritisation of projects. These views are highlighted in the remarks of participants during focus groups.

We have discussed with the SFD committee our needs in the mosque, and we selected the road. (Taiz FGD)

From our views, the project is demand driven and meets the community requirements” and “now we feel happy once it rains, before it was disaster” participants said. (Sana’a FGD)

SFD asked us; what we want, and then we selected the runnel, and protection of springs. (Hadramout FGD)

In presence of village leader, the SFD team asked us to choose either water reservoir or rehabilitate agricultural terraces, where we have selected the first. (Hajja FGD)

G. FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE LABOUR INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME

Given the high labour intensity of the LIWP, the cost structure is dominated by wages paid. The two most important other costs are those of consultants appointed by the LIWP to manage the project implementation, and those of materials and tools. Table 8 provides an overview of these costs for the years 2011 and 2012, for which complete data was obtained from the SFD.

⁷⁴ World Bank, 2013, p. 32-34.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 27.

Table 8: Cost breakdown of the LIWP

	Total expenditure	Wages		Materials		Consultants	
	USD	USD	%	USD	%	USD	%
2011	19,833,654	14,844,402	75.0	3,649,846	18.4	1,299,397	6.6
2012	24,671,899 (32,495,885)	20,834,772	84.4 (64.1)	2,029,302	8.2 (6.2)	1,807,825	7.3 (5.6)

Source: Data provided by SFD.

Note: for 2012 there is an inconsistency in the data, as two figures for total expenditure are provided, one of them about 6 million higher than the other. If this figure is used, the percentages for materials etc also change to what is in brackets.

These figures can be converted cost per household of the LIWP, as is done in table 9. For 2011, it meant that the LIWP cost USD 871 per household to implement. Of this, USD 654 was transferred to the household, USD 160 was spent on tools and materials, and USD 57 on the cost of consultants to manage the projects. In 2012, the cost of consultant per household was slightly reduced, but the material costs were dramatically reduced from USD 160 to USD 60, reflecting the increasing labour intensity.

These costs do not include the costs of the SFD staff running the LIWP programme, which are not reported upon separately. For the SFD as a whole, in its annual report it reports on capacity building costs, which also include operating expenses and fixed assets costs and this presumably also includes the wage of SFD staff. The capacity building costs for 2012 amounted to 17.3 million of the USD 149.6 million disbursed by the SFD, or about 11.5 per cent.⁷⁶

Table 9: Cost breakdown of LIWP per beneficiary household (USD)

	2011	2012
Cost per household	871	735
Transfer amount	654	621
Non transfer costs of which:	217	114
Consulting costs	57	54
Material costs	160	60

Source: Authors calculations based on data provided by the SFD

These costs vary considerably per branch office, and this is partially related to the geography and population density. Because of the low population density and many remote villages in the governorates the Al-Mukalla branch office has to work with, its consultant and materials cost per household are the highest at USD 111 and USD 100 respectively and transport is likely to be a substantial part of both these costs.

These figures imply that the SFD is very cost effective in transferring income to participants, and that it is increasing its performance in this regard. In terms of labour intensity, it compares very well to programmes like the MGNREGA (labour intensity 65 per cent) and the PSNP (80 per cent at the district level⁷⁷). Also, it is estimated that all the administrative costs of the PSNP amount to 17.2 per cent of programme costs.⁷⁸ Assuming that the LIWP overhead costs are similar to those of the SFD as a whole (11.5 per cent), and adding to this the cost of consultants at approximately 6 per cent, the overall administrative costs of the LIWP are similar.

It is difficult to reach a definite conclusion as to whether similar outcomes could be more cost-effectively achieved through, for example, a cash transfer programme. It would seem obvious that a cash transfer programme would be more efficient in terms of the cost of transferring income, as it would require no material inputs and imply lower consultancy costs (there being no need to oversee or manage the project implementation). Such a calculation, however, completely ignores the benefits of the assets created, even

⁷⁶ Republic of Yemen Social Fund for Development, 2013c, p. 88.

⁷⁷ This means that 80% of the budget transferred to the district must be paid out in wage, and this excludes and administrative costs incurred by the programme outside the district.

⁷⁸ World Bank, 2010, p. 36.

though these are visible and widely appreciated by the communities. In addition, it is not clear whether it would be acceptable to have a cash-transfer programme making so large a transfer to a relatively small number of households without any attendant requirement to work.

The continued reduction in materials costs, however, is a possible concern, as it is becoming so small it can start to severely limit the range of projects a community can select, as well as the productivity of workers. SFD data showed, for example, that projects in the branch offices of Ibb, Hodeidah and Hajja had average material inputs of below 5 per cent of project costs in 2012. This is very low, and could start affecting the ability to acquire the appropriate tools to ensure productivity.

H. WAGE RATES AND INCOME TRANSFERRED TO PARTICIPANTS

The wage rates of the programme are set 10 to 20 per cent below the prevailing market wage rate in order to function as a self-targeting mechanism. The prevailing wage rate is determined by LIWP staff based on their knowledge of the area and through engagement with the community. Typically the wage rate is around YER 1500 per day. In addition, the LIWP aims to transfer between YER 120,000 and YER 140,000 (USD 600 and 700) to each participating household over the course of one year. This means that households need to be allocated around 80 to 93 days of work per year.

However, this wage rate is in fact only indicative, as the LIWP pays on a piece-rate basis, and not a day- or task-rate basis.⁷⁹ This means that workers are paid for the quantity of work they are able to perform, and that productive workers, or those who work longer hours, are able to earn more in one day. Furthermore, different activities are paid for at different rates, and it is difficult in practice to align these to ensure that everybody on average earns the same. For example, two different sections of a canal to be dug may be of similar depth and paid for at the same rate, but one section may be easier due to, for example, the soil being softer. In this case, those allocated the softer section are able to earn more.


While the outcomes in terms of income earned are not as equitable when a piece-rate approach is used, it has the advantage of leading to faster completion of projects, as those who are productive can keep working and do not need to stop when their task is done. It also requires less supervision, as tasks do not need to be set out and measured regularly. In a context where there are enough workers sufficiently skilled to "know what they are doing", which is generally the case in Yemen, this is an attractive option from the perspective of physical implementation and completion of projects.

The impact evaluation of the LIWP found a high degree of variation in total income earned per household, the number of days worked and the implied wage rate. These results are presented in the figures below.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of the number of days participating households worked on the LIWP, making clear that the duration of time participants worked varied considerably. Figure 5 shows the income per household, and again the graphs exhibit considerable variation in the actual income earned per household, despite the target of transferring approximately equal amounts to all households. Based on this data, the distribution of the implied wages can be calculated, and this is presented in Figure 6.


⁷⁹ A piece-rate basis means that workers are paid a rate for each unit of work they complete. For example they may be paid YER 1000 for each cubic meter excavated. Those who are able to excavate 2.5 m³ in one day will therefore earn YER 2500 in that day. For the range of project implemented in the LIWP it is possible to implement the work and pay participants on either a task or piece rate basis.

