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**ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA (ESCWA)**

# THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES

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## Introduction

Demographic research related to the changing age structure of the population is central to the formulation of national development strategies and plans, especially in the Arab region where the recent fertility declines have reshaped the population pyramid and led to an unprecedented "youth bulge". The issue gains more significance in light of several studies showing that the youth bulge is a demographic gift, offering a unique window of opportunity to increase investment, foster social and economic development and reduce poverty. Equally, the need to meet the challenges posed by the increase in the absolute numbers of older persons cannot be underrated, even though the process of ageing in these countries is still in its early stage. Consequently, there is a persistent need to examine age-structural changes of the population in Arab countries in light of the evolving global and regional issues, in order to promote knowledge of the challenges posed by population dynamics and the importance of preparedness and early planning.

Against this backdrop, ESCWA is working to increase the understanding of how changes in the age structure of the population and economic growth are interrelated and to urge member governments to adopt appropriate social and economic policies that would advance the inclusion of the various population groups.

*The Demographic Profile of the Arab Countries* is one of a series of reports published biennially by the Population and Social Development Section of the Social Development Division, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA). Each issue presents an analysis of the patterns and trends of such key demographic indicators as population size, growth, age composition, fertility and mortality, in addition to urban-rural distribution and migration for the 22 Arab countries.

The overall objective of this publication is to provide policymakers, researchers and other national constituents with a regional reference on the trends and patterns of selected demographic and socio-economic indicators and highlight their implications for development and achieving the internationally agreed on goals, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

This issue of *The Demographic Profile of the Arab Countries* examines the trends in population size, growth and distribution in the 22 countries of the Arab region, highlights the course of fertility and mortality transitions, and discusses the implications of fertility transition on the age structure of the population for 1980-2050. It also studies the levels of and trends in international migration for 1990-2010 with particular reference to labour migration. The report goes on to discuss the demographic and developmental implications of the youth bulge and showcases the impact of the emergent financial crisis on youth, in addition to such other population groups as older persons and migrant workers. It is expected that the profile will help motivate policymakers to integrate demographic concerns into overall development strategies and plans.

*Data and methodology*

*The World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, prepared by the Population Division of the United Nations Secretariat, provided the data to construct a regional profile for the core demographic indicators, including population size, growth, rural and urban distribution, mortality, fertility, age group distribution and migration rates, disaggregated by gender where applicable. The report adopts an analytical methodology to describe the levels and trends that characterize population dynamics in the Arab countries and identify the challenges and opportunities that the changing age structure presents as a factor fostering development in certain countries. The second part of the analysis reflects the implications of the economic crisis which began in the second half of 2008 on various population groups, employment and remittances. The report finally proposes possible interventions to manage the cost imposed by the economic downturn on social development and migration outcomes.

## I. TRENDS AND LEVELS OF KEY DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS

### 1. Population size

The total population of the Arab region has more than doubled between 1980 and 2009, surging from 173 million in 1980 to 352.2 million in 2009[1] or 5.2 per cent of the world population.[2] Assuming that fertility levels continue to decline according to the medium variant scenario, the total population of the region is projected to reach 428.4 million or 5.6 per cent of the world population by 2020. Population size varies considerably between the countries of the region with Egypt accounting for 23.6 per cent of its total population in 2009 (83 million), followed by the Sudan (42.3 million or 12 per cent); Algeria (34.9 million or 9.9 per cent); Morocco (32 million or 9.1 per cent); Iraq (30.7 million or 8.7 per cent); Saudi Arabia (25.7 million or 7.3 per cent) and Yemen (23.6 million or 6.7 per cent). Egypt is projected to remain by far the most populous and to reach a total population of 91.8 million in 2015 and 98.6 million in 2020. At the other end of the scale, Comoros, Bahrain, Djibouti and Qatar will remain the countries with the smallest population size, with each accounting for less than 0.5 per cent of that of the Arab region (table 1 in statistical annex).

### 2. Population growth

Since 1980, the Arab population has grown at an average rate of 2.45 per cent per annum as compared to 1.5 per cent for the rest of the world. The rate of population growth in the region has, however, been declining and it is expected that it will continue to grow at a slower pace to reach 1.87 per cent in 2009-2015 and 1.78 per cent during the period 2009-2020. The population growth rate also varies considerably between the countries of the region. The highest population growth rate between 1980 and 2009 was registered in Qatar (6.27 per cent) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (5.21 per cent), more likely as a result of intensive labour migration to these countries during this period. The countries which experienced the lowest population growth were Somalia (1.21 per cent), Lebanon (1.44 per cent) and Tunisia (1.60 per cent). The rate of population growth prevailing in the last three decades resulted in a gain of 179 million persons, that is, 6.2 million persons were added annually to the total population of the region. The increments were eventually concentrated in the most populous countries whereby Egypt accounted for an additional 1.3 million annually and contributed 21.5 per cent to the annual 1980-2009 population increment. The top contributors to population increase in the Arab region during this period are illustrated in chart 1.




*Source*: Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Population and Social Development Section, based on the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, online data http://esa.un.org/unpp.

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[1] The de facto total population in the region as of 1 July of the year indicated.

[2] Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, online data http://esa.un.org/unpp.

The Arab population will keep on growing as a result of the population momentum[3] as the large birth cohorts were and are still produced by the large childbearing population from the previous generation. The high rate of population growth prevailing in the last three decades will increase the population increment to a maximum point by adding 35 million people between 2005 and 2010 (chart 2). This population momentum will continue to hamper the capacity of the region to deal with the challenges posed by social change, economic strains, globalization and political instabilities.

**Chart 2. Population Momentum**




*Source*: Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Population and Social Development Section, based on the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, online data http://esa.un.org/unpp.

## 3. Population distribution

The 2007 Revision of the World Urbanization Prospects[4] stated that half of the world population, or 3.3 billion people, would be living in urban areas in 2008. The Arab region is experiencing this same global phenomenon whereby a rapid increase in the share of urban dwellers is matched by a concomitant decline in rural population growth. A 2007 study involving eight Arab countries suggested that rural to urban migration, particularly in the prime working age groups, is the main contributor to the increased growth rate of the urban populations and to the accelerated rural ageing.[5] Between 1980 and 2005, the urban population of the Arab region grew at an average rate of 3.3 per cent per annum, passing from 75.9 million, or 44 per cent of the region's total population, to 173.4 million or 54.6 per cent. It is projected that during 2005-2020 the urban growth rate will decline to 2.4 per cent per annum; nevertheless, the urban population will continue to increase and reach 250.2 million or 59.7 per cent in 2020 (table 2a). At country level, higher levels of urbanization in 2005 characterize each of Kuwait (98.3 per cent), Qatar (95.4 per cent), Bahrain (88.4 per cent) and Lebanon (86.6 per cent). In contrast, Comoros and Yemen remain mostly rural with 72 per cent and 71 per cent, respectively, of their populations living in rural areas (table 2b). All the countries of the Arab region are, however, expected to be over 50 per cent urban by mid century (chart 3).

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[3] Population momentum is the tendency for population growth to continue beyond the time that replacement-level fertility has been achieved because of a relatively high concentration of people in the childbearing years.

[4] United Nations. World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision, Executive Summary.

[5] United Nations - Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. The Demographic Profile of Arab Countries: Ageing of rural populations (E/ESCWA/SDD/2007/Booklet.1/Rev.1)




*Source*: Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Population and Social Development Section, based on the United Nations 2008, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision Population Database. http://esa.un.org/unup/index.asp.

## 4. Fertility levels and trends

Impressive declines in fertility have been recorded in the Arab region as a result of increased school enrolment among girls, increased participation of women in the labour force, and the new trends towards "wait hood" or delayed marriage and the formation of smaller families. According to the 2008 revision, the unweighted average total fertility rate[6] for the Arab countries declined from 6.2 live births per woman in the period 1980-1985 to 3.3 in the period 2005-2010 compared to 2.6 at the world level, consequently reshaping the age structure of the population of the Arab region. This average decline, however, masks the heterogeneity of fertility decline among countries. While a drop of fertility is expected in all countries of the region, the rate of decline is projected to vary considerably from one country to another (chart 4). Table 3 shows that in 2005-2010, each of Lebanon, Tunisia and the UAE have fertility levels already below replacement level, whereas other countries are set to converge below 2.1 live births per woman by mid century, with the exception of Somalia, Palestine and Mauritania.




*Source*: Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Population and Social Development Section, based on the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, online data http://esa.un.org/unpp.

[6] The total fertility rate is defined as the average number of children a woman has during her reproductive life.

## 5. Mortality levels and trends

The twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented improvement in longevity and infant mortality at both global and regional levels. Today both men and women live 20 years more than they did 50 years ago. The infant mortality rate (IMR), defined as the number of children per 1,000 live births who die in the first 12 months of life, is an important indicator of national development and health and has plummeted significantly in many countries during the period 1980-2010 (chart 5). In 1980-1985, the IMR in the Arab region ranged between 21 per 1,000 live births in Bahrain to 137.8 per 1,000 live births in Somalia, averaging around 70.3 per 1,000 live births, and is projected to drop on the regional level to 34.3 per 1,000 live births in 2005-2010. Currently the lowest IMRs are found in Qatar (8.3/1000), Kuwait (9.1/1000), the UAE (9.7/1000) and Bahrain (9.9/1,000). The other countries that are likely to remain in excess than the world's average of 43.2 deaths per 1,000 live births are Somalia, Djibouti, Mauritania, the Sudan, Yemen and Comoros (table 4). Somalia is expected to retain the highest level of infant mortality through 2050 at 48.3 per 1,000 live births.




*Source*: Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Population and Social Development Section, based on the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, online data http://esa.un.org/unpp.

Significant gains in life expectancy for both males and females were achieved in the Arab region during the past three decades. In 1980-1985, the unweighted average life expectancy at birth for the region was estimated at 58.8 years for males and 62.2 years for females; this increased to 67.5 and 71.2 years for males and females in 2005-2010 respectively. In other words, both men and women are currently living nine years longer than they did in the 1980s. This increasing trend is projected to continue for all Arab countries to varying degrees. In the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, life expectancy at birth is expected to keep on rising to reach a maximum of 82 years for both sexes in each of Kuwait and the UAE by mid century. Conversely, the estimated figures for Somalia, Mauritania, the Sudan, Yemen and Djibouti, showed that they were not able to meet the life expectancy target of 65 years in 2005 set by the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994. Moreover, these countries, in addition to Comoros, will unlikely meet the target of 70 years in 2015 (table 5).

## 6. Population age structure

There are three main demographic consequences of fertility transition on population age structure, especially when coupled with a rapid decline in infant mortality and an increase in life expectancy. The first is the unprecedented increase in the number of people aged 15-24 and the formation of the "youth bulge". The second is the growth of the population in the age group (25-64) which will outpace the growth of the rest of the population. The third consequence is population ageing, a process whereby the proportion of older persons in the population increases and that of younger persons declines.

The traditional population pyramid has started to change in recent years in the Arab region. Even though the absolute number of children aged 0-14 increased from 77 million in 1980 to 114.5 million in 2005, and is projected to reach 120.6 million in 2010, the proportion of children aged 0-14 has actually declined from 44.5 per cent in 1980 to 35.3 per cent in 2005 and will reach 33.6 per cent in 2010 (table 6 and chart 6).

**Chart 6. Age and Sex Distribution of the Arab Region Population in 2005**




*Source*: Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Population and Social Development Section, based on the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, online data http://esa.un.org/unpp.

While population growth is still substantiated by the large number of women of childbearing age from the previous generation, the recent sharp fertility declines in the Arab countries have produced a phenomenal increase in the number of youth aged 15-24 which has escalated from 33.7 million, or 19.5 per cent in 1980, to 67.9 million, or 20.9 per cent in 2005. The youth population, which is in the transition period from childhood to adulthood, is expected to increase to 73 million in 2015 and to 81.4 million in 2025. The youth bulge results from the interplay between declining fertility and the population momentum. Over the next decade, however, as the fertility decline becomes stronger and the population momentum slows, the proportion of young people will begin to drop gradually to reach 18.6 per cent in 2015 and 17.6 per cent in 2025 (table 6).

> "As the youth bulge reaches prime family-formation age, the number of births is likely to increase, fueling considerable future growth."
> *Farazaneh Roudi-Fahimi and Mary Mederios Kent, Population Reference Bureau, June 2007.*

It should be noted that the combination of low mortality and high fertility rates in the past led to high population growth rates that eventually translated into increased numbers of people in the working age group (25-65). In absolute numbers, around 72.6 million workers were added to the labour force between 1980 and 2005. It is projected that the working age population will grow in size more rapidly than all other age groups and will reach 176.9 million by 2015 and 220.6 million by 2025, thereby constituting 44.9 per cent and 47.8 per cent respectively of the total population of the region (chart 7).




*Source*: Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Population and Social Development Section, based on the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, online data http://esa.un.org/unpp.

The analysis of the changing age structure of the population shows that the dependency ratio (the ratio of the economically dependent population to the working age population) has decreased substantially during the past 30 years, falling from 91.7 per cent in 1980 to 64.5 per cent in 2005, and is expected to reach 57.6 per cent in 2015 and 52.9 per cent in 2025 (table 7 and chart 8). The child dependency ratio has also decreased significantly during the same period from 85.2 per cent to 58.1 per cent and is expected to reach 44.2 per cent by 2025. On the other hand, the trend in old-age dependency shows some steadiness during the same period as a result of the small proportion of elderly in the total population (table 7). This transition will be associated with important development dividends liable to continue over the period of 25 years owing to the decreased dependency ratios, where the large working age cohort will be supporting a fewer number of dependents, thus providing a one-time opportunity for greater savings, increased investments and economic growth.




*Source*: Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Population and Social Development Section, based on the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, online data http://esa.un.org/unpp.

Another consequence brought about by the reduction in fertility and the increase in longevity is population ageing, whereby the proportion of older persons increases while that of younger persons decreases. While this phenomenon is well advanced in the more developed regions, where 20 per cent of the population is already aged 60 years or over, and 15.3 per cent is aged 65 years and over, the process is less substantial in developing countries, where the population remains relatively young. In the Arab region as a whole, just 4 per cent of the population is currently aged 65 years and over and is projected to reach 4.3 per cent by 2015 and 5.7 per cent by 2025 before it begins to rise more rapidly (table 6). Countries where fertility remains high will experience the slowest population ageing while such countries as Lebanon and Tunisia where fertility declined rapidly are most likely to experience a rapid population ageing. Nevertheless, when examining the ageing trend in absolute terms, it appears that the number of persons aged 65 and over more than doubled from 5.8 million in 1980 to 12.6 million in 2005 and is expected to reach 17 million by 2015 and 26.3 million by 2025. While the process of ageing in the Arab region is still at a relatively very early stage, serious challenges are likely to stem from the increasing absolute numbers of old persons, including its implications on the health and pension schemes, rural development, economy, environment and social organization.

## 7. International migration

International migration acquires a significant peculiarity in the Arab region due to the coexistence of several patterns of migration, including permanent migration, labour migration, brain drain, irregular and transit migration. Table 8 shows that the Arab region has experienced a strong rise in international migration in recent years. In 2005, there were 21.4 million migrants living in the Arab region, as compared to 15.8 million in 1995. One million were in the Arab Maghreb, 6.9 million in the Arab Mashreq (including Yemen) and 12.7 million in the GCC. If the number of migrants in the Arab region continues to grow at the present rate, the number will reach 25.8 million in 2010.[7] The proportion of women migrants in the region, though important, is below the global average and is currently standing at 36.2 per cent; most of them are Asian and engaged in domestic work, child-rearing and personal care.

The countries of the GCC are one of the major poles of attraction of international migrants, presenting a unique situation where immigrants constitute over one third of their total population, (36 per cent) thus causing an imbalance in the overall population structure (chart 9).




*Source*: Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Population and Social Development Section, based on the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2009. Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision. United Nations database (POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008).

[7] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2009. Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision. United Nations database (POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008).

During the last quarter of the twentieth century, international migration within the Arab region occurred mostly in response to the economic development of the oil-rich Gulf countries. These countries were not, however, able to benefit from the economic wealth generated by the booming oil prices and to develop their economic and social infrastructure due to their small labour force, low female labour force participation rates, low status of manual labour, and the reluctance of nationals to work in the private sector. The Gulf countries sought, therefore, to attract workers from the highly-populated Arab countries.[8]

At the same time, the demographic transition in the countries of origin was leading to a rise in the economically active population which impeded the national labour markets from absorbing first-time jobseekers in addition to those already unemployed and seeking work; these countries were also suffering from decades of high population growth, high dependency ratios and from mismatches between the requirements of the labour market and the available skills of the labour force, in addition to political instabilities and wars, which seriously hampered socio-economic development in the region. The combination of these factors created a huge potential for economically active persons to migrate to countries offering attractive employment opportunities and higher incomes, as well as better health and education services for themselves and their families, creating a kind of balanced regional labour market during that period.[9]

This migration regime, under which Arab emigrants had enjoyed advantage as the favoured category of employees in the oil-rich countries, ended, however, after the 1990-1991 Gulf war and was replaced by more restrictive policies based on security concerns. Currently, more than half the immigrants to the Gulf countries originate from India, while the share of those originating from other Arab countries is declining.

The GCC countries stand out as having the highest proportion of expatriate labour, constituting up to 90 per cent of the total labour force in Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait.[10] The backdrop to this is the coexistence of rising unemployment among national workers, especially university graduates, due to the segmented labour markets with differential wages for nationals and non-nationals in the private sector, and the preference for nationals to work in the already saturated public sector. Unofficial estimates put overall unemployment in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman at 15 per cent or more, and unemployment among those aged between 16 and 24 at more than 35 per cent.[11]

It is also important to note that the quandary of unemployment in GCC states mirrors that of the Arab region and is mostly due to youth unemployment, representing on average 50 per cent of total unemployment; the figure is higher among females. The youth unemployment rate stands at 21.5 per cent and is the highest in the world, making it a huge waste of potential given the investment made in youth education and training.[12]

The prevalence of high migration rates and the dependence on foreign labour in the GCC presage serious demographic and economic concerns, which have prompted the governments of the region to adopt measures towards restricting migrant inflows. The concerns associated with increasing expatriate labour include the imbalance of the population structure, increased unemployment among nationals, the adverse effect of the "sponsoring" system and the indirect negative impact of remittances on the balance of payments of these countries.

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[8] Batool Shakoori, 2005. Demographic Transition and its Implications on Employment and International Migration. Paper presented to the Fourth Coordination Committee on International Migration. New York, 26-27 October 2005.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Batool Shakoori, 2009. Features of international migration in the Arab countries and the possibility of regional cooperation. Paper presented to the Coordination meeting: Development Account - 6th Tranche, Project on Strengthening national capacities to deal with international migration: Maximizing development benefits and minimizing negative impact. New York, 6-7 April 2009.

[11] Unemployment Drives GCC Reforms. AMEinfo. 22 November 2007. Available at http://www.ameinfo.com/139517.html.

[12] International Labour Organization. Growth, Employment and Decent Work in the Arab Region: An Overview. Issue Paper. Arab Forum on Development and Employment. Doha, Qatar 15-16 November 2008.

Migration flows in the Arab region show that, to varying degrees, all Arab countries have become sending and receiving countries. During the period 2005-2010, all GCC countries and such Mashreq countries as Jordan and Syria experienced positive net migration with an average annual net migration rate ranging from 1.2 per 1,000 in Saudi Arabia to 93.9 per 1,000 in Qatar. In contrast, the African and Maghreb countries, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Palestine and Yemen experienced negative net migration, the highest rate of -5.6 per 1,000 prevailing in Somalia, most likely as a result of the political instability in that country.

These migration patterns are consistent with the fact that oil-rich states continue to attract large flows of migrant workers from the neighbouring Mashreq countries. Meanwhile, countries of the Maghreb which include Morocco, Tunisia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Algeria are mainly countries of origin for migrants to Europe and to a lesser extent transit countries for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, these trends also suggest that a number of destination countries have either stopped or have imposed restrictions on new admissions of migrants for employment and that significant return migration to countries of origin took place during that period, as stipulated by the momentous decrease in the migration rates between the period 2005 and 2010. This is mainly observed in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon and may be attributed to the impact of the global economic crisis, which began in the second half of 2008, and the huge influx of return migrants who decided to head back to their home countries after losing their jobs (chart 10).

**Chart 10. Average annual migration rates in selected Arab countries**




| | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon | Morocco | Qatar | Saudi Arabia | Syrian Arab Republic | Tunisia | United Arab Emirates |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2005-10 | 8.3 | 8.3 | -0.6 | -2.7 | 93.9 | 1.2 | 7.7 | -0.4 | 15.6 |
| 2000-05 | 4 | 21.5 | 5.1 | -3.7 | 58.4 | 2.6 | 3.4 | -1.7 | 31.5 |
| 1990-95 | 27 | -61.8 | 14.2 | -3.5 | 5.7 | -5.8 | -1 | -1 | 31.6 |

*Source*: Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Population and Social Development Section, based on the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, online data http://esa.un.org/unpp.

## II. Future implications for development

So far, this report has described the trends and levels of selected demographic indicators in the Arab region. This section will primarily focus on the demographic and policy implications of the youth bulge as a factor offering opportunities but also imposing development challenges. The discussion will also showcase the impact of the current economic crisis on some population groups, namely youth, migrant workers, and elderly in terms of loss of jobs; return migration and remittance flows. It concludes with policy recommendations for coping with the challenges arising from the emergent crisis and for safeguarding the progress achieved so far within the framework of the internationally agreed upon development goals, including the MDGs.

## 1. The youth bulge: challenges and opportunities

As the report described, rapidly dropping fertility rates in the Arab countries have led to an unparalleled "youth bulge". Young men are identified as a highly volatile population and it is assumed that the presence of more than 20 per cent of young people in a given country, which is already overwhelmed by social, economic, environmental and political strains, predisposes this country to conflict and civil unrest.[13] This correlation is based on the belief that demographic pressures lead to resource scarcities, which in turn force young people to compete for such limited resources as education, employment, health, housing and social services. Riots break out and armed conflicts arise when governments do not have the capacity to meet the increasing demands of their youth. This assumption has been further underscored by historical evidence which suggests that countries where young adults make up more than 40 per cent of the working age population are 2.5 times more likely to experience armed conflict than countries with lower proportions of youth.[14]

While some contemporary studies have considered upsurges in the numbers of youth as factors of turmoil and violence, the projected increase in the size of this group is of particular importance for the Arab region and has age-specific policy implications. This group embraces several functional and behavioural characteristics: (1) it is of reproductive age, meaning it will further fuel population growth and sustain the population momentum; (2) it is economically active, which increases the number of newcomers into the labour market and increases the risk of unemployment; (3) its increase will add to the fiscal burden of expanding access to post-primary schooling and health services; (4) it could potentially foment turmoil and instability in the context of exclusion and inequality; (5) it represents a period of life when its members are converted from consumers into producers of wealth.[15] This last category suggests that the expansion of this age group, in parallel with the slow growth of the elderly population, will offer countries a unique opportunity to intensify their human capital before it starts to age. Indeed, historical evidence shows that the drop in fertility means that a larger proportion of working age people is caring for the dependent, thus leading to an increase in income per dependent. This particular situation frees more resources for savings and investment and eases the pressure on countries to provide for the dependent young and elderly, especially in education and health, thus paving the way for a demographic dividend,[16] sustained growth and improved quality of life.[17]

In sum, the youth bulge implies a rising share of the working age group, which in turn can trigger economic growth, albeit at different but precise periods of time. Whether these young people become fully integrated and productive in their societies depends to a large extent on how well governments and other social actors, including the private sector and civil society, are willing to and capable of investing in the skills of the labour force and related institutions. To achieve this goal, countries can provide the means to help youth access quality education, stimulate and meet their demand for higher skill levels, and facilitate their entry into jobs. In addition, countries can empower youth and help them become better decision makers

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[13] Anne Hendrixson, 2003. The Youth Bulge. Posted in Znet Commentary.

http://www.zmag.org/Sustainers/Content/2003-03/14hendrixson.cfm.

[14] Richard Cincotta, 2005. State of the World 2005. Global Security Brief No. 2: Youth Bulge, Underemployment Raise Risks of Civil Conflict. http://www.worldwatch.org/node/76.

[15] United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. Social Development Bulletin, Volume 2, Issue 1. The youth bulge: social implications and future vision, June 2008.