Figure 4: Number of days worked on the LIWP




Source Christian et al., 2013, figure 2.1.

Figure 5: Distribution of income received



Source Christian et al., 2013, figure 2.2.

Figure 6: Implied wage rate



Source Christian et al., 2013, figure 2.3.

Given the objective of transferring a target amount to each household, the variation in income received per household is the most problematic one. However, because payment is on a piece-rate basis, the relationship

between days worked and total income is weak. It is therefore not possible to determine whether households that earned below the target amount usually did so because they were only able to work a limited number of days or because their productivity (and thus wage rate) was too low to earn them the targeted income.

There are other factors at play in addition to those mentioned. One finding was that women earned significantly less than men, mainly since women were allocated only certain types of tasks such as bringing water, preparing food, and fetching stones. Some of these tasks, like preparing food, are not really payable on a piece-rate basis. Once food has been prepared for all participants, there is no scope to keep preparing food and earning more. Activities such as preparing food do not require the full day, and the implied wage rate reported is therefore only for working a part of the day. Either way, both of these effects would result in lower average daily earnings for women.

Of course, if women earn less than men on the projects, it will be less attractive, and even irrational, for a household to deploy a woman to the project when a man is available. The lower earning-potential for women stems from two factors: firstly, they would only be allocated a limited range of activities, and secondly, when physically demanding work is involved, men are likely to be able to produce more and thus earn more as payment is on a piece-basis.

This variation to some extent highlights a typical trade-off in PEPs between, on the one hand, a strong emphasis on productivity and completion of projects, and, on the other hand, equity. In a system where productivity is rewarded, it is not realistic to expect that everybody will earn the same. From a social protection perspective, this can be a real concern, since the most vulnerable households may be exactly the ones that have limited labour supply and can only complete a small amount of work. The approach used in most countries to address some of this variation is to employ a task-based system of work-allocation and remuneration. Workers are then allocated equal tasks for each day, and more productive workers are usually able to complete their tasks in fewer hours, and are free to leave when they are done. In this approach, inequality expresses itself in the hours worked (and implied hourly wages), but not in total earnings or implied daily wages.

I. SAFETY AT WORK

The risk of physical injury during construction work is relatively high, and even more so when inexperienced workers are employed, as in the LIWP. It is not clear whether the SFD has a specific policy in place to deal with injuries or death at work. None of the operations manuals reviewed makes specific provisions for this, nor do they provide any guidance on the aspect. During FGDs, various concerns were raised in this regard. In three of the FGDs, it was reported that incidents of injury (varying in seriousness) had occurred during the project. The most severe accident was reported in Hajja, where a participant was reported to have lost his hand. As shown in the quotations below, participants generally had to cover the cost of medical treatment themselves when accidents did take place.

Slight incidents took place, the affected people were offered First Aid at Marib hospital, but paid out of their own pocket. (Sana'a FGD)

There were no dangerous injuries during the project, but it happened once, the person incurred the cost of health treatments personally with the cooperation with his colleagues. (Hadamout FGD)

While it was indicated in all the FGDs that the SFD has an insurance in place, it is questionable whether this insurance does in fact cover LIWP workers or merely SFD employees. Not surprisingly, therefore, it was indicated in all the focus groups that accessing the benefits from this insurance was difficult, and that they in fact never materialised. In three of the FGDs, it was reported that those injured had to cover the costs of the treatment themselves or with the help of other participants.

It was also expressed in various groups that workers were not aware of safety issues and risks, and that the SFD did too little to raise awareness or provide training on this. In all the FGDs, there was dissatisfaction with how injuries at work were dealt with, and with the fact that this issue generally did not receive sufficient attention from programme management.

J. FINDINGS ON SKILLS DEVELOPMENT IN THE LABOUR INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME

The LIWP makes considerable investments in training the community committees that are established in each village and its consultants. The main objective of this training is to enhance the implementation of the LIWP. Most of this training is done through the Training and Organisational Development Unit of the SFD. With regard to the training of participants, it uses a more pragmatic approach to skills development, which involves developing the skills required to have the projects completed properly. The main approach in this is to facilitate skills transfers whereby skilled workers are asked to transfer skills to the unskilled. It is not clear how systematic this is, but given that the average ratio of skilled to unskilled labour is 1 to 9, there is an implicit incentive for the skilled workers to train some of the unskilled workers so that they are not responsible for doing all the skilled work. The findings from the FGDs also suggest that this is common. This is a different approach from bringing in separate formal training, but seemed to be both effective and appreciated by those who participated, as expressed by a participant in Taiz:

Yes, two master constructors were brought from outside the communities, to teach this skills to the participants. (Taiz FGD)

All focus groups indicated that skills development occurred in this way, mostly in construction related skills, like stone cutting and masonry. In general it was felt that these skills could contribute to finding future employment in construction as expressed by participants:

Each builder had to teach 10 workers, especially in building and finishing of walls, as the area is very famous for these skills within the local market and even in the Saudi Arabian Market. (Taiz FGD)

Many people now have understood and learned what construction is, because the project activities in the community for 6 months, some became builder and other master builders. (Sana'a FGD)

With the expansion of the LIWP into education and nutrition-related services, more comprehensive and formal training of workers is envisioned as the specific services to be provided will need to be in line with specific requirements and standards of the ministries of education and health.

Furthermore, in the third implementation modality, where participants are in the programme for three to five years, a more extensive but complementary set of training interventions is envisaged, whereby development committees will be established in the villages. Part of their role will be to identify training that would be beneficial to the community and provided by other parts of the SFD.

K. COMPARISON OF THE LABOUR INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME WITH THE PUBLIC WORKS PROJECT

The main features of the LIWP having been discussed, it is possible to present a more comprehensive comparison with the PWP. Such a comparison is provided in table 10.

Table 10: Comparison of the LIWP and the PWP⁸⁰

Feature	LIWP	PWP
Implementing agent	SFD	MOPIC through a project management unit
Geographical targeting	Poorest village with at least 300 people, poorest neighbourhoods in urban areas	Densely populated poor areas where projects can reach as many people as possible
Targeting of individuals	Poor households based on access indicators and as identified in the community along with self-targeting using below programme wage rate	Self-targeting, Individuals willing to do unskilled labour at (market) wage rate offered

⁸⁰ Key features on PWP as extracted by the author from World Bank, 2012.

Labour intensity	Minimum of 70% and average 83% for 2012 often much higher	Minimum of 30 % and average of 44 per cent over programme life
Income transfer	Target of USD 600-700 per participating households	No specific target
Identification and selection of projects	Villages selected based on poverty criteria and appropriate project decided upon with community	Projects are proposed by communities and best possible projects selected based on predefined criteria including number of people to benefit and poverty
Types of projects	Terrace and Land rehabilitation, flood defence walls, rural road improvement, building of canals and water ponds and the rehabilitation of wells and dykes	Community infrastructure such as health clinics, schools, water supply; sewage; water harvesting, stone paving of roads and streets; and vocational training centres.