[16] The demographic dividend is a rise in the rate of economic growth due to a rising share of working age people in a population. This usually occurs late in the demographic transition when the fertility rate falls and the child dependency ratio declines.

[17] United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. Social Policy Brief. Demographic Transition in the Arab Countries: Preparing for the Future (E/ESCWA/SDD/2008/Technical Paper.6).

by providing them with information and guidance resources as part of targeted education schemes, and developing the education system to incorporate thinking and behavioural competencies.[18]

Some researchers also propose speeding up the process of the demographic transition in order to curtail the youth bulge-connotation of volatility and risk. Among the policy initiatives suggested for young adults in countries experiencing the youth bulge as well as countries emerging from conflicts are promoting job growth and training by encouraging trade policies, foreign assistance and private sector involvement. Another key factor is to improve access to family planning and reproductive health services in order to foster more drops in birth rates and invest more in the education of children. A third measure is to empower women and promote their advancement through access to education, health services and employment opportunities.[19]

*The World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation, states: "there has never been a better time to invest in youth because they are healthier and better educated than previous generations, and they will join the workforce with fewer dependents because of changing demographics."*

(World Bank Press Release No:2007/56/DEC can be accessed at http://web.worldbank.org/)

## 2. The impact of the financial crisis on various population groups in the Arab region

The global slowdown in economic growth which began in the second half of 2008 is primarily expected to lead to higher levels of unemployment, more specifically in the case of migrant workers who are often the most vulnerable category. Nevertheless, the analysis of the impact of the financial crisis on migration and unemployment in the Arab region is still empirical. Consequently, many of the observed trends are based on estimates, or even "guesstimates", and confined to scattered press reports which indicate that the economic crisis caused significant return migration and had adverse effects on unemployment where the primary victims were, as usual, the youth. Evidence gathered so far shows that unemployment, depression in wages and worsening working conditions are on the rise in response to the slowing of activities in finance, construction, tourism, services and real estate. To protect the national labour market from "job competition" a number of destination countries are also adopting more restrictive policies on renewal of work permits and new admissions of migrant workers. Other possible outcomes include increases in irregular migration, informal labour and human trafficking. In addition, there have been reports of an increase in return migration of migrant workers who lost their jobs.[20] This is likely to result in reduced future remittances which might have otherwise contributed to poverty alleviation and narrowing inequity gaps, while also adding pressure to existing unemployment and underemployment particularly in rural areas.

Migrant remittances used to constitute the fastest growing and most stable capital flow to the Arab region. Given their magnitude, the potential decline in remittances resulting from the global economic slowdown will result in adverse effects on development in labour sending countries. Data gathered from five Arab countries showed that remittances were higher than foreign direct investment (FDI) and overseas development assistance (ODA) (chart 11).[21]

[18] Emmanuel Y. Jimenez and Mamta Murthi, 2006. Investing in the Youth Bulge. Finance and Development: IMF paper. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2006/09/jimenez.htm.

[19] See reference 14.

[20] International Organization for Migration, 2009. IOM Policy Brief, March 2009: The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on Migrants and Migration.

[21] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Handbook of Statistics 2005, which is available at: http://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx.




*Source*: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Handbook of Statistics: 2005. Available at http://stats.unctad.org/handbook/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx.

While the economic crisis has taken its toll on employment around the globe, some social groups have been particularly affected. Youth unemployment rates in the Middle East are the highest in the world, ranging between 20 and 40 per cent as compared to the worldwide average of 10-20 per cent.[22] Youth tend to be the last in and the first out from the labour market, owing to their relative lack of work experience and contacts; also, they often find it difficult to obtain new jobs once they have been laid off.[23] This unemployment predicament is an extra burden to be shouldered by this group when, concurrently, they face tremendous challenges transitioning from school to work to family formation.

At the far end of the age spectrum, older persons face similar hardship in remaining in or re-entering the job market. Persons in the 65 and over age group who are still economically active will face extreme difficulties in competing for jobs and accessing credit. That said, however, given the traditional family support system, the majority of the elderly population in the Arab region depends for its livelihood on the support provided by younger family members. The loss of employment and the expected decrease in migrant remittances will jeopardize the subsistence of the dependent elderly, especially those living in rural areas, who are already marginalized, vulnerable and lack access to the social protection schemes.[24]

Another important impact of the financial crisis will be a potential decline in official development assistance, which will further constrain the ability of government to spend on social development, including social services, basic health services, education and training, thereby affecting the most vulnerable and marginalized groups, including the poor, youth and older persons, a situation that aggravates social inequality and halts the progress achieved so far in terms of poverty reduction.[25] Given the importance of social protection in achieving the internationally agreed upon development goals, including the MDGs, there is a strong and imminent need in the Arab countries to develop and coordinate comprehensive social protection programmes, including social safety nets, to mitigate the medium- and long-term impact of the economic crisis on these vulnerable groups.

[22] Navtej Dhillon, 2008. Middle East Youth Bulge: Challenge or Opportunity? Paper submitted at a congressional briefing on 22 May 2008.

[23] Commission for Social Development, 47th Session, 4-13 February 2009. The Current Global Crises and their Impact on Social Development. Note by the Secretariat. (E/CN.5/2009/CRP.2).

[24] Commission for Social Development, 47th Session, 4-13 February 2009. Promoting Full Employment and Decent Work for All. Report of the Secretary-General. (E/CN.5/2009/4).

[25] See reference 23.

## Conclusion

As the demographic transition proceeds, the dependency ratio in the Arab countries will decline to 58 per cent by 2015, thereby allowing more resources to be freed for saving and investment. By that time, however, Arab countries will have to deal with a double challenge: Firstly, the social and economic pressure resulting from the current global crises and their impact on social development, including rising unemployment and the subsequent jeopardy to the progress made in recent years in the area of poverty reduction and hunger; and secondly, the demographic pressure of migration, which arises if the gains from the demographic dividends are insufficient to meet the demands of the growing working age population, thus urging them to emigrate.

Responding to the implications of the current economic crisis on migrants requires solid international and regional cooperation, in addition to flexible and thorough measures to capture the overarching dimensions of international migration. Policy responses should aim at protecting the migrants against xenophobia, safeguarding the rights of migrants in terms of job loss and living conditions; strengthening their integration and subsistence; facilitating return migration and reintegration; safeguarding remittance flows as well as encouraging the use of remittances in productive investment in receiving countries.[26]

Equally, reducing the impact of the economic crisis on social development and employment requires the international community to honour its commitments as well as national stakeholders to take immediate policy measures targeting disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, including the provision of basic social protection for all, promoting investment in agricultural and rural development, and building new social compacts to ensure the contribution of the private sector and civil society in the creation of decent jobs and the provision of social services in rural areas, thereby furthering the achievements of the MDGs.

[26] See reference 20.

## “Statistical annex”

TABLE 1. POPULATION SIZE AND GROWTH IN THE ARAB REGION

| Country | Mid-year Population (1,000) | | Projected Population (1,000) | | | | | Annual Population increment 1980-2009 (1,000) | Annual Growth rate 1980-2009 | Annual Growth rate 2009-2015 | Annual Growth rate 2009-2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1980 | 2009 | 2010 | 2015 | 2020 | 2025 | 2050 | | | | |
| Algeria | 18,811 | 34,895 | 35,423 | 38,088 | 40,630 | 42,882 | 49,610 | 555 | 2.13 | 1.46 | 1.38 |
| Bahrain | 347 | 791 | 807 | 882 | 953 | 1,021 | 1,277 | 15 | 2.84 | 1.81 | 1.69 |
| Comoros | 329 | 676 | 691 | 767 | 838 | 907 | 1,226 | 12 | 2.48 | 2.10 | 1.95 |
| Djibouti | 340 | 864 | 879 | 953 | 1,027 | 1,111 | 1,469 | 18 | 3.22 | 1.63 | 1.57 |
| Egypt | 44,433 | 82,999 | 84,474 | 91,778 | 98,638 | 104,970 | 129,533 | 1,330 | 2.15 | 1.68 | 1.57 |
| Iraq | 14,024 | 30,747 | 31,467 | 35,884 | 40,228 | 44,692 | 63,995 | 577 | 2.71 | 2.57 | 2.44 |
| Jordan | 2,225 | 6,316 | 6,472 | 6,957 | 7,519 | 8,088 | 10,241 | 141 | 3.60 | 1.61 | 1.58 |
| Kuwait | 1,375 | 2,985 | 3,051 | 3,378 | 3,690 | 3,988 | 5,240 | 56 | 2.67 | 2.06 | 1.93 |
| Lebanon | 2,785 | 4,224 | 4,255 | 4,426 | 4,587 | 4,736 | 5,033 | 50 | 1.44 | 0.78 | 0.75 |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | 3,063 | 6,420 | 6,546 | 7,158 | 7,699 | 8,144 | 9,819 | 116 | 2.55 | 1.81 | 1.65 |
| Mauritania | 1,525 | 3,291 | 3,366 | 3,732 | 4,091 | 4,443 | 6,061 | 61 | 2.65 | 2.10 | 1.98 |
| Morocco | 19,567 | 31,993 | 32,381 | 34,330 | 36,200 | 37,865 | 42,583 | 428 | 1.70 | 1.18 | 1.12 |
| Palestine | 1,476 | 4,277 | 4,409 | 5,090 | 5,806 | 6,553 | 10,265 | 97 | 3.67 | 2.90 | 2.78 |
| Oman | 1,187 | 2,845 | 2,905 | 3,198 | 3,495 | 3,782 | 4,878 | 57 | 3.01 | 1.95 | 1.87 |
| Qatar | 229 | 1,409 | 1,508 | 1,630 | 1,740 | 1,848 | 2,316 | 41 | 6.27 | 2.43 | 1.92 |
| Saudi Arabia | 9,604 | 25,721 | 26,246 | 28,933 | 31,608 | 34,176 | 43,658 | 556 | 3.40 | 1.96 | 1.87 |
| Somalia | 6,434 | 9,133 | 9,359 | 10,731 | 12,246 | 13,922 | 23,522 | 93 | 1.21 | 2.69 | 2.67 |
| The Sudan | 20,509 | 42,272 | 43,192 | 47,730 | 52,309 | 56,688 | 75,884 | 750 | 2.49 | 2.02 | 1.94 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 8,971 | 21,906 | 22,505 | 24,494 | 26,475 | 28,592 | 36,911 | 446 | 3.08 | 1.86 | 1.72 |
| Tunisia | 6,457 | 10,272 | 10,374 | 10,884 | 11,366 | 11,797 | 12,711 | 132 | 1.60 | 0.96 | 0.92 |
| United Arab Emirates | 1,015 | 4,599 | 4,707 | 5,193 | 5,660 | 6,109 | 8,253 | 124 | 5.21 | 2.02 | 1.89 |
| Yemen | 8,381 | 23,580 | 24,256 | 27,819 | 31,635 | 35,509 | 53,689 | 524 | 3.57 | 2.76 | 2.67 |
| **Total Arab population** | **173,087** | **352,215** | **359,273** | **394,035** | **428,440** | **461,823** | **598,174** | **6,177** | **2.45** | **1.87** | **1.78** |

*Source*: *United Nations 2009. World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, can be accessed online at http://esa.un.org/unpp.

TABLE 2A. URBAN POPULATIONS AND URBAN GROWTH RATES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES

| Country | Percentage of urban population | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Urban growth rate | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2020 | 2025 | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2045 | 2050 | 1980-2005 | 2005-2020 |
| Algeria | 43.5 | 48 | 52.1 | 56 | 59.8 | 63.3 | 66.5 | 69.3 | 71.9 | 74.1 | 76.2 | 78.2 | 80.1 | 81.9 | 83.5 | 3.73 | 2.26 |
| Bahrain | 86.1 | 87.2 | 88.1 | 88.4 | 88.4 | 88.4 | 88.6 | 89 | 89.4 | 90 | 90.6 | 91.2 | 91.8 | 92.3 | 92.8 | 3.05 | 1.64 |
| Comoros | 23.2 | 25.5 | 27.9 | 28.3 | 28.1 | 27.9 | 28.2 | 29.2 | 30.8 | 33.3 | 36.5 | 39.9 | 43.5 | 47.1 | 50.7 | 3.63 | 2.87 |
| Djibouti | 72.1 | 74.6 | 75.7 | 79.7 | 83.3 | 86.1 | 88.1 | 89.6 | 90.6 | 91.3 | 92 | 92.6 | 93.2 | 93.7 | 94.2 | 4.15 | 1.98 |
| Egypt | 43.9 | 43.9 | 43.5 | 42.8 | 42.6 | 42.6 | 42.8 | 43.6 | 45 | 47.1 | 49.9 | 53.1 | 56.3 | 59.4 | 62.4 | 1.93 | 1.96 |
| Iraq | 65.5 | 68.8 | 69.7 | 68.8 | 67.8 | 66.9 | 66.4 | 66.5 | 67.3 | 68.6 | 70.5 | 72.4 | 74.3 | 76.1 | 77.8 | 2.83 | 2.27 |
| Jordan | 59.9 | 66.3 | 72.2 | 78.2 | 78.3 | 78.3 | 78.5 | 79 | 79.8 | 80.8 | 82 | 83.2 | 84.3 | 85.4 | 86.4 | 4.72 | 2.11 |
| Kuwait | 94.8 | 97.9 | 98 | 98.1 | 98.2 | 98.3 | 98.4 | 98.5 | 98.6 | 98.6 | 98.7 | 98.8 | 98.9 | 98.9 | 99 | 2.85 | 2.10 |
| Lebanon | 73.7 | 79.4 | 83.1 | 84.8 | 86 | 86.6 | 87.2 | 87.9 | 88.6 | 89.3 | 90 | 90.7 | 91.3 | 91.9 | 92.4 | 2.10 | 1.09 |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | 70.1 | 75.5 | 75.7 | 76 | 76.4 | 77 | 77.9 | 79 | 80.3 | 81.6 | 82.9 | 84.1 | 85.2 | 86.2 | 87.2 | 3.01 | 2.00 |
| Mauritania | 27.4 | 35 | 39.7 | 39.8 | 40 | 40.4 | 41.4 | 43.1 | 45.4 | 48.4 | 51.7 | 55 | 58.2 | 61.3 | 64.4 | 4.28 | 3.03 |
| Morocco | 41.2 | 44.8 | 48.4 | 51.7 | 53.3 | 55 | 56.7 | 58.7 | 61 | 63.4 | 65.9 | 68.5 | 70.9 | 73.2 | 75.4 | 2.93 | 1.83 |
| Palestine | 62.4 | 65.2 | 67.9 | 70.4 | 71.5 | 71.6 | 72.1 | 72.9 | 74.1 | 75.6 | 77.2 | 78.8 | 80.3 | 81.7 | 83 | 4.29 | 3.12 |
| Oman | 47.6 | 57.1 | 66.1 | 71.7 | 71.6 | 71.5 | 71.7 | 72.3 | 73.3 | 74.7 | 76.4 | 78 | 79.5 | 80.9 | 82.3 | 4.62 | 2.08 |
| Qatar | 89.4 | 90.1 | 92.2 | 94.1 | 94.9 | 95.4 | 95.8 | 96.2 | 96.5 | 96.7 | 96.9 | 97.1 | 97.3 | 97.5 | 97.6 | 5.24 | 1.86 |
| Saudi Arabia | 65.9 | 72.6 | 76.6 | 78.7 | 79.8 | 81 | 82.1 | 83.2 | 84.2 | 85.2 | 86.2 | 87.2 | 88.1 | 88.9 | 89.7 | 4.42 | 2.31 |
| Somalia | 26.8 | 28.1 | 29.7 | 31.4 | 33.2 | 35.2 | 37.4 | 40.1 | 43 | 46.3 | 49.9 | 53.4 | 56.9 | 60.3 | 63.7 | 2.03 | 4.04 |
| The Sudan | 20 | 22.4 | 26.6 | 31.3 | 36.1 | 40.8 | 45.2 | 49.4 | 53.2 | 57 | 60.7 | 64.3 | 67.7 | 71 | 74 | 5.38 | 3.80 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 46.7 | 47.9 | 48.9 | 50.1 | 51.6 | 53.2 | 54.9 | 56.8 | 59 | 61.4 | 64 | 66.6 | 69.2 | 71.6 | 73.9 | 3.50 | 2.71 |
| Tunisia | 50.6 | 53.8 | 57.9 | 61.5 | 63.4 | 65.3 | 67.3 | 69.2 | 71.2 | 73.2 | 75.2 | 77 | 78.8 | 80.5 | 82 | 2.82 | 1.56 |
| United Arab Emirates | 80.7 | 79.8 | 79.1 | 78.4 | 77.8 | 77.7 | 78 | 78.8 | 80 | 81.2 | 82.4 | 83.6 | 84.7 | 85.7 | 86.7 | 5.44 | 2.47 |
| Yemen | 16.5 | 18.4 | 20.9 | 23.8 | 26.3 | 28.9 | 31.8 | 34.9 | 38.2 | 41.7 | 45.3 | 49.1 | 52.8 | 56.5 | 60.2 | 5.93 | 4.71 |
| **Total Arab population** | **44.2** | **47.2** | **49.7** | **51.5** | **53.1** | **54.6** | **56.1** | **53.6** | **59.7** | **61.9** | **64.3** | **66.7** | **69.1** | **71.5** | **73.7** | **3.31** | **2.44** |

*Source*: United Nations 2008, World Urbanization Prospects, the 2007 Revision Population Database, can be accessed online at http://esa.un.org/unup/index.asp.

## TABLE 2B. RURAL POPULATIONS AND RURAL GROWTH RATES IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES

| Country | Percentage of rural population | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rural growth rate | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2020 | 2025 | 2030 | 2035 | 2040 | 2045 | 2050 | 1980-2005 | 2005-2020 |
| Algeria | 56.5 | 52 | 47.9 | 44 | 40.2 | 36.7 | 33.5 | 30.7 | 28.1 | 25.9 | 23.8 | 21.8 | 19.9 | 18.1 | 16.5 | 0.51 | -0.35 |
| Bahrain | 13.9 | 12.8 | 11.9 | 11.6 | 11.6 | 11.6 | 11.4 | 11 | 10.6 | 10 | 9.4 | 8.8 | 8.2 | 7.7 | 7.2 | 2.24 | 0.96 |
| Comoros | 76.8 | 74.5 | 72.1 | 71.7 | 71.9 | 72.1 | 71.8 | 70.8 | 69.2 | 66.7 | 63.5 | 60.1 | 56.5 | 52.9 | 49.3 | 2.64 | 1.94 |
| Djibouti | 27.9 | 25.4 | 24.4 | 20.3 | 16.7 | 13.9 | 11.9 | 10.4 | 9.4 | 8.7 | 8 | 7.4 | 6.8 | 6.3 | 5.8 | 0.66 | -0.96 |
| Egypt | 56.1 | 56.1 | 56.5 | 57.2 | 57.4 | 57.4 | 57.2 | 56.4 | 55 | 52.9 | 50.1 | 46.9 | 43.7 | 40.6 | 37.6 | 2.13 | 1.31 |
| Iraq | 34.5 | 31.2 | 30.3 | 31.2 | 32.2 | 33.1 | 33.6 | 33.5 | 32.7 | 31.4 | 29.5 | 27.6 | 25.7 | 23.9 | 22.2 | 2.58 | 2.17 |
| Jordan | 40.1 | 33.7 | 27.8 | 21.8 | 21.7 | 21.7 | 21.5 | 21 | 20.2 | 19.2 | 18 | 16.8 | 15.7 | 14.6 | 13.6 | 1.20 | 1.52 |
| Kuwait | 5.2 | 2.1 | 2 | 1.9 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1 | -1.79 | 0.94 |
| Lebanon | 26.3 | 20.6 | 16.9 | 15.2 | 14 | 13.4 | 12.8 | 12.1 | 11.4 | 10.7 | 10 | 9.3 | 8.7 | 8.1 | 7.6 | -1.24 | -0.15 |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | 29.9 | 24.6 | 24.3 | 24 | 23.6 | 23 | 22.1 | 21 | 19.7 | 18.4 | 17.1 | 15.9 | 14.8 | 13.8 | 12.8 | 1.58 | 0.69 |
| Mauritania | 72.6 | 65 | 60.3 | 60.2 | 60 | 59.6 | 58.6 | 56.9 | 54.6 | 51.6 | 48.3 | 45 | 41.8 | 38.7 | 35.6 | 1.93 | 1.66 |
| Morocco | 58.8 | 55.2 | 51.6 | 48.3 | 46.7 | 45 | 43.3 | 41.3 | 39 | 36.6 | 34.1 | 31.5 | 29.1 | 26.8 | 24.6 | 0.71 | 0.19 |
| Palestine | 37.6 | 34.8 | 32.1 | 29.6 | 28.5 | 28.4 | 27.9 | 27.1 | 25.9 | 24.4 | 22.8 | 21.2 | 19.7 | 18.3 | 17 | 2.63 | 2.28 |
| Oman | 52.4 | 42.9 | 33.9 | 28.3 | 28.4 | 28.5 | 28.3 | 27.7 | 26.7 | 25.3 | 23.7 | 22 | 20.5 | 19.1 | 17.7 | 0.55 | 1.46 |
| Qatar | 10.6 | 9.9 | 7.8 | 5.9 | 5.1 | 4.6 | 4.2 | 3.8 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.4 | 1.62 | 0.18 |
| Saudi Arabia | 34.1 | 27.4 | 23.4 | 21.3 | 20.2 | 19 | 17.9 | 16.8 | 15.8 | 14.8 | 13.8 | 12.8 | 11.9 | 11.1 | 10.3 | 1.26 | 0.80 |
| Somalia | 73.2 | 71.9 | 70.3 | 68.6 | 66.8 | 64.8 | 62.6 | 59.9 | 57 | 53.7 | 50.1 | 46.6 | 43.1 | 39.7 | 36.3 | 0.45 | 1.84 |
| The Sudan | 80 | 77.6 | 73.4 | 68.7 | 63.9 | 59.2 | 54.8 | 50.6 | 46.8 | 43 | 39.3 | 35.7 | 32.3 | 29 | 26 | 1.32 | 0.46 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 53.3 | 52.1 | 51.1 | 49.9 | 48.4 | 46.8 | 45.1 | 43.2 | 41 | 38.6 | 36 | 33.4 | 30.8 | 28.4 | 26.1 | 2.46 | 1.14 |
| Tunisia | 49.4 | 46.2 | 42.1 | 38.5 | 36.6 | 34.7 | 32.7 | 30.8 | 28.8 | 26.8 | 24.8 | 23 | 21.2 | 19.5 | 18 | 0.37 | -0.25 |
| United Arab Emirates | 19.3 | 20.2 | 20.9 | 21.6 | 22.2 | 22.3 | 22 | 21.2 | 20 | 18.8 | 17.6 | 16.4 | 15.3 | 14.3 | 13.3 | 6.16 | 1.56 |
| Yemen | 83.5 | 81.6 | 79.1 | 76.2 | 73.7 | 71.1 | 68.2 | 65.1 | 61.8 | 58.3 | 54.7 | 50.9 | 47.2 | 43.5 | 39.8 | 3.05 | 1.93 |
| **Total Arab population** | **55.8** | **52.8** | **50.3** | **48.5** | **46.9** | **45.4** | **43.9** | **46.4** | **40.3** | **38.1** | **35.7** | **33.3** | **30.9** | **28.5** | **26.3** | **1.64** | **1.06** |