What is clear from the table is that the programmes are in practice very different from each other. Only in the urban areas is there likely to be some overlap, but even there the types of projects are likely to be very different. However, they both contribute to an SPF, if that concept is understood to include broader access to essential services. In such a definition of the SPF, the LIWP would make a stronger contribution to the income security element, and the PWP to the access to essential services element.

V. ANALYSIS OF SOME OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF LABOUR-INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME IN YEMEN

In this chapter, some of the findings above will be discussed in more detail and, where possible, complemented by results from the LIWP impact evaluation which included random control trials, enabling some of the impact of the LIWP on communities (treatment) to be compared with control communities. The chapter focuses on the social protection and development related impacts of the LIWP.

A. PROGRAMME DESIGN AND THE POVERTY AND EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT

There are several design features of the programme that directly relate to the poverty and labour market context in Yemen. The first is the target for income to be transferred to a household, which is set at around USD 600 -700. This level reflects almost 40 per cent of average rural household income, estimated at USD 1700. As the programme targets the poorest households, this share of programme income over total household income is probably even higher. As discussed earlier, it is not the level of this target but rather the variation in this transfer that raises concerns. In order to ensure to consistently impact on beneficiaries, it is especially important that the number of households receiving substantially less than the targeted amount are reduced.

From the underemployment and unemployment figures available, it seems likely that most households would certainly be able to work all the days they were allocated without having to sacrifice much income from other work. In this sense, the design also seems appropriate to the local context. However, the number of days of work provided also varies significantly per household, and the majority of households surveyed in the impact evaluation reported to have received fewer than 50 days over the period they participated in the programme.

It was also found in the impact assessment that when households earn more than YER 100,000 (USD 500) through the LIWP they are more likely to report spending at least some of the project income on goods other than food, debt and medical care.⁸¹ This implies that from a food security and consumption smoothing perspective the targeted transfer amount seems to make sense, as an income of approximately YER 100,000 appears to be the point at which the most basic consumption needs of targeted households are met.

The overall scale of the LIWP, and of other social protection measures, remains limited, especially with the high, and increasing, number of food-insecure, poor and unemployed in Yemen. About half the Yemeni population face food insecurity, so the scale of interventions to address this should, in fact, be massive. The LIWP is trying to increase its scale, but this is contingent upon securing additional funding. In 2013, it has managed to achieve a disbursement-rate of USD 4.1 million per month, implying expenditure of almost 50 million - a significant increase from 2012. The wage-rates, however, have also recently been increased to USD 10 in rural areas and to USD 13 in urban ones.⁸² This could reduce the number of households reached, depending on whether the target amount to be transferred has also been increased. While this would expand the programme substantially, the coverage would still be limited.

An important tension the LIWP leadership needs to manage is how to use the program to address serious short-term crises, while at the same time consider how the role of the programme needs to change in order to make longer-term impacts. This is best captured by how the imperative to respond to the current crisis makes it difficult for the LIWP to realise its stated intent of shifting to the longer-term implementation modality. In the interviews with senior head-office staff of the SFD, it was expressed that it aims to develop the LIWP as a “sustainable social tool” that can effectively reach areas affected by shocks and crises (with the understanding that there are many such areas in Yemen, and that the programme is not presently reaching all of them). At the same time, the SFD would like the LIWP to have a clearer location within the national policy framework - both in terms of whom to focus upon, and of what the programme is expected to achieve in reaching that target group.

⁸¹ Christian et al., p. 42.

⁸² Republic of Yemen Social Fund for Development, 2013a, p. 49.

It also appears that there is still room for the LIWP to improve its collaboration and coordination with other social protection interventions. The SFD has been working with the SWF to improve targeting, but this has mainly focused on exchanging information and data, and not on developing an integrated or aligned targeting strategy to optimise the coverage of both programmes. These intentions are there, but to some extent they get overtaken by events - with Yemen moving from crisis to crisis - resulting in an inability to maintain a longer-term perspective.

Interviewed officials of the MOPIC and the SWF all saw an important role for the LIWP within the overall social protection framework, although they did not all see it as having the same role. Some of their views were not consistent with what the LIWP is in fact able to achieve. On the one hand, interviewees expressed the opinion that the LIWP is a short-term, or at least temporary, intervention as part of the TPSD. At the other hand, a number of the recommendations, such as designing long-term interventions for extremely impoverished areas, only make sense from a longer-term perspective. This, perhaps, reflects the difficult context in Yemen, where it is understood that crisis responses are supposed to be temporary, but also that the crisis in the country is an ongoing one not likely to disappear in the near future.

B. IMPACTS OF THE LABOUR INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME ON INCOME, EXPENDITURE AND FOOD SECURITY

It was found in the impact evaluation, and confirmed in the FGDs, that most of the income earned was used for food-related expenditure, and only a small fraction on the acquisition of household assets. As mentioned above, the likelihood of this increased once participants earned more than YER 100,000.

Another important finding was that much of the income was used to pay off debts, which were mostly incurred in order to buy food. It is apparently common for households to be able to buy food on credit, and this practice has been important in helping to buffer the effects of increasing food prices. As a result, the increasing food prices have had a much more pronounced effect on households' debts than on their actual food consumption. Because of this, it is clear that one important impact of the LIWP has been on household debt. While household debt of both control and treatment households increased, debt increase among control households was much greater, at USD 123 (YER 26,100), than among treatment households, where it was USD 25 (YER 5,960).⁸⁵

Despite the apparent availability of credit for the purchase of food, it was found that the LIWP had a positive impact on calorific food intake of between 320 and 435 calories per person per day as compared to control communities. At the same time, it was found that the overall impact on calorific intake due to the crisis was a reduction of between 244 and 345 calories per day. The net effect, thus, was that households in LIWP communities slightly increased their calorific food intake over the course of the impact-study, whereas in control community households calorific food intake was significantly reduced - demonstrating a clear positive impact of the LIWP.

Another interesting finding was that the increase in the number of days worked varied significantly with the labour supply of the household, as households with greater labour supply worked more (and earned more) than did households with more limited labour supply. This reinforces the earlier findings that the LIWP is limited in the extent to which it can transfer the targeted amount of income to households with limited labour supply. While this is not entirely surprising, it is problematic that households with limited labour supply simply may not have enough labour to complete the work they are allocated, even though they are likely to be more vulnerable, as they generally have fewer adults able to earn an income, and may include sick, disabled or elderly members.