TABLE 3. FERTILITY TRENDS IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES, 1980-2050 (PER 1,000 LIVE BIRTHS)

| **Country** | **1980-1985** | **1985-1990** | **1990-1995** | **1995-2000** | **2000-2005** | **2005-2010** | **2010-2015** | **2015-2020** | **2020-2025** | **2025-2030** | **2030-2035** | **2035-2040** | **2040-2045** | **2045-2050** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Algeria | 6.49 | 5.29 | 4.13 | 2.89 | 2.53 | 2.38 | 2.26 | 2.16 | 2.07 | 2 | 1.93 | 1.86 | 1.85 | 1.85 |
| Bahrain | 4.63 | 4.08 | 3.36 | 2.76 | 2.51 | 2.29 | 2.11 | 1.95 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 |
| Comoros | 7.05 | 6 | 5.08 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 4 | 3.6 | 3.23 | 2.94 | 2.72 | 2.54 | 2.39 | 2.27 | 2.17 |
| Djibouti | 6.6 | 6.4 | 5.85 | 5.11 | 4.52 | 3.95 | 3.48 | 3.13 | 2.86 | 2.65 | 2.49 | 2.35 | 2.24 | 2.14 |
| Egypt | 5.52 | 5.2 | 3.91 | 3.5 | 3.16 | 2.89 | 2.68 | 2.51 | 2.37 | 2.25 | 2.15 | 2.07 | 1.99 | 1.92 |
| Iraq | 6.35 | 6.15 | 5.8 | 5.4 | 4.63 | 4.11 | 3.66 | 3.26 | 2.96 | 2.73 | 2.55 | 2.41 | 2.29 | 2.18 |
| Jordan | 6.77 | 5.87 | 5.14 | 4.32 | 3.53 | 3.13 | 2.81 | 2.54 | 2.32 | 2.13 | 1.97 | 1.86 | 1.85 | 1.85 |
| Kuwait | 4.87 | 3.94 | 3.2 | 2.61 | 2.3 | 2.18 | 2.09 | 2.01 | 1.94 | 1.88 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 |
| Lebanon | 3.9 | 3.31 | 3 | 2.7 | 2.09 | 1.86 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | 7.18 | 5.65 | 4.1 | 3.41 | 3.03 | 2.72 | 2.47 | 2.26 | 2.09 | 1.93 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 |
| Mauritania | 6.26 | 6.01 | 5.68 | 5.29 | 4.9 | 4.52 | 4.07 | 3.61 | 3.24 | 2.95 | 2.72 | 2.54 | 2.4 | 2.28 |
| Morocco | 5.4 | 4.45 | 3.66 | 2.97 | 2.52 | 2.38 | 2.26 | 2.16 | 2.07 | 1.99 | 1.92 | 1.86 | 1.85 | 1.85 |
| Palestine | 7 | 6.43 | 6.46 | 6.03 | 5.63 | 5.09 | 4.5 | 3.93 | 3.47 | 3.12 | 2.85 | 2.65 | 2.48 | 2.35 |
| Oman | 7.2 | 6.8 | 6.3 | 5.1 | 3.8 | 3.09 | 2.84 | 2.64 | 2.48 | 2.34 | 2.23 | 2.13 | 2.05 | 1.97 |
| Qatar | 5.45 | 4.7 | 4.1 | 3.38 | 2.92 | 2.43 | 2.27 | 2.17 | 2.08 | 2 | 1.93 | 1.87 | 1.85 | 1.85 |
| Saudi Arabia | 7.02 | 6.22 | 5.45 | 4.62 | 3.81 | 3.17 | 2.83 | 2.56 | 2.34 | 2.15 | 1.98 | 1.86 | 1.85 | 1.85 |
| Somalia | 6.7 | 6.7 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.4 | 6.17 | 5.75 | 5.28 | 4.78 | 4.27 | 3.79 | 3.38 | 3.06 |
| The Sudan | 6.34 | 6.08 | 5.81 | 5.41 | 4.82 | 4.23 | 3.7 | 3.29 | 2.98 | 2.75 | 2.57 | 2.42 | 2.3 | 2.19 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 7.18 | 6.24 | 4.86 | 4.02 | 3.64 | 3.29 | 2.93 | 2.64 | 2.41 | 2.21 | 2.04 | 1.89 | 1.85 | 1.85 |
| Tunisia | 4.92 | 4.14 | 3.13 | 2.32 | 1.97 | 1.86 | 1.82 | 1.8 | 1.84 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 |
| United Arab Emirates | 5.23 | 4.83 | 3.88 | 2.97 | 2.49 | 1.95 | 1.88 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 | 1.85 |
| Yemen | 8.7 | 8.4 | 7.7 | 6.73 | 5.9 | 5.3 | 4.65 | 4.08 | 3.57 | 3.16 | 2.83 | 2.56 | 2.34 | 2.15 |
| **Total Arab region** | **6.2** | **5.6** | **4.9** | **4.2** | **3.7** | **3.3** | **3.0** | **2.8** | **2.6** | **2.4** | **2.3** | **2.2** | **2.1** | **2.0** |

*Source*: *United Nations 2009. World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, can be accessed online at http://esa.un.org/unpp.

## Table 4. Infant mortality rates in the Arab countries, 1980-2050 (per 1,000 live births)

| | **1980-1985** | **1985-1990** | **1990-1995** | **1995-2000** | **2000-2005** | **2005-2010** | **2010-2015** | **2015-2020** | **2020-2025** | **2025-2030** | **2030-2035** | **2035-2040** | **2040-2045** | **2045-2050** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Algeria | 84.4 | 65.2 | 54.2 | 46.8 | 37.4 | 31.1 | 25.8 | 21.7 | 18.9 | 16.5 | 14.4 | 13 | 12 | 11.1 |
| Bahrain | 21 | 18 | 14.7 | 12.5 | 11.2 | 9.9 | 8.9 | 8.3 | 7.7 | 7.3 | 6.9 | 6.5 | 6.1 | 5.8 |
| Comoros | 105.6 | 95.2 | 80.3 | 67.9 | 57.7 | 48.4 | 40.1 | 33 | 27.2 | 22.5 | 19.1 | 16.6 | 14.5 | 12.8 |
| Djibouti | 127.1 | 119.8 | 111.6 | 101.9 | 94.5 | 85 | 75.2 | 66 | 57.9 | 50.7 | 44.1 | 38.2 | 33.1 | 28.6 |
| Egypt | 97.4 | 78.5 | 63.7 | 48 | 39.5 | 34.8 | 30.2 | 25.6 | 21.4 | 18.3 | 15.8 | 13.7 | 11.8 | 10.7 |
| Iraq | 52.1 | 48.9 | 48.3 | 43.8 | 36.5 | 33.2 | 30.1 | 28.4 | 24.6 | 20.4 | 17.7 | 15.4 | 13.5 | 11.9 |
| Jordan | 52 | 42 | 33 | 28 | 23.2 | 19.4 | 16.5 | 14.5 | 12.9 | 11.4 | 10.1 | 9.4 | 8.8 | 8.2 |
| Kuwait | 24 | 16.5 | 13.4 | 10.9 | 9.7 | 9.1 | 8.5 | 8 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 6.7 | 6.4 | 6 | 5.7 |
| Lebanon | 40.5 | 36.7 | 31.2 | 27.9 | 25.2 | 22 | 19.2 | 17 | 14.8 | 13 | 11.5 | 10.1 | 9.4 | 8.8 |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | 50 | 38.1 | 30.7 | 23.8 | 20.9 | 18 | 15.8 | 14.2 | 12.8 | 11.5 | 10.7 | 9.9 | 9.3 | 8.7 |
| Mauritania | 89.8 | 76.2 | 74.6 | 73.2 | 72.7 | 72.8 | 68.8 | 65.3 | 61.8 | 57.8 | 53.4 | 49.2 | 45.4 | 41.9 |
| Morocco | 88.3 | 72.1 | 58 | 47 | 37.5 | 30.6 | 25.3 | 21.5 | 18.6 | 16.2 | 14.2 | 12.5 | 11.1 | 10.3 |
| Palestine | 50.6 | 35.2 | 27.3 | 25.1 | 20.9 | 17.5 | 15.2 | 13.4 | 11.7 | 10.4 | 9.7 | 9 | 8.4 | 7.9 |
| Oman | 58.3 | 37.1 | 23.9 | 19.7 | 15.2 | 12.3 | 10.5 | 9.7 | 9 | 8.4 | 7.9 | 7.4 | 7 | 6.6 |
| Qatar | 33 | 21 | 17 | 12.9 | 9.8 | 8.3 | 7.7 | 7.2 | 6.8 | 6.5 | 6.2 | 5.9 | 5.6 | 5.3 |
| Saudi Arabia | 56.4 | 42.5 | 32.1 | 26 | 22.4 | 18.8 | 16.4 | 14.3 | 12.6 | 11.1 | 9.9 | 9.2 | 8.6 | 8.1 |
| Somalia | 137.8 | 127.2 | 141.3 | 122.6 | 110.6 | 109.6 | 101.2 | 92.7 | 84.3 | 76.2 | 68.4 | 61.1 | 54.4 | 48.3 |
| The Sudan | 106.5 | 99.1 | 91.2 | 81.1 | 73.3 | 69.1 | 61.9 | 55 | 48.9 | 43.5 | 38.8 | 34.6 | 30.9 | 27.8 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 50.3 | 40.3 | 31 | 23.5 | 18.6 | 16 | 14 | 12.4 | 10.9 | 9.9 | 9.2 | 8.6 | 8.1 | 7.6 |
| Tunisia | 64.1 | 48.9 | 34.2 | 26.4 | 22.5 | 19.8 | 17.3 | 15.1 | 13.1 | 11.3 | 10.4 | 9.6 | 8.9 | 8.3 |
| United Arab Emirates | 31.6 | 23.4 | 15.7 | 11.3 | 10.3 | 9.7 | 9 | 8.4 | 7.9 | 7.4 | 7 | 6.6 | 6.2 | 5.9 |
| Yemen | 125.9 | 105.2 | 91.7 | 79.8 | 69.2 | 58.6 | 49.1 | 40.7 | 33.4 | 27.5 | 22.8 | 19.1 | 16.6 | 14.5 |
| **Total Arab region** | **70.30** | **58.50** | **50.87** | **43.64** | **38.13** | **34.27** | **30.30** | **26.93** | **23.85** | **21.13** | **18.86** | **16.91** | **15.26** | **13.85** |

*Source*: *United Nations 2009. World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, can be accessed online at http://esa.un.org/unpp.

TABLE 5. LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES BY GENDER, 1980-2050 (YEARS)

| Country | 1980-1985 | | | 1985-1990 | | | 1990-1995 | | | 1995-2000 | | | 2000-2005 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Male** | **Female** | **both** | **Male** | **Female** | **both** | **Male** | **Female** | **both** | **Male** | **Female** | **both** | **Male** | **Female** | **both** |
| Algeria | 60.2 | 62.6 | 61.4 | 64.7 | 67.1 | 65.8 | 66.6 | 69.1 | 67.7 | 67.9 | 70.4 | 69.2 | 69.7 | 72.2 | 71 |
| Bahrain | 67.4 | 71.5 | 69 | 69.1 | 73.2 | 70.7 | 71.1 | 74.8 | 72.7 | 72.5 | 75.8 | 73.9 | 73.5 | 76.5 | 74.8 |
| Comoros | 51 | 55 | 53 | 53 | 57 | 55 | 56.1 | 59.9 | 58 | 58.7 | 62.7 | 60.7 | 60.9 | 65.1 | 63 |
| Djibouti | 47.1 | 50.1 | 48.5 | 48.6 | 51.6 | 50.1 | 50.1 | 53.2 | 51.6 | 51.7 | 54.9 | 53.3 | 52.4 | 55.3 | 53.8 |
| Egypt | 57 | 59.5 | 58.2 | 60.2 | 62.9 | 61.5 | 62.9 | 65.6 | 64.2 | 65.7 | 68.8 | 67.2 | 67.3 | 70.7 | 69 |
| Iraq | 58.7 | 65 | 61.6 | 57.8 | 70.5 | 63.2 | 60.2 | 73.1 | 66 | 68.1 | 73.7 | 71.1 | 67.5 | 72.6 | 70.2 |
| Jordan | 61.9 | 65.8 | 63.7 | 64.2 | 67.8 | 65.9 | 66.3 | 69.9 | 68 | 68.3 | 71.5 | 69.8 | 69.7 | 73.1 | 71.3 |
| Kuwait | 69.6 | 73.7 | 71.3 | 72.6 | 76.3 | 74.2 | 73.6 | 77.3 | 75.2 | 74.6 | 78.3 | 76.2 | 75.3 | 79.2 | 76.9 |
| Lebanon | 64.7 | 69.5 | 67 | 65.6 | 70.5 | 67.9 | 67.2 | 71.6 | 69.3 | 68.2 | 72.4 | 70.3 | 68.9 | 73.2 | 71 |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | 60.6 | 64.2 | 62.2 | 64.5 | 68.9 | 66.4 | 66.9 | 71.7 | 69 | 69.3 | 74.5 | 71.6 | 70.5 | 75.7 | 72.7 |
| Mauritania | 52.3 | 55.5 | 53.9 | 53.5 | 56.9 | 55.2 | 54.2 | 57.8 | 56 | 54.6 | 58.3 | 56.4 | 54.6 | 58.4 | 56.5 |
| Morocco | 58 | 61.5 | 59.7 | 60.9 | 64.6 | 62.7 | 63.5 | 67.5 | 65.4 | 65.6 | 69.8 | 67.7 | 67.5 | 71.8 | 69.6 |
| Palestine | 62.7 | 66.2 | 64.4 | 65.4 | 68.8 | 67 | 68.1 | 71.4 | 69.7 | 69.4 | 72.7 | 71.1 | 70.8 | 73.9 | 72.4 |
| Oman | 61.3 | 64.3 | 62.7 | 66.2 | 69.5 | 67.7 | 69.9 | 72.9 | 71.2 | 71.2 | 74.2 | 72.5 | 72.9 | 75.9 | 74.2 |
| Qatar | 65.5 | 69.8 | 67 | 66.8 | 71.3 | 68.4 | 68.4 | 73 | 69.9 | 70.8 | 74.5 | 72 | 73.4 | 75.8 | 74.2 |
| Saudi Arabia | 61.9 | 64.5 | 63.1 | 65 | 68.1 | 66.4 | 67.4 | 70.8 | 68.9 | 68.9 | 72.7 | 70.5 | 69.8 | 74 | 71.6 |
| Somalia | 42.4 | 45.6 | 43.9 | 44.4 | 47.6 | 45.9 | 41.8 | 44.9 | 43.3 | 45.3 | 48.5 | 46.9 | 47.8 | 51 | 49.4 |
| Sudan | 48.8 | 51.7 | 50.2 | 50.2 | 53.2 | 51.7 | 52 | 55.1 | 53.5 | 53.7 | 57 | 55.3 | 55.1 | 58.4 | 56.7 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 62.9 | 66.5 | 64.6 | 65.3 | 68.9 | 67 | 67.6 | 71.2 | 69.2 | 69.7 | 73.4 | 71.5 | 71.2 | 74.9 | 73.1 |
| Tunisia | 62.7 | 65.7 | 64.1 | 65.3 | 68.8 | 67 | 68.3 | 72.1 | 70.1 | 70.1 | 74 | 72 | 71.1 | 75.1 | 73 |
| United Arab Emirates | 67.1 | 71.4 | 68.6 | 69.6 | 73.6 | 71.3 | 72.3 | 76.4 | 73.7 | 74.7 | 78 | 75.9 | 75.7 | 78.5 | 76.7 |
| Yemen | 48.8 | 49.3 | 49.1 | 52.4 | 53.4 | 52.9 | 54.7 | 56.5 | 55.6 | 56.8 | 59.3 | 58 | 58.8 | 61.8 | 60.3 |
| **Total Arab Region** | **58.8** | **62.2** | **60.3** | **61.2** | **65.0** | **62.9** | **63.1** | **67.1** | **64.9** | **65.3** | **68.9** | **67.0** | **66.6** | **70.1** | **68.2** |

TABLE 5. LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES BY GENDER, 1980-2050 (YEARS) *(continued)*

| Country | 2005-2010 | | | 2010-2015 | | | 2015-2020 | | | 2020-2025 | | | 2025-2030 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Male** | **Female** | **both** | **Male** | **Female** | **both** | **Male** | **Female** | **both** | **Male** | **Female** | **both** | **Male** | **Female** | **both** |
| Algeria | 70.9 | 73.7 | 72.3 | 71.9 | 75 | 73.5 | 72.8 | 76.1 | 74.5 | 73.7 | 77.1 | 75.4 | 74.4 | 78 | 76.2 |
| Bahrain | 74.3 | 77.5 | 75.7 | 75 | 78.3 | 76.4 | 75.7 | 79.1 | 77.1 | 76.4 | 79.8 | 77.7 | 77 | 80.5 | 78.4 |
| Comoros | 63 | 67.4 | 65.1 | 64.9 | 69.5 | 67.1 | 66.6 | 71.4 | 68.9 | 68.1 | 73 | 70.5 | 69.4 | 74.4 | 71.9 |
| Djibouti | 53.9 | 56.7 | 55.3 | 55.8 | 58.5 | 57.1 | 57.7 | 60.4 | 59.1 | 59.4 | 62.3 | 60.8 | 61.2 | 64.1 | 62.6 |
| Egypt | 68.3 | 71.8 | 70 | 69.3 | 73 | 71.1 | 70.4 | 74.1 | 72.2 | 71.4 | 75.4 | 73.4 | 72.4 | 76.5 | 74.4 |
| Iraq | 63.5 | 71.7 | 67.4 | 67.7 | 72.6 | 70.2 | 68.2 | 72.9 | 70.6 | 69.3 | 74 | 71.6 | 70.5 | 75.3 | 72.8 |
| Jordan | 70.8 | 74.5 | 72.5 | 71.8 | 75.7 | 73.6 | 72.8 | 76.7 | 74.6 | 73.6 | 77.6 | 75.5 | 74.4 | 78.5 | 76.4 |
| Kuwait | 76 | 79.9 | 77.6 | 76.7 | 80.5 | 78.2 | 77.3 | 81.2 | 78.8 | 77.9 | 81.8 | 79.4 | 78.4 | 82.3 | 79.9 |
| Lebanon | 69.9 | 74.2 | 72 | 70.7 | 75.1 | 72.9 | 71.7 | 76 | 73.9 | 72.6 | 77 | 74.9 | 73.5 | 77.9 | 75.8 |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | 71.7 | 76.9 | 74 | 72.7 | 77.9 | 75 | 73.6 | 78.7 | 75.8 | 74.4 | 79.4 | 76.6 | 75.1 | 80.1 | 77.4 |
| Mauritania | 54.7 | 58.5 | 56.6 | 56.2 | 60.3 | 58.2 | 57.5 | 61.9 | 59.7 | 58.8 | 63.5 | 61.1 | 60.4 | 65.1 | 62.7 |
| Morocco | 69 | 73.4 | 71.2 | 70.2 | 74.8 | 72.4 | 71.3 | 75.9 | 73.6 | 72.3 | 76.9 | 74.6 | 73.2 | 77.8 | 75.5 |
| Palestine | 71.8 | 75 | 73.4 | 72.7 | 76.1 | 74.4 | 73.6 | 77.1 | 75.4 | 74.4 | 78 | 76.2 | 75.1 | 78.8 | 76.9 |
| Oman | 74.2 | 77.5 | 75.6 | 75.2 | 78.5 | 76.6 | 75.9 | 79.4 | 77.3 | 76.6 | 80.1 | 78 | 77.2 | 80.8 | 78.6 |
| Qatar | 74.9 | 76.9 | 75.5 | 75.6 | 77.8 | 76.3 | 76.3 | 78.6 | 77 | 76.9 | 79.4 | 77.7 | 77.5 | 80.1 | 78.3 |
| Saudi Arabia | 70.9 | 75.3 | 72.8 | 71.9 | 76.3 | 73.8 | 72.8 | 77.3 | 74.7 | 73.7 | 78.2 | 75.5 | 74.5 | 79 | 76.3 |
| Somalia | 48.2 | 51 | 49.6 | 50 | 53 | 51.5 | 51.9 | 54.9 | 53.4 | 53.8 | 57 | 55.4 | 55.7 | 59 | 57.4 |
| Sudan | 56.5 | 59.5 | 58 | 58.3 | 61.4 | 59.8 | 60.1 | 63.3 | 61.7 | 61.7 | 65 | 63.3 | 63.3 | 66.7 | 64.9 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 72.3 | 76.1 | 74.1 | 73.1 | 77.1 | 75.1 | 74 | 78 | 75.9 | 74.7 | 78.8 | 76.7 | 75.4 | 79.5 | 77.5 |
| Tunisia | 71.9 | 76 | 73.9 | 72.6 | 77.1 | 74.8 | 73.4 | 77.9 | 75.6 | 74.2 | 78.8 | 76.5 | 74.9 | 79.5 | 77.2 |
| United Arab Emirates | 76.6 | 78.8 | 77.4 | 77.3 | 79.5 | 78.1 | 77.9 | 80.2 | 78.7 | 78.4 | 80.8 | 79.2 | 79 | 81.5 | 79.8 |
| Yemen | 61.1 | 64.4 | 62.7 | 63.2 | 66.7 | 64.9 | 65.1 | 68.9 | 67 | 66.8 | 70.9 | 68.8 | 68.3 | 72.5 | 70.4 |
| **Total Arab Region** | **67.5** | **71.2** | **69.2** | **68.8** | **72.5** | **70.5** | **69.8** | **73.6** | **71.6** | **70.9** | **74.8** | **72.7** | **71.9** | **75.8** | **73.7** |

TABLE 5. LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES BY GENDER, 1980-2050 (YEARS) *(continued)*

| | 2030-2035 | | | 2035-2040 | | | 2040-2045 | | | 2045-2050 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Country** | **Male** | **Female** | **both** | **Male** | **Female** | **both** | **Male** | **Female** | **both** | **Male** | **Female** | **both** |
| Algeria | 75.2 | 78.8 | 77 | 75.9 | 79.6 | 77.7 | 76.5 | 80.3 | 78.4 | 77.1 | 80.9 | 79 |
| Bahrain | 77.6 | 81.1 | 79 | 78.2 | 81.7 | 79.5 | 78.7 | 82.3 | 80.1 | 79.2 | 82.9 | 80.7 |
| Comoros | 70.6 | 75.6 | 73.1 | 71.7 | 76.7 | 74.1 | 72.6 | 77.6 | 75.1 | 73.4 | 78.4 | 75.9 |
| Djibouti | 62.7 | 65.7 | 64.2 | 64.1 | 67.2 | 65.6 | 65.4 | 68.8 | 67.1 | 66.8 | 70.3 | 68.5 |
| Egypt | 73.3 | 77.4 | 75.3 | 74.1 | 78.3 | 76.2 | 74.9 | 79.1 | 77 | 75.6 | 79.8 | 77.7 |
| Iraq | 71.5 | 76.4 | 73.9 | 72.5 | 77.3 | 74.9 | 73.4 | 78.2 | 75.7 | 74.2 | 79 | 76.6 |
| Jordan | 75.1 | 79.3 | 77.1 | 75.8 | 80 | 77.8 | 76.5 | 80.6 | 78.5 | 77.1 | 81.3 | 79.1 |
| Kuwait | 79 | 82.9 | 80.4 | 79.5 | 83.4 | 81 | 80 | 83.9 | 81.5 | 80.5 | 84.4 | 82 |
| Lebanon | 74.3 | 78.8 | 76.6 | 75 | 79.5 | 77.4 | 75.7 | 80.2 | 78.1 | 76.4 | 80.8 | 78.7 |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | 75.8 | 80.8 | 78.1 | 76.4 | 81.4 | 78.8 | 77.1 | 82 | 79.4 | 77.7 | 82.6 | 80.1 |
| Mauritania | 62 | 66.9 | 64.4 | 63.6 | 68.5 | 66 | 65.1 | 70 | 67.5 | 66.4 | 71.3 | 68.8 |
| Morocco | 74 | 78.7 | 76.3 | 74.7 | 79.4 | 77.1 | 75.5 | 80.1 | 77.9 | 76.1 | 80.8 | 78.6 |
| Palestine | 75.8 | 79.5 | 77.6 | 76.5 | 80.2 | 78.3 | 77.1 | 80.9 | 78.9 | 77.7 | 81.5 | 79.5 |
| Oman | 77.8 | 81.4 | 79.2 | 78.3 | 82 | 79.8 | 78.9 | 82.5 | 80.4 | 79.4 | 83.1 | 80.9 |
| Qatar | 78.1 | 80.7 | 78.8 | 78.6 | 81.3 | 79.3 | 79.2 | 81.9 | 79.8 | 79.7 | 82.5 | 80.3 |
| Saudi Arabia | 75.2 | 79.7 | 77 | 75.9 | 80.4 | 77.7 | 76.5 | 81 | 78.4 | 77.1 | 81.6 | 79.1 |
| Somalia | 57.7 | 61 | 59.3 | 59.5 | 63 | 61.2 | 61.3 | 64.9 | 63.1 | 62.9 | 66.7 | 64.8 |
| Sudan | 64.7 | 68.2 | 66.4 | 66 | 69.6 | 67.7 | 67.1 | 70.8 | 68.9 | 68.2 | 71.9 | 70 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 76.1 | 80.2 | 78.1 | 76.7 | 80.9 | 78.8 | 77.4 | 81.5 | 79.4 | 77.9 | 82.1 | 80 |
| Tunisia | 75.6 | 80.2 | 77.9 | 76.3 | 80.9 | 78.6 | 76.9 | 81.5 | 79.2 | 77.5 | 82.1 | 79.8 |
| United Arab Emirates | 79.5 | 82 | 80.3 | 80 | 82.6 | 80.9 | 80.5 | 83.1 | 81.5 | 81 | 83.7 | 82 |
| Yemen | 69.6 | 74 | 71.8 | 70.8 | 75.2 | 73 | 71.8 | 76.3 | 74 | 72.7 | 77.3 | 75 |
| **Total Arab Region** | **72.8** | **76.8** | **74.6** | **73.6** | **77.7** | **75.5** | **74.5** | **78.5** | **76.4** | **75.2** | **79.3** | **77.1** |

*Source*: *United Nations 2009. World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, can be accessed online at http://esa.un.org/unpp.