C. LABOUR MARKET EFFECTS OF THE LABOUR INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME

Similarly to how it affected food consumption, the crisis impacted negatively on wage rates, which were found to decline due to the drop in overall availability of employment. This made the LIWP wage rate more

⁸⁵ Christian et al., 2013, p. 36. Amounts calculated from figures provided in table 3.19.

attractive than was initially intended, and as a result it has also had a greater impact on local wage rates. In this regard, it was found that average wages in treatment communities were about 300 YER per day higher than in control communities, and that about half of this effect could be attributed to the LIWP.⁸⁴ Again, though, this needs to be understood in the context of a system of payment based on piece-rates. In a situation of declining incomes, it becomes more likely that households will try to get the most out of a system of payments based on piece-rate earning, even if that involves, for example, very long hours. However, workers working longer hours than normal would not be reflected, as the wages reported are in essence only implied, and calculated from the total income divided by the number of days worked, regardless of the hours worked.

As would be expected, the LIWP also had a positive effect on the overall number of days worked (both within and outside the programme), and the increase of 57 days worked is approximately the same number of days offered by the LIWP of 64 days shown by administrative data.⁸⁵ The finding that the increase in the total number of days worked is similar to the number of days of work offered by the LIWP suggest that the LIWP caused little displacement and that it was effective in reaching the un- and underemployed and offering work during periods when other work was not available.

Another interesting finding pertains to the LIWP's impact upon employment in other sectors. Because the impact evaluation coincided with the peak of the economic crisis in 2011, significant shifts in employment took place between various sectors. These shifts, however, varied considerably between treatment and control communities, and are captured in table 11 below. In control communities, losses in employment due to the crisis were apparently only partially compensated for by increased employment in agriculture and unskilled self-employment. There was, however, an overall reduction in employment in these communities of 190 people (from 1134 to 944). In villages with the LIWP, though, the overall reduction in employment was only marginal (7 people) - even if employment by the programme is ignored, and despite similar structural shifts taking place. The major change in these LIWP communities was a large increase in unskilled self-employment, from 188 to 376 people. This is likely to have been an effect of the increased demand generated by the injection of LIWP income into the communities, with the unskilled self-employed offering services to those working in the programme. The impact of the LIWP in these communities, then, was not only the 747 jobs it directly created, but also the other employment opportunities it indirectly enabled.

Table 11: Employment on control and treatment communities

	Control Baseline	Treatment Baseline	Control Expost	Treatment Expost
Governmental	128	96	81	91
Private Agriculture, skilled	17	20	25	5
Private Agriculture, unskilled	88	69	146	112
Private Construction, skilled	42	58	17	34
Private Construction, unskilled	57	83	32	32
Private other, skilled	96	99	44	42
Private other, unskilled	171	156	85	133
Self-employed skilled	193	159	113	96
Self-employed unskilled	342	188	395	376
SFD skilled	0	5	1	86
SFD unskilled	0	0	5	661
Totals	1134	928	944	1668

Source: Christian et al., 2013, with totals added by author.

⁸⁴ Christian et al., p. 24-25.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 22.

D. IMPACTS ON CHILD LABOUR

It is not possible to make conclusions about the effect of the LIWP on child labour in Yemen. While the programme does not officially allow for the participation of children, in FGD participants in Hajja indicated that there were instances of children assisting parents with some of the work on the LIWP. The children, however, were not registered by the SFD as having participated, and it was indicated that the SFD had conducted awareness campaigns to reduce the participation of children. At the same time, participants did not believe that this participation negatively affected the children's studying, as they did not drop out of school to work on the LIWP - when they assisted their parents, it was generally outside of school hours. In many communities, however, only primary schools were available, and children who had completed primary school were more likely to assist their parents on the LIWP. Overall, participants also indicated that the LIWP allowed more children to attend school by providing income to cover school-related expenses. In Taiz, FGD participants indicated that while the local school had no teachers, and therefore no pupils attending it, children - although having no a formal role in the project - supported their parents with LIWP work.

The impact evaluation of the LIWP supports the assertion that the programme had a positive impact on school attendance, and found that boys from treatment villages were 8 per cent more likely to be enrolled in school than were boys from control villages.⁸⁶ As discussed earlier, however, this does not necessarily mean that the LIWP also had a positive effect on the reduction of child labour.

E. BENEFITS FROM AND MAINTENANCE OF ASSET CREATED THROUGH THE LABOUR INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME

1. *Benefits generated by Labour Intensive Works Programme projects*

In the FGDs, respondents were generally very appreciative of and positive about the assets constructed in the programme. The type of assets constructed in the communities where the FGDs were held varied. The quotations from the FGD's below highlight the views of respondents about the usefulness of the assets created:

Previously three days were needed for the spring to refill to get the water out, however after the project, it takes only one day, and some time it has been filled twice a day. This is in addition to other benefits (from the LIWP) such as cash and skills earned. (Hadramout FGD)

My house has been effected by rains caused floods so many times in the past, floods entered inside more than once, but now no more, bless God for the project. (Sana'a FGD)

Yes, The project has provided real benefits: before the road, a bag of flour had to be split out into three parts to be carried out to the village, however after construction the road, the access to the village becomes easier and cheaper. (Taiz FGD)

Other FGDs, as well as the impact evaluation by the SFD, show similar results regarding the utility of assets created. In the impact evaluation, 95 per cent of respondents indicated that the project was beneficial to their community as a whole. Furthermore, "80 per cent indicated that their household benefited directly from the project. Of those that did not benefit, the main reasons were either because they were far from the project location, or did not own land".⁸⁷ The impact evaluation also attempted to quantify the benefits of the project, and concluded that water projects in the sample survey were likely to reduce the travel time (return) to fetch water in the rainy season by 18 minutes. More importantly, it also found that the water infrastructure reduced average water shortages by half, from 3 to 4 months before the projects to 1 to 2 months afterwards. This is especially important as it has been found that rural households spend as much as 10 per cent of household income on water during the dry season, mostly due to the high transport cost of water which then has to be transported.⁸⁸

From these findings, it would appear that the assets created and services provided do contribute to the SPF, if a broader interpretation of the SPF - including such services and assets - is used. As a national SPF has not

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 23.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 52.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 52-53.

been defined in Yemen, however, it is difficult to conclude from these findings to what extent these projects contribute to establishing an SPF there. Nonetheless, it would be fair to conclude that if the broader approach to the SPF is taken, the assets and services of the LIWP could make an important contribution to establishing it in Yemen, and could if necessary be adjusted to focus on enhancing access to those essential services included in the national definition.

2. *Maintenance of assets created through the Labour Intensive Works Programme*

After LIWP projects have been completed, maintenance of the constructed assets is supposed to be carried out by the local community through a local maintenance committee established with the support of the LIWP. The extent to which this functions varies, but no systematic review of how well the maintenance arrangements function has so far been done.