TABLE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES BY BROAD AGE GROUPS

| Country | Distribution of the Population aged 0-14 | | | | | | | | | | Distribution of the Population aged 15-24 | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **1980** | **1985** | **1990** | **1995** | **2000** | **2005** | **2010** | **2015** | **2020** | **2025** | **1980** | **1985** | **1990** | **1995** | **2000** | **2005** | **2010** | **2015** | **2020** | **2025** |
| Algeria | 45.9 | 44.9 | 43.1 | 39.6 | 34.1 | 29.6 | 27 | 26.7 | 26 | 24.5 | 19.3 | 20.2 | 20.4 | 21.1 | 22.6 | 22.6 | 20.5 | 17 | 14.8 | 15.1 |
| Bahrain | 34.6 | 31.6 | 31.5 | 30.5 | 28.1 | 27.5 | 25.9 | 23.8 | 21.7 | 20.1 | 21.6 | 16.2 | 16.2 | 15.9 | 17.1 | 17.1 | 17.9 | 16.7 | 15.4 | 14.5 |
| Comoros | 46.5 | 47.5 | 46.2 | 43.5 | 39.7 | 38.4 | 38 | 37.3 | 35.3 | 32.3 | 19.5 | 19 | 19.5 | 20.8 | 22.7 | 21.8 | 19.3 | 18.4 | 18.7 | 19.7 |
| Djibouti | 45.3 | 44.5 | 44 | 43.3 | 41.2 | 38.4 | 35.6 | 33.5 | 31.9 | 30.4 | 19.5 | 20 | 20 | 19.9 | 20.2 | 21.1 | 21.6 | 20.7 | 19.4 | 18.6 |
| Egypt | 42.2 | 42 | 42.3 | 39.9 | 36.9 | 33.4 | 32.1 | 31.1 | 29.5 | 27.5 | 19.7 | 19.6 | 18.4 | 19.4 | 20.9 | 22 | 20.2 | 17.7 | 17.4 | 17.4 |
| Iraq | 46.7 | 45.8 | 45.5 | 44 | 42.9 | 41.8 | 40.7 | 37.5 | 34.9 | 32.7 | 18.3 | 20 | 21.1 | 21.2 | 20.5 | 19.9 | 19.9 | 20.7 | 20.6 | 19.7 |
| Jordan | 49.4 | 47 | 46.8 | 41.3 | 39.4 | 37.2 | 34 | 32.3 | 30.3 | 27.6 | 19.4 | 20.6 | 21.8 | 22.5 | 21.8 | 21.5 | 20.4 | 19.3 | 18.5 | 18.1 |
| Kuwait | 40.3 | 37.1 | 36.6 | 28.8 | 26 | 23.7 | 23.3 | 22.4 | 21.3 | 19.6 | 18 | 17.2 | 17.3 | 16.4 | 14.9 | 16 | 14.4 | 13.7 | 13.4 | 13.5 |
| Lebanon | 39.1 | 37.5 | 35.7 | 32.1 | 30.4 | 27.5 | 24.8 | 22.3 | 21.4 | 21 | 20.7 | 20.8 | 20.4 | 19.3 | 18.3 | 18.5 | 18 | 17.6 | 15.7 | 13.6 |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | 47.0 | 47.3 | 43.3 | 37.9 | 32.1 | 30.3 | 30.1 | 29.4 | 27.4 | 24.6 | 18.2 | 19.1 | 21.1 | 23 | 24.3 | 21.7 | 17.3 | 15.9 | 16.3 | 17 |
| Mauritania | 45.0 | 44.8 | 44.5 | 43.6 | 42.2 | 40.6 | 39.3 | 37.8 | 35.8 | 33.5 | 19.6 | 19.9 | 20 | 20.4 | 20.5 | 20.4 | 20.1 | 19.8 | 19.9 | 19.9 |
| Morocco | 42.5 | 41.6 | 39.7 | 37.4 | 33.6 | 30.3 | 28 | 26.8 | 26 | 24.5 | 20.7 | 20 | 20.2 | 20.5 | 21.1 | 21.1 | 19.7 | 17.7 | 16 | 15.5 |
| Palestine | 47.6 | 46.6 | 46.7 | 46 | 46.7 | 45.9 | 44.5 | 41.9 | 39.2 | 36.7 | 20 | 20.1 | 20.4 | 19.5 | 18.7 | 19.3 | 19.9 | 20.7 | 21.2 | 20.7 |
| Oman | 45.6 | 45.2 | 44.1 | 40.4 | 36.8 | 33.9 | 30.8 | 28.7 | 27.6 | 26.6 | 18.3 | 17.1 | 16.9 | 16.7 | 20.6 | 20.3 | 20.6 | 18.9 | 17.3 | 15.8 |
| Qatar | 32.4 | 27.6 | 27.7 | 26.5 | 25.7 | 17.9 | 16 | 16 | 16.7 | 16.3 | 19 | 15.1 | 12.5 | 14.1 | 13.9 | 18.4 | 17.9 | 11.1 | 12 | 11.6 |
| Saudi Arabia | 44.3 | 42.3 | 41.9 | 41.5 | 38 | 34.5 | 32 | 29.9 | 28 | 26.4 | 18.5 | 19.4 | 18.5 | 17.3 | 18.9 | 18.5 | 18.9 | 18.3 | 17.4 | 16.5 |
| Somalia | 46.2 | 45.1 | 44.4 | 43.3 | 44.1 | 44.6 | 44.9 | 44.4 | 43.2 | 42 | 19 | 19.5 | 19.9 | 20.6 | 19.3 | 18.3 | 18.6 | 19 | 19.8 | 20 |
| The Sudan | 44.8 | 44.7 | 44 | 43.2 | 42.2 | 40.7 | 38.7 | 36.3 | 34.1 | 32.1 | 18.8 | 19.1 | 19.4 | 19.7 | 19.9 | 20 | 20.3 | 20.6 | 20.2 | 19.4 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 49.2 | 49.4 | 48.4 | 45 | 40.7 | 36.9 | 34.7 | 34.3 | 32.2 | 28.9 | 19.5 | 19.5 | 20 | 21.5 | 23.1 | 23.1 | 20.5 | 18.2 | 18.2 | 18.8 |
| Tunisia | 42.0 | 40.1 | 38 | 34.2 | 30.1 | 25.7 | 22.9 | 22 | 21.6 | 21 | 21.1 | 20.8 | 20 | 19.8 | 20.7 | 20.9 | 19.3 | 16.1 | 13.7 | 13.1 |
| United Arab Emirates | 28.6 | 29.7 | 29.9 | 27.8 | 23.8 | 19.6 | 19.2 | 18.5 | 17.1 | 15.8 | 17.6 | 14.6 | 14.9 | 16 | 16.5 | 16.3 | 11.9 | 13.3 | 14.3 | 14 |
| Yemen | 50.8 | 51.4 | 51.7 | 49.7 | 48.2 | 45.6 | 43.4 | 41.5 | 39.8 | 37.5 | 19.9 | 19.6 | 19.4 | 18.8 | 20.3 | 21.6 | 22.1 | 21.6 | 20.5 | 20.2 |
| **Total Arab population** | **44.5** | **43.8** | **43.2** | **41.0** | **38.1** | **35.3** | **33.6** | **32.2** | **30.7** | **28.9** | **19.5** | **19.6** | **19.5** | **19.9** | **20.7** | **20.9** | **19.9** | **18.6** | **17.9** | **17.6** |

TABLE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES BY BROAD AGE GROUPS *(continued)*

| **Country** | **Distribution of the Population aged 25-64** | | | | | | | | | | **Distribution of the Population aged 65+** | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **1980** | **1985** | **1990** | **1995** | **2000** | **2005** | **2010** | **2015** | **2020** | **2025** | **1980** | **1985** | **1990** | **1995** | **2000** | **2005** | **2010** | **2015** | **2020** | **2025** |
| Algeria | 30.8 | 31.1 | 33.0 | 35.6 | 39.1 | 43.3 | 47.9 | 51.3 | 53.2 | 53.4 | 4 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 4.7 | 5 | 5.9 | 7.1 |
| Bahrain | 41.8 | 49.9 | 50.1 | 51.0 | 52.2 | 52.7 | 53.9 | 56.8 | 59.3 | 60.2 | 2.1 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 3.6 | 5.3 |
| Comoros | 31.0 | 30.6 | 31.5 | 32.5 | 34.4 | 36.7 | 39.5 | 41.2 | 42.4 | 43.9 | 3.1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 4.2 |
| Djibouti | 32.9 | 33.1 | 33.6 | 34.3 | 35.9 | 37.5 | 39.5 | 42.1 | 44.7 | 46.6 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 3 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 4.1 | 4.5 |
| Egypt | 34.6 | 34.9 | 35.5 | 36.7 | 38.0 | 40.2 | 43.1 | 45.9 | 47.2 | 48.4 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 | 4 | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 5.9 | 6.7 |
| Iraq | 31.1 | 30.6 | 30.0 | 31.5 | 33.1 | 34.9 | 36.2 | 38.6 | 40.6 | 43.6 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.2 | 3.9 | 4.1 |
| Jordan | 28.0 | 28.7 | 28.2 | 33.7 | 35.8 | 37.8 | 41.9 | 44.3 | 46.9 | 49.3 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 3.2 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 4 | 4.3 | 4.9 |
| Kuwait | 40.4 | 44.4 | 44.9 | 53.6 | 57.8 | 58.5 | 60.0 | 60.7 | 61.1 | 60.7 | 1.4 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 3.1 | 4.3 | 6.2 |
| Lebanon | 35.0 | 36.7 | 38.7 | 42.4 | 44.4 | 46.8 | 49.9 | 52.5 | 54.3 | 55.4 | 5.3 | 5 | 5.2 | 6.2 | 6.8 | 7.1 | 7.4 | 7.7 | 8.5 | 9.9 |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | 32.5 | 31.4 | 33.2 | 36.3 | 40.2 | 44.2 | 48.2 | 49.8 | 50.5 | 51.6 | 2.2 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.9 | 3.3 | 3.8 | 4.4 | 4.9 | 5.7 | 6.8 |
| Mauritania | 32.5 | 32.6 | 32.7 | 33.3 | 34.6 | 36.3 | 38.0 | 39.6 | 41.3 | 43.1 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3 | 3.4 |
| Morocco | 32.7 | 34.4 | 36.2 | 37.7 | 40.5 | 43.4 | 46.9 | 49.6 | 51.2 | 51.5 | 4.2 | 4 | 3.8 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 6.8 | 8.5 |
| Palestine | 28.9 | 29.7 | 29.5 | 30.6 | 31.1 | 31.8 | 32.7 | 34.4 | 36.4 | 38.9 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 3.5 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 3 | 3.2 | 3.7 |
| Oman | 33.8 | 35.6 | 37.1 | 41.1 | 40.5 | 43.3 | 45.4 | 48.8 | 50.5 | 51.9 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 2.6 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 4.5 | 5.6 |
| Qatar | 47.2 | 56.2 | 58.7 | 58.2 | 58.8 | 62.3 | 65.2 | 71.5 | 70.1 | 70.0 | 1.1 | 1 | 1.1 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 2.1 |
| Saudi Arabia | 34.3 | 35.9 | 37.3 | 38.8 | 40.4 | 44.2 | 46.2 | 48.4 | 50.5 | 51.9 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3 | 3.4 | 4.1 | 5.2 |
| Somalia | 31.8 | 32.4 | 32.7 | 33.3 | 33.8 | 34.3 | 33.8 | 33.9 | 34.0 | 34.7 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.7 | 3 | 3.1 |
| The Sudan | 33.4 | 33.3 | 33.5 | 34.0 | 34.7 | 35.8 | 37.4 | 39.2 | 41.4 | 43.7 | 2.9 | 3 | 3 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 4 | 4.3 | 4.7 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 28.7 | 28.5 | 28.9 | 30.7 | 33.2 | 36.9 | 41.5 | 44.1 | 45.7 | 47.4 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 3.4 | 4 | 4.8 |
| Tunisia | 33.2 | 35.0 | 37.3 | 40.2 | 43.0 | 46.8 | 51.1 | 54.7 | 56.2 | 55.9 | 3.8 | 4 | 4.6 | 5.8 | 6.3 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 7.2 | 8.4 | 10.1 |
| United Arab Emirates | 52.5 | 54.3 | 53.9 | 55.1 | 58.6 | 63.0 | 68.0 | 66.8 | 66.5 | 66.8 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 1.3 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1 | 1.4 | 2.1 | 3.3 |
| Yemen | 27.1 | 26.9 | 26.9 | 28.9 | 29.1 | 30.3 | 32.2 | 34.5 | 36.9 | 39.2 | 2.2 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.1 |
| **Total Arab population** | **32.7** | **33.2** | **34.1** | **35.6** | **37.4** | **39.9** | **42.6** | **44.9** | **46.5** | **47.8** | **3.4** | **3.3** | **3.3** | **3.5** | **3.7** | **3.9** | **4.0** | **4.3** | **4.9** | **5.7** |

*Source*: *United Nations 2009. World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, can be accessed online at http://esa.un.org/unpp.

TABLE 7. TRENDS IN DEPENDENCY RATIOS IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES, 1980-2025

| Country | Child Dependency ratio | | | | | | | | | | Old Age Dependency ratio | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2020 | 2025 | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2020 | 2025 |
| Algeria | 91 | 87 | 81 | 70 | 55 | 45 | 39 | 39 | 38 | 36 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 10 |
| Bahrain | 55 | 48 | 47 | 45 | 41 | 39 | 36 | 32 | 29 | 27 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 7 |
| Comoros | 92 | 96 | 91 | 81 | 69 | 66 | 65 | 63 | 58 | 51 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Djibouti | 86 | 84 | 82 | 80 | 73 | 66 | 58 | 53 | 50 | 47 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 7 |
| Egypt | 78 | 77 | 78 | 71 | 63 | 54 | 51 | 49 | 46 | 42 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| Iraq | 95 | 91 | 89 | 83 | 80 | 76 | 73 | 63 | 57 | 52 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Jordan | 104 | 95 | 94 | 73 | 68 | 63 | 54 | 51 | 46 | 41 | 7 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 |
| Kuwait | 69 | 60 | 59 | 41 | 36 | 32 | 31 | 30 | 29 | 26 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 8 |
| Lebanon | 70 | 65 | 60 | 52 | 49 | 42 | 36 | 32 | 31 | 30 | 9 | 9 | 10 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 12 | 14 |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | 93 | 94 | 80 | 64 | 50 | 46 | 46 | 45 | 41 | 36 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 9 | 10 |
| Mauritania | 86 | 85 | 84 | 81 | 77 | 72 | 68 | 64 | 59 | 53 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Morocco | 80 | 76 | 71 | 64 | 55 | 47 | 42 | 40 | 39 | 37 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 13 |
| Palestine | 97 | 94 | 94 | 92 | 94 | 90 | 85 | 76 | 68 | 62 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 6 |
| Oman | 87 | 86 | 82 | 70 | 60 | 53 | 47 | 42 | 41 | 39 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 8 |
| Qatar | 49 | 39 | 39 | 37 | 35 | 22 | 19 | 19 | 20 | 20 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| Saudi Arabia | 84 | 77 | 75 | 74 | 64 | 55 | 49 | 45 | 41 | 38 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 8 |
| Somalia | 91 | 87 | 84 | 80 | 83 | 85 | 86 | 84 | 80 | 77 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 |
| The Sudan | 86 | 85 | 83 | 80 | 77 | 73 | 67 | 61 | 55 | 51 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 102 | 103 | 99 | 86 | 72 | 61 | 56 | 55 | 50 | 44 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Tunisia | 77 | 72 | 66 | 57 | 47 | 38 | 32 | 31 | 31 | 30 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 12 | 15 |
| United Arab Emirates | 41 | 43 | 43 | 39 | 32 | 25 | 24 | 23 | 21 | 20 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Yemen | 108 | 110 | 112 | 104 | 98 | 88 | 80 | 74 | 69 | 63 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| **Total Arab population** | **85.21** | **82.94** | **80.57** | **73.77** | **65.62** | **58.10** | **53.75** | **50.77** | **47.76** | **44.17** | **6.48** | **6.23** | **6.11** | **6.32** | **6.40** | **6.40** | **6.37** | **6.80** | **7.65** | **8.73** |

TABLE 7. TRENDS IN DEPENDENCY RATIOS IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES, 1980-2025 *(continued)*

| | **Total Dependency ratio** | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Country** | **1980** | **1985** | **1990** | **1995** | **2000** | **2005** | **2010** | **2015** | **2020** | **2025** |
| Algeria | 99 | 95 | 87 | 76 | 62 | 52 | 46 | 46 | 47 | 46 |
| Bahrain | 58 | 51 | 51 | 49 | 45 | 43 | 39 | 36 | 34 | 34 |
| Comoros | 98 | 102 | 97 | 87 | 75 | 71 | 70 | 68 | 64 | 58 |
| Djibouti | 90 | 88 | 87 | 84 | 78 | 71 | 64 | 59 | 56 | 54 |
| Egypt | 84 | 84 | 85 | 78 | 70 | 61 | 58 | 57 | 55 | 52 |
| Iraq | 102 | 98 | 96 | 90 | 86 | 83 | 78 | 69 | 63 | 58 |
| Jordan | 111 | 103 | 100 | 78 | 73 | 69 | 60 | 57 | 53 | 48 |
| Kuwait | 71 | 62 | 61 | 43 | 38 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 35 |
| Lebanon | 80 | 74 | 69 | 62 | 59 | 53 | 47 | 43 | 43 | 45 |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | 97 | 98 | 84 | 69 | 55 | 52 | 53 | 52 | 50 | 46 |
| Mauritania | 91 | 91 | 90 | 86 | 82 | 76 | 72 | 68 | 63 | 59 |
| Morocco | 87 | 84 | 77 | 72 | 62 | 55 | 50 | 49 | 49 | 49 |
| Palestine | 104 | 101 | 100 | 99 | 101 | 96 | 90 | 81 | 74 | 68 |
| Oman | 92 | 90 | 85 | 73 | 64 | 57 | 51 | 48 | 47 | 48 |
| Qatar | 50 | 40 | 40 | 38 | 37 | 24 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 |
| Saudi Arabia | 89 | 81 | 79 | 78 | 69 | 60 | 54 | 50 | 47 | 46 |
| Somalia | 97 | 92 | 90 | 85 | 88 | 90 | 91 | 89 | 86 | 83 |
| The Sudan | 91 | 91 | 89 | 86 | 83 | 79 | 73 | 67 | 62 | 58 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 107 | 108 | 104 | 92 | 77 | 67 | 61 | 60 | 57 | 51 |
| Tunisia | 84 | 79 | 74 | 67 | 57 | 48 | 42 | 41 | 43 | 45 |
| United Arab Emirates | 43 | 45 | 45 | 41 | 33 | 26 | 25 | 25 | 24 | 24 |
| Yemen | 113 | 115 | 116 | 110 | 103 | 92 | 84 | 78 | 74 | 68 |
| **Total Arab population** | **91.69** | **89.17** | **86.67** | **80.10** | **72.02** | **64.50** | **60.12** | **57.57** | **55.41** | **52.90** |

*Source*: *United Nations 2009. World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*, can be accessed online at http://esa.un.org/unpp.

TABLE 8. ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS AT MID-YEAR

| | 1990 | | 1995 | | 2000 | | 2005 | | 2010 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Country** | **Total migrants** | **Percent Female migrants** | **Total migrants** | **Percent Female migrants** | **Total migrants** | **Percent Female migrants** | **Total migrants** | **Percent Female migrants** | **Total migrants** | **Percent Female migrants** |
| Algeria | 273,954 | 45 | 298,874 | 45 | 250,110 | 45 | 242,446 | 45 | 242,324 | 45 |
| Bahrain | 173,200 | 28 | 205,977 | 30 | 239,366 | 31 | 278,166 | 32 | 315,403 | 33 |
| Comoros | 14,079 | 52 | 13,938 | 53 | 13,799 | 53 | 13,661 | 53 | 13,525 | 53 |
| Djibouti | 122,221 | 47 | 105,192 | 47 | 110,201 | 47 | 110,333 | 46 | 114,147 | 46 |
| Egypt | 175,574 | 47 | 174,301 | 47 | 169,149 | 47 | 246,745 | 47 | 244,714 | 47 |
| Iraq | 83,638 | 33 | 133,733 | 32 | 146,910 | 31 | 128,115 | 31 | 83,380 | 31 |
| Jordan | 1,146,349 | 49 | 1,607,661 | 49 | 1,927,845 | 49 | 2,345,235 | 49 | 2,972,983 | 49 |
| Kuwait | 1,585,280 | 39 | 1,089,545 | 31 | 1,500,442 | 32 | 1,869,665 | 30 | 2,097,527 | 30 |
| Lebanon | 523,693 | 49 | 655,832 | 49 | 692,913 | 49 | 721,191 | 49 | 758,167 | 49 |
| Libyan Arab Jamahiriya | 457,482 | 35 | 505,596 | 35 | 558,770 | 35 | 617,536 | 35 | 682,482 | 35 |
| Mauritania | 93,878 | 42 | 117,580 | 42 | 62,593 | 42 | 66,053 | 42 | 99,229 | 42 |
| Morocco | 57,597 | 50 | 55,315 | 50 | 53,124 | 50 | 51,020 | 50 | 49,098 | 50 |
| Palestine | 910,637 | 49 | 1,200,972 | 49 | 1,407,631 | 49 | 1,660,576 | 49 | 1,923,808 | 49 |
| Oman | 423,572 | 21 | 582,463 | 21 | 623,608 | 21 | 666,263 | 21 | 826,074 | 21 |
| Qatar | 369,816 | 26 | 405,915 | 26 | 470,731 | 26 | 712,861 | 26 | 1,305,428 | 26 |
| Saudi Arabia | 4,742,997 | 30 | 4,610,694 | 30 | 5,136,402 | 33 | 6,336,666 | 30 | 7,288,900 | 30 |
| Somalia | 633,109 | 47 | 18,644 | 47 | 19,873 | 47 | 21,271 | 46 | 22,843 | 46 |
| Sudan | 1,273,141 | 49 | 1,111,143 | 48 | 853,867 | 48 | 639,686 | 48 | 753,447 | 48 |
| Syrian Arab Republic | 690,349 | 49 | 816,799 | 49 | 924,086 | 49 | 1,326,359 | 49 | 2,205,847 | 49 |
| Tunisia | 37,986 | 50 | 37,612 | 50 | 36,221 | 50 | 34,881 | 49 | 33,591 | 49 |
| United Arab Emirates | 1,330,324 | 33 | 1,715,980 | 30 | 2,286,174 | 28 | 2,863,027 | 28 | 3,293,264 | 27 |
| Yemen | 343,509 | 38 | 377,914 | 38 | 413,530 | 38 | 455,230 | 38 | 517,926 | 38 |
| **Total Arab region** | **15,462,385** | 38.2 | **15,841,680** | 37.1 | **17,897,345** | 37.6 | **21,406,986** | 36.2 | **25,844,107** | 36.4 |

*Source*: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009). Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008).