Emerging from discussion on this topic in the focus groups was a general awareness of the importance of maintenance and the community's responsibility with regard to this, but also a lack of clarity as to how exactly the maintenance was supposed to be carried out. For example, participants Hajja and Taiz could not clearly articulate how the maintenance was taking place, and who exactly had a role in it. In Hadramout, some participants indicated that they were involved in maintenance of the runnels (small irrigation canals), as it was important to keep these running. In the Sana'a FGD it was indicated that there was no maintenance of the channel that had been constructed, and that waste was rapidly accumulating in it. Participants, furthermore, believed it would be difficult to have effective voluntary maintenance in urban areas like Sana'a, since such communities are less cohesive and more transient.

F. IMPACTS ON SKILLS AND EMPLOYMENT OF LABOUR INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME PARTICIPANTS

It is difficult to draw any conclusions about impacts of the LIWP on skills development that can lead to future employment. As discussed above, however, there are several factors that make it very difficult to have a large impact in this area. Participants were generally optimistic that the skills they developed could lead to future employment, but there is no further data to support this optimism. Nor is there generally any information available about the employment status of participants after the LIWP.

Impacts of the skills developed on other facets of the lives of participants are also difficult to assess. In the focus groups respondents large focused on the technical (construction related) skills they gained. Understanding the impact of these and other non-technical skills possibly gained would need to be the subject of separate research.

VI. LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In this final chapter, the main conclusions and lessons from the various findings and discussions on the LIWP are presented. These are divided in two sections. The first focuses on general conclusions and lessons, relating the broader context and impacts of the LIWP. The second section outlines the conclusions and lessons specifically related to the design and implementation of the LIWP.

A. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

The difficult context in Yemen has affected the LIWP in various ways. Apart from impacting operationally and making the implementation much more challenging, it has had impacts at the design and policy levels. It has demanded that the LIWP revert back to more of a shorter-term crisis-response approach as opposed to the longer-term developmental approach towards which it had been shifting. This makes sense given the overwhelming immediate needs due to the severity of the crisis and the overall lack of resources for addressing increasing poverty rates and food insecurity. At the same time, it raises questions about the role of the LIWP and whether it should be used as a crisis response instrument or adopt longer-term social protection objectives. However, in the current volatile context, where it is difficult to formulate a long-term social protection strategy, it is likely that this role will remain somewhat unclear, and that the SFD will have to keep taking a pragmatic approach.

The experience with the LIWP also raises broader questions as to which social protection mechanisms are most appropriate in crisis-prone countries like Yemen, where crisis is often systemic, consisting of a combination of simultaneous political, social, economic and environmental problems and upheavals. While Yemen experienced an increased need for social protection measures due to higher rates of poverty and unemployment, there was also a simultaneous decrease in both available resources and government implementation capacity. An important lesson from the LIWP is that the SFD was able to continue effective implementation throughout the crisis as it was not only relatively independent but also widely recognised as politically neutral. This meant that it could continue to function even in a context of high political uncertainty and dramatic political changes. Another important feature supporting this is the SFD's structure, whereby the regional offices can continue to function independently of each other, meaning that if there are problems in one area it does not affect other ones.

As an instrument for income provision, the LIWP appears particularly good at reaching the poorest in remote rural areas. Impact evaluations demonstrated that it increased household income, resulting in enhanced food security and reductions in household debts. They also found an increase in the transport related assets (mini-busses) accumulated in targeted communities as compared to in the control group of communities.

While the benefits of income provided are clear - particularly with regard to food security, nutrition, and reducing household debt - they are to a large extent limited to the period when income is provided. The long-term approach that the LIWP tried to shift towards, whereby households would be part of the programme for a period of at least 3 and up to 5 years and receive annual work and income, was meant to address this. However, due to the 2011 crisis this shift could only be implemented to a limited degree.

Rural areas in particular seem to appreciate the positive effects of the project on community cohesion. This could be important in a context of crisis and conflict, where many events tend to fracture communities and lead to deteriorating infrastructure. In such a context, a programme like LIWP that can respond swiftly and builds infrastructure and cohesion may be even more appreciated and beneficial.

There are also indications that the LIWP functioned as a local economic stimulus. In addition to the direct employment it created, the programme helped sustaining employment levels in the communities where it was implemented, whereas overall employment declined in communities where the LIWP was not present.

Finally, a lack of financial resources remains the biggest constraint for increasing both the scale and scope of the LIWP. The visions to expand the LIWP to reach 100,000 households by 2015 and to shift the programme towards a longer-term approach are both primarily dependent on financing being available.

B. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS RELATED TO THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOUR INTENSIVE WORKS PROGRAMME

1. *Institutional arrangements*

The capacity that the SFD brings to bear on the implementation of the LIWP is critical to the programme's success. The SFD brings institutional capacity in crucial areas like project management, monitoring and evaluation; construction and engineering; poverty targeting; community engagement; and management of donor relationships. This has not only contributed to the effective implementation, but has impacted on the design of the programme as well. The important lesson in this regard is perhaps that the institution implementing such programmes should be involved in their design, so that they can benefit from its experience, but also so that the design can reflect the capacity of the institution which will be responsible for implementation. This lesson is particularly important, as it has implications and to some extent questions the practice where designs for such programmes are completed before implementing agents are commissioned.

The LIWP faces a real trade-off with regard to increasing the role of other government departments and local authorities. This would, on the one hand, increase government and political ownership of the programme, and in the long run mobilize additional capacity and possibly funding for implementation. On the other hand, though, it seems inevitable that it would also expose the programme to greater political interference, and negatively affect the professionalism and quality of programme implementation. Given the current political instability, it would seem best to let the LIWP remain firmly managed by the SFD so that it remains relatively sheltered from this instability.

2. *Self-targeting*

Relying only on self-targeting within communities by setting a low wage rate was found to have its limitations in the rural Yemeni context, as the programme still tended to attract participants who obviously were not among the poorest.

It has also, for two reasons, proven difficult to maintain the LIWP wage rate at below the prevailing one. Firstly, since the LIWP demands that participants are highly productive, participants tend to demand higher wages. Secondly, due to the economic crisis in Yemen, wages were actually declining, but it was difficult to reduce LIWP wages, as that would have reduced participant income exactly at the time when it was most needed. It was therefore found necessary to complement the self-targeting with other targeting mechanisms such as household surveys and community targeting to ensure that only the poorest were targeted by the programme.

3. *Geographic targeting*

The geographic targeting approach in the rural component, whereby the poorest small villages are targeted using census and household survey data, has proven to be effective in that the programme is able to reach the poorest villages. Consideration should be given to using this approach to more specifically define the LIWP target group. Because the size of the LIWP target group is currently not clearly defined, it is also unclear what size it should aim to grow to, or what its optimal size would be. Currently, the desired scale of the programme is largely defined by pragmatic considerations of available funding or capacity rather than by a strategy to provide a certain level of protection to a specific vulnerable group in Yemen.

4. *Payment based on piece-rates and female participation*

The use of piece-rate in the LIWP seems to contribute to the high variation in the amount of income provided to each household, and to some households receiving total incomes of well below the targeted amount. The piece-rate system also seems to work against increasing the participation rate of women, especially for physically demanding work, as it makes it possible for men to earn more than women. Regardless of any cultural factors, this would make it much more likely that households decide to let men participate. Making it possible for women to earn on par with men would therefore seem a necessary, but probably not sufficient, means to enroll more women. The recent inclusion of health and education related

services in the LIWP is significant, since it broadens the scope of activities and creates clear avenues for higher rates of female involvement.

5. Labour intensity and the types of assets

The assets and activities selected in the LIWP seem appropriate in that they can be completed within the labour and material budget available, and that they still provide benefits to the communities where they are located. Participants are generally positive about the assets providing benefits to the community as a whole as well as to them, and this is further supported by evidence from the impact evaluations. However, it is possible that the rising labour intensity of the LIWP will compromise the choice communities have in choosing assets that are most useful to them, and the SFD should weigh this carefully against the benefits of reaching a higher number of beneficiaries. In this sense, the LIWP should not aim to set a goal of further increasing labour intensity, but rather establish an optimal range that balances the income security objective of maximising the income transfer with the objective of providing quality assets that enhance access to essential services. This range may vary, taking into account specific geographic circumstances, but international experience as well as the history of the LIWP would suggest that projects in the LIWP should have a minimum labour intensity of 60 per cent and a maximum of 85 per cent.

6. Maintenance of assets created

With regard to the maintenance of assets, indications are that the systems put in place by the LIWP are not effective and need to be improved. This would need to involve different approaches in rural and urban areas to maintenance, and – possibly - different approaches to different types of assets, depending on how clearly and directly those who are expected to maintain the assets are also benefiting from them.

7. Skills development

The approach to skills development in the LIWP is quite pragmatic and opportunistic, involving skills transfer from skilled workers to unskilled ones. In FGDs, it was generally agreed that this approach was rather effective. While the skills in question are mostly construction related, such are generally seen as useful to gain other employment, as well as for being able to do maintenance work on the assets. It is unclear, however, how many of the participants gained skills in this way, as it is not currently monitored. It is also unclear what impacts the LIWP had on non-technical skills of individuals and on the overall capacity of communities to organise themselves and improve their own environment. More research is required to shed light on these possible impacts.

8. Safety at work

It has also emerged from this study that safety at work is a real concern on LIWP projects, and that there is no clear policy to address this. The current practice of relying on the insurance of long-term SFD staff is not effective. The LIWP can improve this situation by introducing awareness and training on safety at work in order to prevent accidents from occurring in the first place. As it is unlikely that the LIWP will be able to find a suitable insurance product to cover the risk of injury, it should consider putting in place its own measures. A relatively simple such would be to provide each branch office with a contingency budget, which could be accessed relatively easily, and which could be used to cover the cost of medical expenses in case of an accident. Additionally, the LIWP should consider a policy to provide some predetermined level of compensation to participants who are permanently injured while working on an LIWP project.

9. Equity in transfers

The LIWP should put in place measures to better manage the typical trade-off in PEPs, whereby a strong emphasis on productivity and completion of projects impact on reduced equity in terms of income transferred. The current system provides too much opportunity for households with high labour availability to capture a larger share of possible programme income, while households with limited labour supply, who are often also the most vulnerable, are not able to earn their target amount. One option would be to shift to a task based system, but this could have the undesirable effect of projects taking longer to complete and thus

having higher overhead costs. Another option would be to assess labour supply of households in the targeting process and design specific interventions for labour-constrained households whereby they could earn higher (implied) daily wages, or to make sure that the wage income of this group is supplemented by other social protection measures such as cash transfer from the SWF.

Finally, the LIWP clearly demonstrates that it is possible for such programmes to be dynamic and responsive, and to adopt an approach of continuous improvement. In the five years since its inception, the LIWP has seen numerous changes and improvements, driven both by the external context and by the desire of the SFD and its partners to keep improving the programme.

C. SUSTAINABILITY, THE RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH AND CONTRIBUTING TO A NATIONAL SOCIAL PROTECTION FLOOR

The LIWP has the potential to contribute to a national SPF in Yemen. Certain adjustments would be required at various levels in order to realise this potential. Firstly, at the policy level, a national definition of the SPF would need to be adopted, making clear the types of essential services included. This, in turn, would provide direction to the LIWP on how to achieve the best balance between income transfer and provision of assets and services. The range of essential services seen as part of the SPF in Yemen would have an important influence in this regard. This, however, also implies that the LIWP adopts contributing to the SPF as its primary, or at least partial, objective, and that it in doing so also implicitly adopts an RBA.

Secondly, the financing of the programme would need to be stabilised, so that the types of guarantees the SPF aims to provide are not as threatened by changes in donor budgets or policies. And, while the SFD has managed to secure some long-term relationships with various donors, it is still susceptible to overall trends and changes in donor funding to Yemen. In 2011, for example, the LIWP was affected by the overall reduction of available funding. Financial stability would also be enhanced if there was more cooperation between donors and the government on the financing of the LIWP as a whole. Currently, donors finance the rural component and the government the urban one, making it impossible for the SFD to take a more integrated approach to budgeting and, for example, compensate for reductions in one component by using funds from the other.

Lastly, it would require that the long-term modality, providing employment and income to households over a three to five year period, became the dominant mode of the LIWP, as that is the only modality to include elements of an RBA. Even with the same annual budget, this shift would not have to make a big impact on the total number of households reached per annum, but would have a large impact on the total number of *different* households and villages the programme would reach on a cumulative basis. This shift would start changing the LIWP from an emergency-response programme to one more in line with the RBA of the SPF. While the SFD has been making a shift like that, it has so far been limited. In the Yemeni context, where such a large proportion of the population lack food security, it is also hard to justify a modality where the same households benefit every year while others receive no benefits at all. Ironically, while the government funding of the urban component has been more stable and is longer-term, the urban modality is planned to continue along the same lines of providing once-off opportunities to workers.

Finally, this raises the question of scale of the LIWP. A significant increase in scale would be required for the LIWP to make a contribution to the establishment of an SPF in Yemen. As long as the LIWP is not big enough to provide general coverage to a clearly identifiable target group, it will be difficult to justify making a complete change to the envisioned long-term modality, unless there are additional social protection measures put in place to cover those who are not part of the LIWP. For example, if the LIWP became of sufficient scale to cover all the villages of category 4 poverty with a population of between 300 and 1500 people, it could define this as its target group and shift to a long-term modality. It could then argue that other social protection instruments should be used for the providing the SPF for other target groups.

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ANNEX I
Details of the interviews and FGDs

Interviews: 6 – central level, 23 governorate level

Location	Ministry of planning			SFD Management			Social Welfare Fund		
	No of interviews	Name / position	Date	No of interviews	Name / position	Date	No of interviews	Name / position	Date
Central level	2	1- Ms.Eman alhamami General Manager for Women and Social Protection - Ministry of planning and international development (MOPIC) 2- Mr.Nabil Altairy , General Manager for studies of human resources - Ministry of planning and international development (MOPIC)	3/8/2013	3	1- Mr. Abdulalah Aldailami , Executive Director of SFD	14/7/2013	1	1- Mr. Abdulkari m Salah , General Manager for policies - social Welfare fund (SWF) – Ministry of labor	27/7/2013
					2- Mr.Abduljalil Alshamiri , LIWP program Manager	26/5/2103			
					3- Abdulelah Albadani , Technical Manager of LIWP	9/7/2013			

Governorates:

SFD branch /LIWP				Local Authority		
Location	No of interviews	Name / position	Date	No of interviews	Name / position	Date
Sana'a city	4	1- Mr.Abdulrahman Alakhram, Sana'a Program Officer 2- Ms. Yasmain Alzubairy, Social Officer 3- Ms.Basama Alward , Social Officer	28/7/2013	NA	NA	NA
		4- Mr.Mohamed Alabdi, Consultant with program (Accountant) with Shoub project	22/9/2013			
Taiz	5	1- Mr.Ghaleb Galeb Alsowfi , Manager of LIWP at Taiz Governorate	20/6/2013	NA	NA	NA
		2- Dina Abdullah Almassani – Social Officer 3- Baligh Saif Alkamali – Project Officer 4- Mohamed Hamoud Ghaleb – Technical Officer 5- Hussain Mohamed Albahiry – Technical Assistant – Makbana	19/6/2013			
Hajjah	4	1- Mr.Ahmed Salem Dhaiff Allah , Manager of LIWP at Hajjah Governorate	12/6/2013	2	1- <u>Dr.Ahmed Yahyia Nassar , Hajja city District General Manager</u> 2- <u>Ali Yahyia Almarwe, Alshagharda</u>	12/6/2013

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2- Mr.Ibrahim Gailan , Hajja Program Officer 3- Ms. Amani Hassan Raghaily , Social Officer 4- Eng.Abdulbari Mohamed Alakwaa , Technical Officer 			<u>District , Almarwe Village , Local authority member</u>	
Hadramout	6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1- Mr.Mohamed Mohamed Aldailami , Manager of LIWP at Hadramout governorate 2- Abdulalah Baharoon – Program Manager – Hadramout branch 3- Hadi Salmeen Mansour – Technical Officer 4- Amal Fouad Alhabshi Social Coordinator 5- Ghassn Baras – Social Officer 6- Mohamed Abdulalh Althaibi – Assistant to Social Officer 	26/6/2013	2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1- <u>H.E Khaled Aldianeh – the Governor</u> 2- <u>Said Ahmed –HAJAR District General manager</u> 	26/6/2013

FGDs

Location	FGD1				FGD2			
	No of participants	Project description	Project location	Date	No of participants	Project description	Project location	Date
Sana'a city	9	Paving box-channel and tubular channel for street and paving sidewalks	Shaoub District – Marib Street	22/9/2013	NA	NA		
Taiz	9	Rehabilitation Agricultural Lands, Construction of water reservoirs, Construction of access roads	Magbanah District, Alaref Village	19/6/2013	9	Maintenance of Agricultural Lands, Water Reservoirs, Access Roads	Mawiah District, Geraf Village	20/6/2013

Hajjah	9	7 water harvesting reservoir , Maintenance of Agricultural Lands, Protection of exist wells	Almarwe Village –	12/6/2013	14	4 water harvesting reservoir (sizable), Maintenance of Agricultural Lands, reduction of flood flow	Alanabis , Althary Villages :	13/6/2013
Hadramout	9	Maintenance of Agricultural Lands, Irrigation channels, Springs	Hajr District, Ain Basoid Village	27/6/2013	NA	NA	NA	NA

ANNEX II
Detailed Interview and FGD questions

Interview and Focus Group Discussions plan

Objectives of the interviews and discussions are to assess additional dimensions that have not been either covered or partially covered by the SFD Impact Evaluation and the internal monitoring within the LIWP. The LIWP Branch Offices produce monthly reports on several socio-economic indicators (explained below) that are of relevance to the study.

Below is the Plan for conducting structured interviews, focus group discussions and the questions suggested for each level. we will probably deploy 2 experienced consultants male & female to assist with conducting focus group discussions at the project sites.

We will conduct a total of 8 FGD, 2 for each of the 4 selected Governorates. For each FGD a total of 6-8 persons will be participated. The FGD participants will be identified and selected with coordination with SFD main office and Governorates offices.

So the suggested criteria to identify participants for each FGD will be as the following:

- Two Contractors (females are necessary if possible), to be selected from the SFD database in each Governorate,
- 2 - 4 Workers (Male and Female) , to be selected with coordination with the selected contractors in each Governorate.
- Two Beneficiaries communities (Male and Female), to be selected with coordination with the beneficiary community leaders from in each Governorate,
- One Donor Staff member only in Sana'a FGD, due to the security situation

To minimize the time for conducting interviews and FGD may some sites will be done in parallel

	Persons to be interviewed	Focus groups	Time frame
At The Central Level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SFD (4) : Executive Director, LIWP Manager, Socio-economic senior officer, Head of M&E unit. • MOPIC(3):Deputy Minister of planning, Social Protection department /planning sector, LIWP's Officer/project programming sector • Ministry of Social Affairs & Labor (2): labor force sector, social welfare sector. • Social Welfare Fund(2): manager, concerned department. 		Week starting from 25-28 May
1.Sanaa Branch Office	1- Local Authority: (3) Governor, Development Planning Committee, Social Affairs Committee 2- SFD Branch Office (4): Manager, Branch Office Program Officer, Socio-economic Monitoring Consultants*2	Visit projects and conduct discussions with beneficiaries 2 FGD	25-28 May
2.Taiz Branch Office	1- Local Authority: (3) Governor, Development Planning Committee, Social Affairs Committee 2- SFD Branch Office (4): Manager , Branch Office Program Officer ,	Visit projects and conduct discussions with beneficiaries 2 FGD	1-2 June

	Socio-economic Monitoring Consultants*2		
3.Hajja Branch Office (has the oldest and extensive experience,)	1- Local Authority: (3) Governor , Development Planning Committee , Social Affairs Committee . 2- SFD Branch Office (4): Manager , Branch Office Program Officer , Socio-economic Monitoring Consultants*2	Visit projects and conduct discussions with beneficiaries 2 FGD	4-5 June
Hadhramut	1- Local Authority: (3) Governor , Development Planning Committee , Social Affairs Committee . 2- SFD Branch Office (4): Manager , Branch Office Program Officer , Socio-economic Monitoring Consultants*2	Visit projects and conduct discussions with beneficiaries 2 FGD	8-10 June

Proposed Interview Questions:

1- SFD Management:

SFD Management
1. To which extent does the programme facilitate graduation to the private job market? How does the programme impact poverty? Has the programme had an impact in terms of income security?
2. Is the financing of the programme established in a sustainable manner? How does the programme fit within a rights based approach?
3. How does the programme impact local development, social services and increased access to markets (roads etc.)?
4. To which extent may the programme work towards reducing child labour?
5. Which procedures are in place to ensure maintenance of the assets created? Are these sufficient?
6. What are the skills gained from the programme by the beneficiaries? Are these skills market relevant? Have they contributed to graduation of beneficiaries from the programme?
7. Is the scale of the programme meaningful related to level of unemployment? What are the constraints to scale up?
8. Is the programme cost effective? Would similar outcomes be possible with other means? (e.g. direct cash transfer, without work)
9. To what extent the program considered gender in its ultimate benefits/
10. Does the created job opportunities under the programme aligned with the minimum standards of decent work.
11. To what extent the program could support stability and community resilience toward successful transition in Yemen.

2- MOPIC / Ministry of Labor / SWF

2- MOPIC / Ministry of Labor / SWF
1. What is the role of the LIWP in contributing to social protection/ safety net. Provisions for implementing LIW in the stabilization Plan , anticipated budgets estimates, sources
2. How is LIWP positioned with respect to other social protection interventions and the broad social safety net. From an overall coverage perspective what programmes should be scaled up?
3. Is the design appropriate to the country context, and seasonal changes etc?
4. What do they see as the role of LIWP beyond the stabilization plan (ie is it a short-term intervention, or do they see a longer-term role for LIWP?)
5. Role of LIWP in employment generation , skills developments , and poverty reduction
6. Any explicit results / impacts on improvements in unemployment reduction
7. Could the program so far have significant impacts on poverty reduction
8. What is their opinion in need for scaling up the program
9. What can be done in a better way to have wider impacts on poverty reduction and unemployment

3- Local Authorities / District Councils

Their role and responsibilities
1. How and when did they get involved with the LIWP
2. What were their main roles and what aspects of the programme were they involved in?
3. Did they have a role in identifying these communities?
4. To what extent did the LA participate in selection process
5. Did they get involved in the implementation process?
6. Did they get involved in the selection of contractors
7. Has there been any capacity building or training of the LA staff to enable them to do more work in the LIWP?
8. Would it be feasible for the LA to undertake financing & implementing LIW in order to scale up/ have a wider outreach in the future.

Their views on impact and effectiveness
1. Did the LIWP target the most vulnerable communities?
2. Did they get complaints from communities that were not included?
3. Did they get complaints from individuals who were not included?
4. What is their opinion on the methodology and procedures used for targeting, contractor selection and implementation
5. Is there any noticeable improvement in the skills of labor who participated?
6. Are these skills relevant (Do they think the labor can use these skills elsewhere- for instance on their own land or house, or in finding other work)
7. How are the communities benefiting from the assets, maintenance issues, is the LA willing to assist communities in O&M, sustainability issues.
8. What are the expected long-term impacts of the program
9. Were the assets created of good standard and quality?
10. Were the assets created useful?
11. To what extent in their opinion HH benefited from the income, did their livelihoods improve, has the training and awareness raising programs impacted HH, (can they share specific stories or examples?)
12. Any suggestions/ remarks they would like to make

4- Interviews with Program Officer and Socio-economic Consultants:

Focus will be on projects that have already been completed to assess longer-term impacts
Their role and responsibilities
1. How long have you been working on the LIWP?
2. On how many subprojects have you worked?
3. What is your role in the project?
4. How do you work with the LA, Communities, individual workers and SFD?

Longer term impacts
1. What in your opinion are the main outcomes / impacts of the Program on the beneficiary communities.
2. How are the communities maintaining the assets.
3. How are the communities benefiting from the assets
4. Have the communities continued with any other development aspects such as requesting services, training, income generating skills ..etc
5. Have skills gained during project implementation increased their chances of accessing job opportunities in the labor market. What in your opinion needs to be done in future projects to enhance skills adequately?
6. Are any skills gained relevant within the household? (Improve their own land or house for example)
7. Did handicapped persons participate in any form in the projects, what type of activities.

8. What were women roles in the project.
9. Did youth have participated as labor in the project.
10. What was the children's role in the project? Were they participating as labor?
11. What were the effects of the project on school attendance ? (were they skipping school to work, or was the income used to enable children to attend school?)
12. Are communities continuing to practice the nutrition, health & hygiene training received during project ? and are the trained committees still active in training?
13. Are there any self-initiatives undertaken by the communities to improve infrastructure (cleaning access roads, rehabilitating community assets such as flood protection, gabions, water springs, wells rain water collection ponds, ..etc
14. Were there Environmental Assessments conducted for the selected projects ?
15. Are there any new income generating activities/ increase in productive activities, economic activities such as shops ..etc.
16. Have any members of the community acquired Micro-finance services such as loans or savings.

Community Focus Groups

Proposed themes and questions for the focus group discussions.

Theme 1- Relationship with project

How do they understand their relationship with the project- long term, short-term, were they lucky, is it once-off chance, do they think they will work on another project? How did they get involved, did they apply? Or were they chosen, and if so for what reasons?

Theme 2- Access to services

What effects has the project had on access to education, health care, water, sanitation? (Did they use some of the earnings on these, Did an improved road make it easier to go to a clinic?) What was the children's role in the project ,were they participating as labor, were they attending school?

Theme 3: Relationships within the society

Is your community cooperating and has better social cohesion than before project, do you have more or less disputes in the community? Have you got to know any new people in the project or strengthen existing relationships? Did you got to know or interact with any government or SFD officials? Do you think there are any benefits to these new relationships?

Theme 4: Empowerment to improve ones own life, community and environment

- What in your opinion are the benefits gained from the project.
- Are you benefiting from the assets.
- How are you maintaining the assets.
- How do you intend to maintain them in the future, who can assist , source of funds
- Have you tried to look for other agencies , local authority to provide other development services including training for example on agricultural aspects, livestock/ veterinary services income generating skills ..etc
- What type of skills were gained during project implementation and has job opportunities in the labor market increased. What in your opinion needs to be done in future projects to enhance skills adequately
- Are you still continuing to practice the nutrition training received during project and are the committees still active in training
- Are there any self-initiatives undertaken by the communities to improve infrastructure (cleaning access roads, rehabilitating community assets such as flood protection, gabions, water springs, wells ..etc rain water collection ponds,

- What were women roles in the project.

Theme 5: broader economic impacts/ effects?

- Are there any new income generating activities/ increase in productive activities, economic activities such as shops ..etc.
- Have any members of the community acquired Micro-finance services such as loans or savings.
-

Theme 6: Payment

How were participants paid? How often? Was it on time? Did it involve costs (travel, waiting for a long time?) was the payment accurate (what they thought they would get), were there any conflicts unhappiness about the payments? Did anybody want them to pay some of their payment (for instance as a “reward” for helping to select them?

General: Any (success) stories